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Chapter 1 
Introduction: 
Theorizing Transnationalisation and Institutional Transformations 
Eveline Reisenauer and Thomas Faist 
 
 
Since the 1990s, transnational perspectives have gained increasing prominence in migration 
research and social movement studies. Yet it is above all in migration studies that not only 
issues of cross-border exchange but also problems of membership in states and thus 
institutional transformations have figured prominently. While migration studies after World 
War Two concentrated on migration as unidirectional and one-time changes in location, 
transnational approaches in migration research emphasized dynamics and changes in 
mobility, and thus new interstitial social realities of migrants. Many transnational studies 
pointed out that nowadays, due to new communication and travel opportunities, migrants 
maintain cross-border relations and ties to a higher extent than in earlier times. While the 
differences with the past may be overdrawn – for example, the masterpiece of empirical 
migration studies, The Polish Peasant in America (Thomas/Znaniecki, 1927, Vol. 5: 98-127), 
already addressed issues such as dense and continuous cross-border ties and transnational 
organisations – transnational approaches have resulted in a decisive change of perspective. 
 
So far, however, most transnational studies have focused on migrant practices and migrant 
agency but have neglected the transformation of institutions and how these changes interact 
with the transnational life worlds of migrants (for exceptions, see e.g. Bauböck, 1994 and 
Levitt/de la Dehesa, 2003; cf. Faist, 2010). A first step has been taken in pointing out that 
migrants contribute to broadening, enhancing or intensifying transformation processes which 
are already ongoing (Vertovec, 2004: 972), such as migrant financial and social remittances 
impacting upon social transformations in regions of origin, or states rethinking and reforming 
citizenship legislation. Now, we need to take the next step and ask how political, economic, 
educational and socio-cultural institutions have been challenged and transformed and how 
migrants and other actors in transnational settings are affected by institutional 
transformations. For example, in the first part of this scientific compilation the transformation 
of citizenship is analysed. It is pointed out, to what extend citizenship is challenged by 
transnational activities of migrants and what are the consequences of transnational 
citizenship for migrant sending countries. Yet political, economic, educational and socio-
cultural institutions do not only provide opportunity structures for individual or collective 
transnational practices. They are themselves transforming through transnational relations. An 
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example is, how the movement of family members to another country is affecting and 
transforming the institution of the family as explored in the chapters of part four. 
 
This introductory chapter proceeds in four steps. First, we substantiate our focus on 
institutional transformations in carrying out transnational research. This gives an opportunity 
to avoid methodological nationalism and become aware of multiple scales (local, regional, 
national, global and so forth). Thus, the contributions to this collection move on various 
scales of analysis by focusing on institutional transformations in a web of transnational 
migrant mobility and connectivity. Second, we explore our understanding of institutions in this 
collection. Institutions are conceptualised as relatively permanent social constructs that 
influence social behaviour. Third, so far most transformation theories focus on fundamental 
social transformations, either global trends in Western Europe affecting all regions of the 
world, such as the rise of capitalism or processes of globalization, or postsocialistic 
transformation in Eastern Europe. Against this backdrop, this collection addresses the nexus 
between transnationalisation – the processes of involving sustained and continuous cross-
border ties and structures – and institutional transformation in the political, economic, 
educational and socio-cultural domains. Fourth, this chapter concludes by introducing the 
contributions to this compilation. 
 
 
Starting with Institutional Transformations 
 
During the 19th and 20th century methodological nationalism has been the dominant concept 
in social science. And even in spite of the critique of methodological nationalism (e.g. 
Martins, 1974; Smith, 1979; Wimmer/Glick Schiller, 2002), sociological research is still 
influenced by the concept of the (territorial) congruence of society and national state, that is, 
nationally organised societies. Migration research, in particular, has often been limited by 
focusing on certain national or ethnic groups only, and conflates societal and state 
boundaries (cf. Weiß/Berger, 2008: 10). To give an example, Samuel N. Eisenstadt defines 
immigration as “a process of physical transition from one society to another” (1953: 169) and, 
as a result, analyses the assimilation of immigrants within their new country. Through such 
understanding, the nation-state is designed as a container in which migrants settle. It follows 
that a branch of migration research still deals exclusively with the countries of destination. 
For example, by analysing the process of acculturation and assimilation of immigrants and 
the second generation, Richard Alba focuses on the United States as an immigration society 
(Alba, 2008; Alba/Nee, 2003). As these few examples illustrate, migration research often 
keeps on with conceptualising migration as unidirectional move from one nation-state-
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
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bounded container to another and is content with capturing integration processes within 
strictly bounded nation-states. 
 
To move beyond methodological nationalism in migration research it is necessary to develop 
concepts that encompass the sending or the receiving regions of migrants and the various 
scales on which social formations can be conceptualized. "Today, global change and the 
increasing importance of transnational processes require new approaches from the sociology 
of migration." (Castles, 2003: 24) The challenge for a transnational optic is to capture 
processes and changes at various levels or scales of society. Towards this end we use the 
concept of transnational social spaces. "Transnational social spaces consist of combinations 
of sustained social and symbolic ties, their contents, positions in networks and organizations, 
and networks of organizations that can be found in multiple states. These spaces denote 
dynamic processes, not static notions of ties and positions." (Faist, 2000: 199-200) The 
sociological analysis of transnational social spaces accounts for the empirical evidence, that 
migration never could be confined to one-time and unidirectional changes from one nation-
state to another. Rather, migration processes are often characterised by multiple bi-
directional movements and relationships across borders. 
 
If we take a transnational perspective seriously we have to surpass an analytical irritation of 
social theory’s immanent methodological nationalism by focusing also on methodological 
challenges and implications for the study of transnational migration. Thus, there is not only a 
need for new terms but also for new concepts and methodological tools. Referring to Sanjeev 
Khagram und Peggy Levitt one could say that "the terms 'transnational' or 'transnationalism' 
or 'transnationality' are partly misnomers, in that the only thing we are interested in are 
dynamics across or beyond nations, states, or within the (nation-) state system. We also 
mean something else. By transnational, we propose an optic or gaze that begins with a world 
without borders, empirically examines the boundaries and borders that emerge at particular 
historical moments, and explores their relationship to unbounded arenas and processes. It 
does not take the existence of, or appropriateness of, the spatial unit of analysis for granted. 
[...] A key component of a transnational approach, however, is to interrogate the territorial 
breadth and scope of any social phenomenon without prior assumptions." (Khagram/Levitt, 
2008: 5) 
 
This compilation contains an attempt to avoid methodological nationalism and cultural 
essentialism by choosing the starting point of institutional transformations. To start with 
institutions offers the opportunity for migration research not to focus primarily on the frame of 
nation-states or ethnic groups, that is fixed territorial and societal units. Rather institutions, 
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such as citizenship, entrepreneurship, schools or families, are cross-cutting and perforating 
nation-states and affect migrants as well as non-migrants. By focusing on institutional 
transformations, the contributions to this collection discuss on which multiple scales (local, 
regional, national, global and so forth) transformations operate. Furthermore, the complex 
web of interaction between different levels will be analysed. A crucial aspect, however, is that 
transnational social spaces are not fixed entities. They can overlap and are not necessarily 
exclusive. We assume that processes of transnationalisation involve transformations of 
institutions and institutional transformations effect, in turn, transnationalisation. It is to be 
pointed out, hot transnationalisation on the one hand and institutional transformations on the 
other hand interact. Thus, the object of this volume is the nexus between transnationalisation 
and migration-related institutional transformation. 
 
For example, migration researchers consider the transformation of institutions important in a 
nation-state context, such as dual citizenship (see chapters 2 and 3) or educational 
organizations (see chapter 7 and 8). Quite often such transformations are not the result of 
international migration itself, but of changing conceptions of political community that respond 
to perceived challenges and opportunities created by migration. The contributions to this 
collection do not proclaim the end of the nation-state but explore its persistent relevance in a 
web of various scales of social formations, ranging from small groups to an emerging global 
or world society. Furthermore, they look how migrants and their often relatively immobile 
others are affected by and involved in transforming institutions. One institution, which is also 
subject of contributions in the fourth part of this collection, is the family. This example makes 
very clear that migration and transnationalisation go along with the transformation of 
institutions. Transnational family links bring forth two-way flows of financial remittances as 
well as social security practices. Furthermore, family relations and functions are changing if 
family members are separated from each other. Examples include "transnational 
motherhood" (e.g. Hondagneu-Sotelo/Avila, 1997), "transnational childhood" (Suárez-
Orozco/Suárez-Orozco, 2001) but also "transnational fatherhood" (Pribilsky, 2004). Another 
example, linked with the family, is the institution of child and elder care. As Minna Zechner in 
this collection points out, family responsibilities do not fade away when family members live 
dispersed in various countries. Rather, transnational caring became a common practice. 
 
 
The Concept of Institutions 
 
In the context of institutional transformation, it is necessary to consider not only migrant 
practices but also how these draw on and contribute to wider political, social and economic 
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processes (Vertovec, 2004). By focusing on institutional transformations in different societal 
domains, this volume aims to go beyond an exclusive focus on migrant practices. For 
Alejandro Portes (2003: 876) transnationalism "refers primarily to the cross-border activities 
of private grassroots actors, including immigrants." Accordingly, so far, most transnational 
research has focused on migrant agency.  
 
In contrast to transnational studies restricting themselves to migrant practices and migrant 
agency, the subject of the contributions to this collection is the analysis of institutional 
change in the context of transnationalisation and transnationality relating to migration and 
migrants. On the one hand, our questions refer to how institutions function, how they are 
transformed and how institutional transformations affect migrants and other actors in 
transnational settings. On the other hand, we seek to identify the ways through which 
migrants shape institutional change. "There is a point to be emphasized in analyzing the 
impact of migrant transnationalism: while not bringing about substantial societal 
transformations by themselves, patterns of cross-border exchange and relationship among 
migrants may contribute significantly to broadening, deepening or intensifying conjoined 
processes of transformation that are already ongoing" (Vertovec, 2009: 24). However, in 
analysing the nexus between migrant transnationality and institutional transformation, we ask 
how 'old' local, national and international institutions acquire 'new' meanings and functions 
and to what extent additional institutions emerge. Furthermore, deinstitutionalization and the 
limit of institutional transformation will be addressed. The focus on institutional 
transformations allows not only for looking at migrant agents but also on impacts of cross-
border movements for local and national institutions including non-migrants. By taking a 
transnational view we are interested in transformations of local, national and international 
institutions but also in the establishment of institutions on a transnational level. The 
interaction of transforming institutions on different societal levels will be of particular interest. 
 
Social institutions, in our understanding, denote regular social interactions between individual 
or collective actors in different social spheres which are guided by reciprocal expectations 
concerning specific rules based on values and norms. "Institutions are symbolic and 
behavioral systems containing representational, constitutive and normative rules together 
with regulatory mechanisms that define a common meaning system and give rise to 
distinctive actors and action routines" (Scott, 1994: 68). The crucial point is that institutions 
are relatively permanent social constructs that influence social behaviour. 
 
Moreover, institutions vary according to two dimensions: first, the degree of formalisation, 
and second, the extent of shared rules which constitute reciprocal expectations. First, 
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institutions may range from highly formalised structures and processes at one end of the 
scale to relatively informal ones at the other end. "They consist of both informational 
constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct), and formal rules 
(constitutions, laws, property rights)." (North, 1990: 97) Second, in some cases institutions 
are based on widely recognised rules delivered from traditions, conventions or even laws. 
These rules are usually backed up by several forms of social, political or legal control and 
corresponding sanctions that ensure conformity to them. In other cases institutions also 
include broader rules and routines of overall society. It does not matter if there is consensus 
about the rules in the specific situation or if consensus is only anticipated by those involved.  
 
From a societal perspective, the main function of institutions is the reduction of complexity. 
Institutions allow for stability, social order and security. They ensure that not every social 
situation has to be redefined by the actors. From the perspective of actors, institutions 
regulate behaviour and disburden individuals in certain social situations from extensive 
reflections, justifications and negotiation processes. Institutions are organizing relatively 
stable patterns of human activity (Turner, 1997: 6). At the same time, institutions make 
behaviour expectable for the opponent actor. They structure diverse situations of human 
coexistence, such as schooling (see chapter 7) or labour markets (see chapters 5 and 6), 
and thus, create anticipatory reliability for social actors (Göhler, 2004: 210). To sum up, 
institutions constrain human behaviour and make it expectable. Thus, they structure the 
political, economic, educational and socio-cultural life of migrants and other actors. However, 
it is clear that institutions cement relations of power, dominance and coercion by reproducing 
various forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1992), exclude certain persons and forms of behaviour, 
and frame perceptions and regulations of conflicts and disguise other issues of contestation 
and forms of conflictive interests. This, however, does not preclude that there are 
opportunities for agency to change institutions, albeit to varying degrees. For example, the 
contribution by Kaveri Harriss and Filippo Osella analyses strategies of parents and students 
with respect to transformations in educational institutions. And Mika Raunio focuses in his 
article on institutional entrepreneurs shaping labour markets in the case of the health care 
sector. 
 
Even if institutions seem to be durable and stable formations, they are flexible and can adapt 
to various situations. That is also the reason why they are relatively resistant to complete 
deinstitutionalisation, even if this is possible (Vester, 2009: 108). Because of the flexible 
character of institutions, it is not only revolutionary situations that bring about institutional 
change. Institutional transformation may also take place under more standard conditions. 
Transformation mostly is gradual and thus is visible only after long periods of time (Lepsius, 
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1997: 63). Following Ronald L. Jepperson, we assume that "institutions can be powerful 
sources of both stability and change." (1991: 159) Thus, the contributions to this compilation 
will analyse processes of institutional transformation over time to get aware of the stability as 
well as the dynamic of several institutions going along with transnational practices. Moreover, 
institutions often overlap and "thus constitute an order of interconnections among, and 
embeddedness in, one another." (Turner, 1997: 4) Thus, this collection does not focus only 
on individual institutions but also on nested institutions at different societal scales and their 
interaction with their social environment. For example, referring to the Indian case, S. Irudaya 
Rajan and V. J. Varghese are concerned with interrelations between transformations in the 
economic and the political domain. 
 
 
The Nexus between Transnationalisation and Institutional Transformation 
 
The contributions to this compilation do not posit a singular theory of social transformation or 
envision one transformation path for all institutions analysed in this volume. The collection 
does not claim to develop a theory of social transformation in the context of 
transnationalisation and migration. Following Wilbert E. Moore there is "no reason to expend 
a singular theory of change" (Moore, 1963: 24). Rather, the focus of this collection is on 
institutional aspects of political, economic, educational and socio-cultural transformation 
processes. Thus, the collection seeks to point out the complexity of institutional 
transformations in various societal domains. Also, the collection does not assume a direction 
of institutional transformation a priori. Transformation is neither seen as a continuous 
process like in development paradigms, nor as a linear process like in evolutionary 
approaches. The contributions to this collection focus on specific institutional transformations 
and reconstruct interrelations between institutional transformations. Whether or not 
transformations of different institutions go in the same direction or diverge is an empirical 
question and thus, the "ultimate course of each path can only be identified and described 
post hoc" (Djelic/Quack, 2007: 168). 
 
With respect to the scale on which transformations occur, there are several broad 
perspectives regarding social transformation. Paradigms taking transformations on the world 
scale as a starting point include variants of modernisation theories and globalisation 
approaches. But there are also studies to transformations in specific regions or states. 
Examples include social transformations in Western societies, such as Western Europe 
(Crouch, 1999) or the United States (Allen, 1971), but also postsocialistic transformations in 
Eastern Europe (Elster/Offe/Preuß, 1998). A classic to social transformation is Karl Polanyi's 
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"The Great Transformation" (1968). Polanyi's work on European transformations from the 
18th to the 20th century includes a historical analysis of broad political and economic macro-
processes, which led to the catastrophe of Nazism. It is not so much the particular political-
economic focus which is inspiring but the view it offers on broad changes. Social 
transformation refers to a fundamental shift in the way societal life is organised. This shift 
goes beyond the continual processes of incremental social change that are always at work, 
and implies a kind of change in which all existing social patterns are questioned and many 
are reconfigured. 
 
While Polanyi's work on European transformations is no attempt at grand theory, a branch of 
globalisation theories grasps globalization as an all-embracing change. But to describe 
transformations in an interconnected world more precisely, "globalization might be better 
conceived as a highly differentiated process which finds expression in the key domains of 
social activities" (Held et al., 2005: 12). Therefore, a transnational perspective can be 
regarded as an alternative to concepts and theories of globalization which look at the 
significance of social, economic, political and cultural transformations on a world scale. 
Transnational approaches thus emphasize the differing effects on various regions of the 
world and how factors of globalization are shaped by "not only varying economic and political 
structures, but also specific historical experiences, philosophical and religious values, cultural 
patterns, and social relationships." (Castles, 2001: 22) Thus, they seek to explore how 
already existing social patterns react to global forces and transnational challenges. 
 
In this collection we consider the concept of institutional transformations in different domains 
as an adequate starting point for two reasons. First, from a methodological point of view, we 
do not presuppose fixed spatial or societal units, such as the national or the global. Instead, 
by focusing on institutional transformations, we start without prior assumptions about such 
units but then we empirically examine which boundaries and borders emerge in the course of 
institutional transformation. Thus, the goal of a transnational methodology is to get aware of 
various scales and levels of society. Second, this volume provides a contribution to the 
deeper understanding of parallel and interrelated processes of transnationalisation and 
institutional transformation. To discern processes of migrant transnationalisation we focus on 
transformations of distinct institutions in the political, economic, educational and socio-
cultural domain. In order to speak of transformation, changes need to be significant in these 
domains. The contributions to this collection focus on both, transnationalisation as condition 
of institutional change and influences of institutional change on transnationalisation. 
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This collection aims to analyze not only established and relatively stable institutions but also 
the emergent and transformational character of institutions. Thus, we do not take particular 
institutions for granted but rather stress the process of institutionalization. According to 
Ronald L. Jepperson, "Institution represents a social order or pattern that has attained a 
certain state or property; Institutionalization denotes the process of such attainment." (1991: 
145) In this collection we ask how institutional transformation is occurring. Focusing 
institutions as socially constituted constructs allows for a better understanding of four aspects 
of institutional transformation. First, we deal with changes in 'old' institutions. The question 
arises how existing institutions are transformed by transnational challenges. One example is 
how transnational migration is affecting territorial borders and hence how nation-states 
redefine themselves. Second, the emergence of 'new' institutions can be observed. In this 
collection the construction and establishment of transnational institutions, such as hometown 
associations, will be of special interest. The relevant question is what drives the increasing 
spatial reach of such institutions. We will also ask for the agents' role engaged in these 
processes. Third, we mainly focus on processes of institutionalization yet give also room for 
processes of deinstitutionalisation. The disappearance of institutions without being replaced 
by new institutions also needs to be addressed. For example, due to a depopulation of 
emigration regions, the infrastructure in these regions could be declining. For example, we 
may observe the gradual disappearance of schools. Fourth, another question concerns the 
reinforcement of old institutions. This type allows for the fact that not all institutions are 
transformed, replaced or dissolved in the course of transnationalisation but continue to exist 
in their traditional form. In this case institutions may not meet the needs of migrants or even 
pathologize or exclude them. 
 
 
Institutional Transformations in Four Domains 
 
The nexus between transnationalisation and institutional transformation described above 
provides the common perspective of all contributions in this scientific compilation. However, 
the individual chapters offer a range of diverse topics and analyze disparate institutions. 
Three characteristics stand out. First, this collection brings together researchers from 
multiple disciplines, including sociology, cultural studies, political science, economics, and 
education. Second, the collection includes authors from different countries, located in 
Europe, Asia and Africa. Third, the following parts illustrate the simultaneous processes of 
transnationalisation and institutionalization in the political, economic, educational and socio-
cultural domain, in which the authors deal with central societal institutions. Examples relate 
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to different institutions, such as citizenship, labour migration, education, family and social 
security. 
 
In the first part of this compilation transformations of state institutions are discussed. The 
article by Jürgen Gerdes and Thomas Faist on transnational citizenship considers the 
prospects, dimensions and the extent of citizenship transformations transcending nation-
state borders and boundaries. Their main argument, from a conceptual and analytical 
viewpoint, is that a reasonable account of citizenship transformation should take into account 
more systematically and simultaneously different dimensions of change. 
 
Ahmet İçduygu and Deniz Sert focus on dual citizenship as key component of emigration-
related policies of migrant sending countries in order to enhance the transnational ties 
between their emigrant citizens with the homeland. By analysing the dual citizenship 
regulations of Turkey and Morocco, they emphasize a transformation of migrant sending 
states’ dual citizenship regimes. While in a first period the politics of citizenship only dealt 
with national interests, a second period is characterized by transnational influences. 
 
From the perspective of polities Leif Kalev, Mari-Liis Jakobson, and Rein Ruutsoo ask 
whether the transforming political spaces maintain their coherence effectiveness in 
governance and democratic citizenship. Even if there are opportunities for transnational 
political spaces to develop and to enrich political structures, their main finding is that the 
transnational political spaces are not likely to replace states as the core of polities in 
foreseeable future. 
 
The contributions to the second part of this volume engage with institutional transformations 
in the economic domain. As in the article of Ahmet İçduygu and Deniz Sert the focus of the 
contribution by S. Irudaya Rajan and V.J. Varghese is on the sending country context. 
Drawing on the Indian-Punjabi experience, they trace on the role of the state in formalizing 
transnational economic spaces, what they call the Indian national regime of transnationalism. 
They argue that institutional transformation in terms of alterations in administrative 
frameworks as a result of the potentiality of transnational resources has resulted in changes 
at the national, sub-national and local level. 
 
Whereas the previous contribution is concerned with the role of the state in economic 
processes, the article by Mika Raunio approaches the economic domain from an agency 
point of view. Based on the example of health care as specific field of employment he 
analyzes the institutional transformation of transnational labour markets. In this context Mika 
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Raunio understands transformation as the process, in which institutionalized national 
patterns of recruitment are becoming more transnationalised. The emphasis of this 
contribution lies on institutional entrepreneurs who aim to change existing institutional 
patterns such as recruitment. 
 
Part three deals with transformations of educational institutions. Based on the example of 
India, Kaveri Harriss and Filippo Osella discuss transformations taking place in educational 
institutions in relation to transnationalism. They analyse how colonial and post-colonial 
transformations in education as well as the global production of educational regimes 
influence educational strategies of parents and students. They point out that history provides 
complex contexts that are variously reinforced or reworked in unpredictable, unstable ways. 
Kaveri Harriss and Filippo Osella conclude with comments on the implications of 
transnational education for social development. 
 
In her article about education Devorah Kalekin-Fishman argues that in a globalizing world, 
school populations are becoming more diverse. Teachers will be able to facilitate 
cosmopolitanism in education only if (a) they find ways to deal with the tensions between the 
goals of the nation-state, and the growing transnational reality in schools; and (b) they 
discover that the professional repertoire they command for promoting excellence in learning 
fits in with a program that promotes cosmopolitanism in education. 
Part four of the compilation analyses various examples of institutional transformation in the 
socio-cultural domain. In the first contribution to this part Pauliina Järvinen-Alenius, Pirkko 
Pitkänen and Anna Virkama point out that social remittances are not only transferred from 
countries of immigration to migrants’ homelands but also in the opposite direction. Moreover, 
social remittances are transferred to relatives, friends or colleagues in third countries. To 
take into account these multi-sited trajectories, the focus of analysis is on the flows of social 
remittances in transnational social spaces. Drawing on empirical examples concerning 
family, work and politics, the authors explore how social remittances affect the transformation 
of existing institutions. 
 
Minna Zechner’s analysis to the care of children and older persons traces the interrelation of 
care policies and transnational care practices. Care policies on the one hand are supporting 
social care within the territory of the nation-state. The idea of welfare is to secure the citizens 
or inhabitants of a nation-state from certain social risks. Social care practices of migrants on 
the other hand are not restricted to territorial borders. When family members migrate to 
another country family responsibilities, like care, do not fate away. Rather migrants continue 
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to perform social care for children and elders back home. Minna Zechner asks how such 
transnational care practices are supported or hindered by national care policies. 
 
In her contribution Laura Huttunen gives preference to “emplacement” over concepts of 
“integration” or “belonging” to capture dynamics and nuances of relationships to place. 
Emplacement is understood as a complex process of interlinking everyday life activities and 
mundane practices with various local and global structures and policies. Laura Huttunen 
sees the family as the central institution structuring processes of emplacement. To analyse 
emplacement within transnational social spaces she looks at both, transnational families and 
families engaged in transnational practices. 
 
Also the final article by Noureddine Harrami focuses on the institution of the family. Based on 
ethnographic data about Moroccan migrants in the South-West of France, the contribution 
deals with the transformation of the family in the context of transnational migration.  
According to Noureddine Harrami the fundamental function of the familial institution is 
socialization. On the basis of the examples of religious issues and gender issues concerning 
young girls' conditions he analyzes cultural transmissions within the family. For example, it is 
described how rules of honour are changing under the condition of transnational social 
supervision. 
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TRANSFORMATION OF STATE INSTITUTIONS 
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Chapter 2 
Transnational Transformations of Citizenship 
Jürgen Gerdes and Thomas Faist 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Today, we are witnessing increasingly forces and developments transcending the reach and 
borders of nation states, such as economic and cultural globalization, a growing influence of 
multilateral policy regimes and international organizations, transnational social movements 
and migrant transnational practices, which, although in different ways, challenge and change 
the well established institution of national citizenship. These cross-border realities pose 
fundamental challenges to traditional citizenship because it is based essentially on the 
assumption of a congruence of continuous residence in a given territory, a shared collective 
identity and participation in and subjection to a common jurisdiction. These challenges 
meanwhile have led to many different, mostly more theoretical, accounts of citizenship 
beyond the nation state, such as, to name the most prominent terms, postnational, 
transnational and cosmopolitan citizenship. Empirically, the most visible expression in terms 
of a corresponding legal status, apart from European citizenship, is the increasing incidence 
of dual citizenship, which meanwhile is tolerated in some form by more than half of all the 
states in the world (Faist & Gerdes, 2008). The aim of this chapter is to clarify the prospects, 
dimensions and the extent of citizenship transformations beyond and transcending the nation 
state and how these are portrayed by influential theoretical accounts. The scope of the article 
is, however, confined to some conceptual considerations concerning the different aspects, 
dimensions and mechanisms of institutional change with regard to citizenship as one of the 
most important meta-institution1 in liberal and democratic societies. 
 
The chapter proceeds in five steps. In order to get a solid basis for the question of 
institutional transformation, we, first, recapitulate the essential features of the concept of 
citizenship, which is essentially tied to the borders and boundaries of nation-states. 
                                               
1
 We call citizenship a meta-institution because it is based on a host of other institutions relating to the whole 
process of representative democracy, effective governance and definitions and enforcement of individual basic 
rights, such as political parties, parliaments, governments, courts and other adminstrative bodies.    
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Citizenship, as it has been developed as membership in liberal democratic nation states, 
comprises three important dimensions: it builds on democratic self-determination of the 
people, equal individual rights and obligations, and membership in a political community. 
Although different understandings of citizenship usually accentuate these dimensions 
differently – for example, while republican approaches highlight citizens’ activities and 
responsibilities, liberal accounts emphasize citizens’ rights – one important question is how 
far these different components can be disaggregated without making the use of the concept 
itself meaningless. Second, concerning citizenship transformation we begin with the 
empirical significant case of increasing tolerance of dual citizenship. Even if dual citizenship 
creates potentially overlapping rights and practices that reflect a simultaneous belonging of 
migrants to two different nation states, we argue, that the transformational reach of dual 
citizenship should not be overestimated, because al least some nation-state based functions 
and justifications are still at work. Third, we elaborate the boundaries of national citizenship 
and the conditions of access to or maintenance of it and how these have changed in recent 
years. Changing rules towards toleration of dual citizenship, however, have to be related to 
other changes of citizenship law rules. While some authors seem to think that the growing 
tolerance of dual citizenship in itself indicates an increasing permeability of nation-state 
borders, we argue that this is only one factor which has to be counted against other trends 
towards more restrictive conditions of citizenship acquisition, especially in European 
immigration states. Fourth, we inspect some theoretical accounts of citizenship which are 
announced to transcend the national concept. Most of the concepts of trans- and 
postnational citizenship focus, however, on only one or two components of citizenship but 
neglect the other(s) or derive from changes in only one dimension a transformation of 
citizenship also in its other features. For example, some of these approaches predominantly 
refer to changes of nation and collective identity but suggest a much more far-reaching 
change concerning the territorial reach of governance and the transnational origin of 
individual rights. Our main argument is, derived from an immanent critique of prominent post- 
and transnational theories, that the dimensions of change should be distinguished much 
more systematically. On closer inspection, it turns out that what is advocated as citizenship 
beyond nation-states refers in different ways back to existing nation-states: For instance, an 
important share of transnational political practices are targeted at national publics, parties 
and governments; cosmopolitan norms and human rights are often dependent to be 
implemented in nation-state institutions; and a transformation of collective identity from a 
particularistic and homogeneous national culture to a multicultural self-understanding does 
not necessarily imply the erosion of state borders. Therefore, we argue that it is misleading to 
think of a gradual replacement of national citizenship in favour of trans- or postnational 
citizenship, at least in a collective dimension. Fifth, we content that efforts to investigate 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 23 
citizenship transformations are insufficient if they are focussing only on questions of 
inclusion, access conditions and changing political spaces, as it is the case with regard to 
some accounts of European citizenship. Rather the question of a changing substance of 
citizenship in terms of the scope and level of individual rights as usually granted to all 
persons on an equal basis should be included as well as the issue of possible 
interdependencies between these two factors. Finally, we conclude that, all in all, the 
institution of citizenship seems to be today in a somewhat dilemmatic situation. The reach of 
problems to be regulated by effective political action surpasses the political capacities of 
nation states, while the democratic resources on the level of nation states are increasingly 
undermined.    
 
 
II. The Concept of National Citizenship 
 
In essence, citizenship comprises three important dimensions: it builds on democratic self-
determination of the people, equal individual rights and obligations, and membership in a 
political community. In the first dimension citizenship means above all the principle of unity of 
both those governing and those being governed, whatever forms the democratic procedures 
of each state may take in detail. Ideally, citizens endowed with equal political liberty obey the 
laws in the creation of which they have participated and to whose validity they thus consent 
(Walzer, 1989). Without democratic procedures guiding citizens’ political self-determination, 
citizenship would mean little more than members of political communities being subjects of a 
sovereign. The second dimension of citizenship refers to the constitutions of modern states 
which enshrine human and fundamental rights of liberty as a legal status. In general, citizens’ 
rights fall into various realms, for example, civil or negative rights to liberty, political rights to 
participation such as the right to vote and to associate, and social rights including the right to 
social benefits in case of sickness, unemployment, old age, and the right to education 
(Marshall: 1992). The duties corresponding to citizens’ rights are the duty to serve in the 
armed forces in order to protect state sovereignty against exterior threats, while the duty to 
pay taxes, to acknowledge the rights and liberties of other citizens, and to accept 
democratically legitimated decisions of majorities structure the internal sphere. In a third 
dimension, citizenship rests on an affinity of citizens with certain political communities, the 
partial identification with and thus loyalty to a self-governing collective, often a nation or a 
multi-nation (cf. Weber, 1972: 242-244). In modern national states, citizens identify with a 
self-governing collective which claims to establish a balance between the individual and 
common interests on the one hand and rights and responsibilities within the political 
community on the other. Affiliation with a collective expressed as a set of relatively 
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continuous, social, and symbolic ties of citizens otherwise anonymous to each other, is linked 
to the status dimension of citizenship because of reciprocal obligations of members in a 
political community. Solidarity and reciprocity are deemed as a requirement for peaceful 
coexistence and welfare state redistribution. During processes of nation-building, this logic of 
internal inclusion, however, has always been accompanied with forces of social closure and 
thus of arbitrary and often violent external exclusion of “others” at the same time. However, 
due to the dominance of a legitimation horizon of equality, basic rights and democracy today, 
it seems that the only candidate of exclusion remain the non-citizen. 
 
From a sociological perspective, citizenship as well as its transformations can be analysed in 
each of these dimensions separately. Accordingly, Isin and Turner (2002: 4) distinguish three 
axels of analysis: first, the “extent” of citizenship meaning the rules and practices of inclusion 
and exclusion; second, its “content” in terms of rights and obligations accrued to citizens; 
and, finally, the “depth” of citizenship referring of the degree of citizens’ identifications with 
the political community and the form and thickness of collective identity. In a similar vein, 
Joppke (2010) in a recent book analyses citizenship changes in Western immigration 
countries in relation to three broad realms: status, rights and identity. Moreover, he rightly 
points out, that an adequate analysis of citizenship transformations should also be concerned 
with “internal relationships and possible connections between the developments across 
these dimensions”, which has rarely been done to date (Joppke 2010: 31). While it is 
certainly important to grasp the different dimensions of citizenship transformations and their 
interrelations, it is somewhat striking that the political dimension of democratic participation 
within a governmental structure, which can be regarded as the essence of citizenship by 
distinguishing pure subjects of political rule from citizens partaking in political self-
determination, is missing in these announced research agendas. From a political 
perspective, the institution of citizenship is tied essentially to the idea of collective autonomy 
and core principles of democratic legitimacy. Citizens view themselves as equal members of 
a political community, who by means of democratic procedures and institutions within a self-
governing unit continuously try to regulate the different matters generally conceived as 
problems in the different areas of society, to provide for collective goods and, not least, to 
secure and enforce the individual rights of its members (Habermas, 1996; 2001). That 
certainly does not mean that real political processes proceed necessarily along these ideal 
lines, but rather that democratic legitimacy, from the perspective of citizens, serve as a 
yardstick to assess the political process regarding its input (democracy) and its output (the 
provision of collective goods and ensuring justice).  
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Because we are concerned with a perspective of citizenship transformation, we depart from 
citizenship as an institution of the nation state. On the other hand, as it has been argued in 
the case of European citizenship, “methodological nationalism” should be avoided implying 
that new developments regarding citizenship should not be assessed according to criteria of 
traditional national citizenship (Beck & Grande, 2005; Wiener 2007). However, the idea of 
political self-determination together with individual rights and obligations as well as collective 
identity can still be seen as key components of citizenship which have to be considered in 
transformation analysis, irrespective of the fact that they have been aggregated historically 
and somewhat successfully in territories of nation states, amalgamated with national 
ideologies of cultural homogeneity and exclusion of others. Concerning access conditions of 
citizenship, a “transnational perspective”, however, should be concerned not only with 
processes of “de-ethnization” and “re-ethnization” (cf. Joppke 2010) or the “making and 
unmaking of ethnic boundaries” (cf. Wimmer 2008), but also with the drawing and re-drawing 
of borders and boundaries which are not primarily of an ethnic or national kind but rather 
have geographical, political, economic and social dimensions and which might change the 
distribution as well as the scope of rights for different groups.         
 
Although we will argue below that the two basic realms of citizenship transformation, 
conditions of access and content of rights, often overlap und may have mutual 
consequences, they first should be distinguished and considered separately. We will begin 
with some considerations on the transformation of the border and boundary dimension in one 
of its most obvious empirical case, the rise of dual citizenship, and will then later also focus 
on the dimension of content or substance of citizenship and how that has changed. 
 
 
III. Increasing Permeability of National Membership Boundaries through Growing 
Tolerance of Dual Citizenship? 
 
There is an exponential rise of countries with legislation allowing dual citizenship, showing 
the strongest growth in the last fifteen years (Brøndsted Sejersen, 2008; Faist and Gerdes, 
2008). In Western European states the acceptance of dual citizenship has grown even more; 
meanwhile about two third of these countries tolerate dual citizenship (Howard, 2005). That, 
certainly, is an important as well as far-reaching transformation of citizenship, because 
national citizenship until very recently was deemed as essentially exclusive and there were 
many provisions in national citizenship laws as well as in international conventions aimed at 
avoiding the incidence of dual citizenship as far as possible. While some authors seem to 
think that the growing tolerance of dual citizenship indicates an increasing permeability of 
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nation-state borders in general (cf. Bauböck, 1994, 2003), we argue that this is only one 
factor which has to be counted against other contradicting aspects and trends which express 
or stress the national perspective. Especially two of these should be considered in the 
context of citizenship transformation. First, dual citizenship can have different meanings and 
functions in different political settings. In order to discover those differences it is helpful to 
consider also the different justifications as they appear in the corresponding political 
processes. Second, the increasing tolerance of dual citizenship has been accompanied with 
citizenship law policies in European immigration states which made the conditions of 
citizenship acquisition in some other items much more restrictive than before.  
 
Concerning the first issue, it should not be neglected that the states allowing for dual 
citizenship often justify that due to reasons based on national factors, such as national 
interests, nation-state-based democracy, equal rights and immigrant integration, although 
acceptance of dual citizenship from the perspective of the migrants concerned might imply a 
kind of official and legal recognition of their transnational relations and certainly can have 
substantial effects in terms of rights and benefits for them. As studies on the political 
processes of citizenship legislation in immigration states show, most of the arguments of 
those who were in favour of tolerance of dual citizenship have been raised the issue in the 
context of efforts to increase the naturalization rates of permanent immigrants (Gerdes and 
Faist, 2007). That has been justified with reference to the basic legitimation principles of 
nation-states: individual rights and democracy. Full legal and political inclusion of long-term 
immigrants by means of citizenship acquisition was viewed as a question of their equal and 
basic rights that also has a high symbolic value by demonstrating their legitimate 
membership status for themselves as well as the majority population. The democracy-related 
argument was that those who are concerned by political decisions should be able, by means 
of the full franchise, to participate in its development. Also nation-state-based institutions 
such as constitutions and courts essentially contributed to the acceptance of dual citizenship. 
For example, the principle of gender equality and its interpretation as superior to the political 
aim of avoiding dual citizenship was one of the most influential factors in this respect, 
whereby the transmission of citizenship at birth from both parents in cases of bi-national 
marriages was legalized. The corresponding situation in emigration countries, however, is 
somewhat different. Recent policies and citizenship law reforms in emigration states indicate 
a clearer trend towards an expansion of political communities beyond the nation-state 
borders and to promote what is called “external citizenship” (Barry, 2006). Many migrant 
sending states have revised their laws towards acceptance or even embracing dual 
citizenship and grant to an increasing degree political voting rights by citizens residing 
abroad. By this means, they obviously try to maintain closer relations to their emigrant 
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communities abroad because they expect migrants’ contributions concerning economic 
development in terms of migrant remittances and investments and as political lobby groups 
advancing the related emigration county’s interests and images in international relations. 
However, even in this case nation-states are seriously involved insofar as the acceptance of 
dual citizenship, including its related rights and practices, at least in many cases, did not 
happen because of the legitimate interests of transnational migrants but rather in the name of 
national interests (cf. Bosniak 2003; Smith 2003; Faist, 2007).  
 
Regarding the second aspect, several European immigration states have introduced more 
restrictive requirements of citizenship acquisition, including, for example, more demanding 
language skills, knowledge of the state’s society and history and constitutional system and 
more explicit confessions to the public values, more demanding standards of economic self-
sufficiency and absence of criminal records, and the adoption of citizenship tests (Joppke 
2007; Jacobs & Rea 2007). In cases of so-called integration failures according to these 
criteria, some countries, as for instance the Netherlands and Germany, introduced legal 
sanctions in terms of the immigrants’ prospects to gain secure residence permits and to be 
eligible to naturalization. In general, these trends signify a far-reaching shift concerning the 
perception of the relation of integration and citizenship acquisition. While many European 
immigration states in the 1980s and 1990s still regarded naturalization as a precondition or 
means of immigrant integration, now a conception of citizenship acquisition as a reward for 
successful efforts of integration on the part of immigrants seems to prevail (Bauböck et. al. 
2006, Jurado, 2008).  
 
From this it follows that the question of the permeability of nation-state boundaries and 
borders cannot be reduced to the issue of dual citizenship, but rather has to include more 
general developments as well as the different functions of dual citizenship in the context of 
particular understandings of national citizenship. However, even if the changes connected to 
increasing tolerance of dual citizenship, because it simply combines national citizenships, do 
not directly or substantially contribute to transformations towards post- or transnational 
citizenship there might be other factors, forces and developments in this direction (cf. 
Bosniak 2003). Therefore, in the next section we will change our focus to theoretical and 
conceptual accounts of citizenship transformation beyond the borders and boundaries of 
national citizenship. 
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IV. Post- and Transnational Citizenships 
 
There are different theories and concepts with titles announcing a transformation 
transcending the nation state concept. The most prominent are postnational, transnational 
and cosmopolitan citizenship. Because accounts with the same title partly differ significantly 
regarding their main thesis, in the following, the arguments of some theories will be 
discussed independently of their respective title. These concepts mostly contain both 
descriptive statements about the factual development of political institutions related to 
aspects of citizenship, on the one hand, and normative assertions how to revise the 
institution of citizenship in order to cope with challenges that democratic nation-states face 
with respect to processes of international migration, globalization and transnationalization, on 
the other hand.  
 
To begin with, in some cases these approaches seem mainly concerned with transformations 
of collective identity in immigration states as from previously based on rather thick, 
particularistic and homogeneous cultures to more pluralistic, ethnic-neutral, multicultural and 
political conceptions of shared identity. For example, Bader discusses under the heading of 
‘transnational citizenship’ the issue of a decoupling of ‘ethnos’ and ‘demos’ and the many 
questions arising in the face of increasing cultural diversity within the boundaries of 
demarcated nation-states. Bader (1997: 780) proposes a far-reaching “disentanglement of 
democratic citizenship from ethnic languages, history, and cultures” which is considered 
necessary in order to live up to substantial individual equality and fair democracy. The 
problems of cultural justice for national and ethnic minorities and the official recognition of 
difference in terms of cultural backgrounds, practices and religions, which Bader discusses, 
are very similar to those that have been raised in the context of multicultural politics of 
recognition (Taylor, 1993) and under the heading of ‘multicultural citizenship’(Kymlicka, 
1995). According to the general thesis of multicultural citizenship, the established ‘colour-
blind’ institutional framework of liberal democratic states which grant individual and formal 
rights irrespective of the particular characteristics and identities of persons (such as ethnicity 
and gender) is insufficient to fully accommodate ethnic and national minorities because these 
institutions as well as the political cultures are biased in favour of the dominant classes or 
majority’s ethnicity and religion. Because of that, multicultural theorists argue for providing 
group-differentiated rights as an extension of formal citizenship, such as exemption rights for 
minority religious practices within official institutions and special representation rights for 
cultural minorities. Obviously, the kind of transformation that is announced with the use of the 
word transnational citizenship in this case is related to a changing understanding of (ethnic) 
nation rather than that of state. While such a transformation of collective identity, including 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 29 
political consequences such as the introduction of multicultural group-differentiated rights, 
certainly is an important change, it does not, however, lead automatically to a threat of 
nation-states’ sovereignty to maintain territorial borders and to define membership 
boundaries.  
 
The most prominent concept of postnational citizenship also seems predominantly 
concerned with the nationalist imperatives of nation-states. Y. Soysal’s (1994) account of 
citizenship transformation starts with the empirical observation that in immigration states 
there is a dwindling influence of shared nationhood and national belonging on the definition 
of individual rights and membership boundaries. As she puts it: "Postnational citizenship 
confers upon every person the right and duty of participation in the authority structures and 
public life of a polity, regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that community." (Soysal, 
1994: 3) It is mainly the fact that immigration states have gradually granted to their 
immigrants increasing individual rights which previously have been tied to citizenship that 
has inspired her theory: "Rights that used to belong solely to nationals are now extended to 
foreign populations, thereby undermining the very basis of national citizenship." (Soysal, 
1994: 137) Up to this point, the postnational citizenship approach seems to indicate nothing 
more than a nation-state-internal revision of collective identity or a reformulation of the terms 
of legitimate belonging as a basis for access to individual rights. In this sense, the 
transformation in question might be interpreted as somewhat analogues to a transformation 
from an ethno-cultural concept of nationhood, which is primarily based on common descent 
and cultural similarity, toward a republican or civic understanding of political community, 
where access to membership is essentially derived from residence and the will of the 
individual persons to join the political community (for this ideal-typically distinction see 
especially Brubaker, 1992). Such a transformation from ethno-cultural to republican nation, 
for instance, has happened in Germany during the last ten to fifteen years (Weinbach, 2005; 
Gerdes, Rieple and Faist, 2007).   
 
However, the postnational model, when it comes to the proposed explanation of this 
transformation, makes an additional claim which transcends the territorial space of 
established nation-states, because the sources of this transformation are essentially located 
outside the nation-states. The postnational approach contents that the development of 
citizenship rights for non-citizens originate from fundamental changes of the international 
political order since World War Two, which can best be described as an increasing 
decoupling of rights and obligations on the one hand and collective identity and national 
membership on the other. While some postnationalists detect the main aspect in the 
proliferation of international conventions and treaties relating to universal human rights (e.g. 
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Jacobsen, 1996), Soysal refers not only to such institutional factors of international law but 
also to softer forces such as increasing transnational discourses on universal human rights 
from several collective actors, which significantly form public opinion and delegitimize 
practices of unequal treatment and marginalisation of categories of persons according to 
ascriptive criteria. According to Soysal, the emergence of individual rights for immigrants 
indicates that rights traditionally tied to national citizenship are no longer granted on the basis 
of territory and on membership within a shared nationhood. To underpin her thesis of a 
postnational membership based on general human rights, which increasingly led to equal 
treatment of migrants and nationals within nation states in the postwar era, and to illustrate „a 
proliferation of transnational arrangements, grounded in human rights discourse, that 
address the rights and interests of migrants and refugees“ (1994: 149), Soysal epecially 
refers to several conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Council of 
Europe, The Geneva Convention on the Legal Status of Refugees (1951) and UN 
conventions regarding international migration and the rights of immigrants. She explicitly 
rejects the view that these transformations could be interpreted at least partly as a revision or 
reformulation of national citizenship: “As I see it, the incorporation of guestworkers is no 
mere expansion of the scope of national citizenship ... Rather, it reveals a profound 
transformation in the institution of citizenship, both in its institutional logic and in the way it is 
legitimated. To locate the changes, we need to go beyond the nation state.“ (Soysal, 1994: 
139) 
 
Hence, the main postnational thesis seems to be that, first and foremost, international norms 
and institutions exert pressure on nation states’ sovereignty toward granting individual rights 
to migrants. Such an interpretation, however, neglects or at least underestimates the values 
and norms of liberal democratic states, which are anchored in their domestic constitutions 
and institutions, namely democracy and basic individual rights. In liberal democratic states, 
some general human rights (such as security of the person, freedom of faith and conscious) 
are not restricted to citizens and legal residents, but are granted to all human beings, even to 
tourists. Regarding the improved rights status of permanent residents, which has been 
denoted as ‘denizenship’ (Hammar, 1990), the postnational membership model with its only 
reference to international and universal human rights, as it has been objected (cf. Joppke, 
1998: 24ff.), cannot fully explain differences of alien policies and laws between immigration 
countries as well as legal distinctions of resident status of different categories of immigrants. 
One can go even so far to say that the contention that the rights of denizens are neither tied 
to territory nor to the societal community of the respective state ignores the real origin of the 
denizenship status. This is not to deny the influence of international human rights 
conventions and discourses which certainly also contributed in some way or other to the 
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improvement of non-citizens’ resident status and the corresponding individual rights. 
However, human rights are usually formulated in a rather general and abstract way so that 
they have to be interpreted in relation to concrete situations by parliaments, courts and in the 
general public. These complex institutional structures of interpretation and balancing different 
basic rights, the rights of different individual persons, and rights vis-à-vis important collective 
aims are still primarily available on the nation state level. There are many indications, that 
denizen rights should rather be interpreted as essentially ‚membership-specific-rights‘, 
because they are granted to immigrants to an increasing degree the longer they reside and 
the more social ties to the societal community they presumptively have developed. Especially 
in relation to binding definitions and enforcement of non-citizen rights, as it has been showed 
(e.g. Joppke, 1999; Guiraudon, 1998), administrative and constitutional courts, located at the 
national level, have played a pivotal role in extending basic rights of migrants against state 
interests. For instance, courts have often overruled administrative deportation decisions on 
grounds of long-term residence and in the case of existing family ties. Even in cases, where 
international organizations and international norms played a certain role, as for example in 
relation to rules of citizenship acquisition in nationality laws of those states which became 
independent after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the related justifications emphasized 
the principle of “genuine link” between certain states and persons, which have to be 
respected (cf. Orentlicher, 1998). Joseph Carens has argued for a very simple moral 
principle, which relates to the rights of non-citizens as well as their claims to naturalization: 
“Living in a society on an ongoing basis makes one a member of that society. The longer one 
stays, the stronger one’s connections and social attachments. For the same reason, the 
longer one stays the stronger one’s claim to be treated as a full member.” (Carens, 2005: 33) 
According to Carens, this principle, by and large, is also guiding existing practices and 
policies in liberal democracies, even if it is not applied to a desirable extent and in all cases. 
Likewise Kymlicka (2003: 289) argues that residence-based rights and citizenship acquisition 
should not be regarded as alternatives: “The rights of aliens are defended as ‘protocitizen’ 
rights, in recognition of partial integration, and as a step toward fuller national integration.”   
 
Against this background, it would be more plausible that efforts trying to explain the evolution 
of denizenship take into consideration at least both levels: the national and the transnational 
level (cf. Sassen, 2000). Postnational theorists, when underpinning their claims regarding 
citizenship transformations beyond the nation-state more concretely, often refer to the 
European level. For example, Soysal contends that  „[t]he most comprehensive legal 
enactment of a transnational status for migrants is encoded in European Communities law.“ 
(Soysal, 1994: 147) Thus, the developments toward ‚European Citizenship‘ with the growing 
importance of supranational legal bodies such as the European Court of Justice is deemed to 
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be effectively limiting the leeway of nation-states. It is supposed that European norms and 
regulations on the scope of individual rights increasingly also influences matters of 
immigration and migrants’ rights. That is also argued by Seyla Benhabib, who takes the 
European Union as the primary example to illustrate the increasing influence of cosmopolitan 
norms, which in terms of human rights constrain the latitude of nation-states’ democratic 
sovereignty. This leads, as she argues, to an increasing visibility of the “paradox of 
democratic legitimacy” within political as well as legal processes and debates. “The paradox 
is that the republican sovereign should undertake to bind its will by a series of 
precommitments to a set of formal and substantive norms, usually referred to as ‘human 
rights.’ The rights and claims of others – be they ‘auxiliaries to the commonwealth,’ as 
women, slaves, and propertyless males were considered to be, or be they subjugated 
peoples or foreigners – are then negotiated upon this terrain flanked by human rights on the 
one hand and sovereignty assertions on the other.” (Benhabib, 2004: 47) According to 
Benhabib, this fundamental tension between rights and democracy cannot be entirely 
reconciled, but can be mediated and mitigated through what she calls “democratic iterations”, 
which are processes of public debate and deliberation in which universalist principles and 
rights claims are contested, (re-)interpreted and contextualized (Benhabib, 2004: 176ff.). 
When speaking of cosmopolitan norms, however, it is not entirely clear, first, whether these 
norms are anchored on an international level or on the nation-state level as well, and, 
second, whether and to what extent these norms and the related democratic iterations 
transcend the nation-state level of governance, rights and democracy (cf. Kymlicka, 2006). 
 
With regard to contemporary Europe Benhabib (2004: 21) speaks of a “disaggregation of 
citizenship” by which factual “trends toward postnational solidarity” would be discernible. 
Also, the European development shows the decoupling of the different components of 
citizenship: “The unitary model [of citizenship], which combined continuous residency upon a 
given territory with a shared national identity, the enjoyment of political rights, and subjection 
to a common administrative jurisdiction, is coming apart. One can have one set of rights but 
not another: one can have political rights without being a national, as is the case for EU 
nationals; more commonly, though, one has social rights and benefits, by virtue of being a 
foreign worker, without either sharing in the same collective identity or having the privileges 
of political membership.” (Benhabib 2004: 146) Especially, however, with regard to migration 
and migrants’ rights she makes rather ambivalent, if not contradictory assertions. On the one 
hand, she reiterates the postnational thesis: “The right to have rights today means the 
recognition of the universal status of personhood of each and every human being 
independently of their national citizenship.” (Benhabib, 2004: 68) On the other hand, she 
stresses the different rights of EU citizens, which are derived from citizenships of EU 
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member states, and so-called third-state citizens: “While throughout the EU a dissociation of 
the privileges of political citizenship from nationality can be observed for EU citizens, for 
third-country nationals, the ties between identities and institutions, between national 
membership and democratic citizenship rights, are reinforced.” (Benhabib, 2004: 155f.) On 
the one hand, she complains of the extremely weak rights status of refugees and asylum-
seekers in European member states, where they are treated “if they were quasi-criminal 
elements” (Benhabib, 2004: 163). On the other hand, she is very optimistic regarding the 
Europeanization of migration policies: “The integration of third-country nationals into the EU’s 
rights regime is well advanced and, given the growing role of the European Court of Justice 
and of the European Court of Human Rights, these trends are quite irreversible.” (Benhabib, 
2004: 167)  
 
 
National citizenship as a part of transnational citizenship 
 
These critical descriptions already indicate that what is advocated as citizenship beyond 
nation-states refers, however, in different ways back to existing nation-states. Even Soysal 
(1996: 24f.) finally admits that “postnational rights remain organized at the national level. The 
world is still made up of territorially configured political units; implementation and 
enforcement of global rules and norms lie with national political structures. Simply put, the 
exercise of universalistic rights is tied to specific states and their institutions. Even though its 
mode and scope of action are increasingly defined and constrained by the wider global 
system, the sovereign nation state retains the formally and organizationally legitimate form 
venerated by the ideologies and conventions of transnational reference groups such as the 
UN, UNESCO, European Union and the like.” Even if it can be assumed that international 
norms today have an important influence in domesticating the politics of national interest, we 
should be aware that national policy makers, because of their interest to be elected again, 
are forced to meet legitimacy requirements towards their domestic electorates. Therefore, as 
Boswell (2007: 87) argues, the commitment to human rights at the international level is “likely 
to be far weaker than at the national level, where there is, after all, a strong pragmatic 
interest in rights extension as a tool of conflict prevention and enlisting consent. At the 
international level, states are rarely troubled by the mobilization of societal groups outside of 
their own state, nor are they under any obligation to secure the consent of nationals of other 
countries.” (Boswell, 2007: 87) 
 
Also Benhabib’s descriptions of what she calls “democratic iterations” are interestingly 
referring back to the nation-state level in several ways. First, she criticises communitarian 
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(Walzer) as well as liberal (e.g. Rawls) proponents of national citizenship as relying on 
misleading presuppositions of cultural cohesiveness and homogeneity and pleads for a clear 
distinction between cultural and political integration (Benhabib, 2004: 115ff.). Because of 
cultural diversity as a consequence of different competing and coexisting world views and in 
order to avoid a structural exclusion of immigrants, she is arguing for a shift towards a 
political instead of a cultural definition of political community: “ (_) in liberal democracies 
conceptions of human and citizens’ rights, constitutional traditions as well as democratic 
practices of election and representation, are the core normative elements of political 
integration. It is toward them that citizens as well as foreigners, nationals as well as resident 
aliens, have to show respect and loyalty, and not toward any specific cultural tradition.” 
(Benhabib, 2004: 121f.; original emphasis) Obviously, such a transformation toward political 
integration, though altering the terms of membership and belonging, does not put into 
question the model of national citizenship. Again, it resembles very much a transformation of 
nations from ethno-cultural to civic or republican. Second, the political and legal processes 
concerning the question of public and official headscarf-wearing of Muslim girls and women 
in France and Germany and alien suffrage in Germany, which she describes as several 
illustration of “democratic iterations”, happened essentially on the nation-state level as well. 
According to her account, it was the nation-state based community whose collective identity 
was simultaneously altered by a reinterpretation of the rights claims of migrants. Moreover, 
the actors involved, according to her own description, were the constitutional courts and the 
political elites of these two nation-states. Third, although she states that “the challenge 
ahead is to develop an international regime which decouples the right to have rights from 
one’s nationality status” (2004: 68), she nonetheless advocates a “human right to 
membership” (2004: 134ff.) as a right to citizenship in a nation-state. Such an individual right 
to naturalization, as she describes it, should consist in a clear and transparent procedure, 
including a right to appeal, which would preclude arbitrary refusals of naturalization 
applications and exclusions of foreigners on basis of ascriptive and non-elective criteria such 
as race, ethnicity, gender, religion, language or sexuality. After all, such an intensive effort of 
justifying and explaining a right to citizenship as naturalization into existing nation-states 
makes little sense if citizenship and its corresponding rights, including political participation, 
are (to be) transferred to other levels anyhow.   
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However, other accounts of transnational citizenship allude to the experiences and practices 
of transnational migrants who are political active in two countries. For instance, against 
Huntington’s claim (Huntington, 2004) that Hispanic migrants in the US would not assimilate 
and are, to a great extent, oriented towards their home cultures and countries, Michael Peter 
Smith (2007) argues2, drawing on his ethnographic field research, that these migrants are 
often simultaneously politically active at their place of residence as well as in their countries 
of origin. Especially, his interviews with Mexican migrants who are leading members of the 
Federation of Zacatecan Hometown Associations of Southern California (FCZSC) reveal that 
they have developed, in the course of their transnational orientation and experiences, a 
sense of interest, loyalty and responsibility vis-à-vis both political contexts, both 
municipalities, both regions and both states. Because their political contacts as well as their 
political objectives and projects are oriented in about equal shares toward different political 
units, Smith, in this sense, speaks of a transformation into “transnational citizens.” (see for a 
similar accounts: R. Smith 2003; Glick Schiller, 2005). However, the transnational expansion 
of political interest and involvement of citizens do not imply a transformation of the institution 
of citizenship, as its meaning does not rely exclusively in active participation (cf. Fox 2005). A 
related institution underpinning and recognizing transnational political practices can be dual 
citizenship, but “not all dual nationals are transnationals” and “not all transnationals are dual 
nationals” (Bosniak 2006: 41). Moreover, transnational migrant political practices and 
identifications as well as other engagements in transnational advocacy networks do not 
change the established systems of governance as located in nation state-related and 
territorially-bounded legislatures, but rather direct their political claims to these governmental 
units. That is why they are, as Kymlicka (2003: 291) puts it, “predicated on, even parasitic on, 
the ongoing existence of bounded political communities.” 
 
The terms postnational and transnational citizenship, however, are also used in still another 
context, namely in relation to premises and statements usually made by concepts of 
cosmopolitan, global or some versions of European citizenship (e. g. Tambini, 2001). Such 
accounts usually do not start with a description of changes of the institution of citizenship, but 
rather accentuate the challenges with regard to effective governance by means of 
democratic national citizenship in the face of several processes of globalisation. Traditional 
                                               
2
 Smith also argues against Appadurai (1996), who claims that international migrants to Western immigration 
states, because of continuing connections to their home countries by means of transnational media, today are 
unlikely to acquire a sense of loyalty to their countries and places of residence.  
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national citizenship is deemed to be no longer an appropriate concept, because the scope of 
political problems such as global market regulation, environmental problems and 
international terrorism and crime increasingly exceed nation-states capacities of political 
regulation. Most of these theories, however, exhibit strong normative traits. In a rather 
general version, global or cosmopolitan citizenship is understood simply as a sort of appeal 
to individual citizens, to develop, alongside with identifications to their own nation state 
related polities, a sense of belonging also to humankind, a corresponding sense of 
responsibility for the world as a whole and some kind of sensibility with the fate of people 
living elsewhere (cf. Appiah 2007). Such a cosmopolitan morality of citizens beyond their 
national allegiance is deemed as a precondition for tackling the global problems of poverty 
and grave social inequalities between different regions and nation states as well as serious 
human rights violations in countries where citizens do not live. Other more direct political 
accounts of cosmopolitan citizenship claim that nation state based democracy “has been 
diminished by economic globalisation which place national societies at the mercy of external 
social and economic forces which citizens are powerless to control.” (Linklater 2002: 327) 
For example, as David Held (1999: 103) argues, because of increasing forces and processes 
beyond the reach of nation states that determine the nature of citizens’ life chances, “the idea 
of a political community of fate – of a self-determining collectivity – can no longer 
meaningfully be located within the boundaries of a single nation state.” Such a view is 
rebutted by Will Kymlicka (2003: 298) who states that the boundaries of a community of fate 
is not determined by “the forces people are subjected to, but rather how they respond to 
those forces, and in particular, what sorts of collectivities they identify with when responding 
to those forces.” This, however, is a rather weak argument because of especially two 
reasons. First, today nobody can seriously doubt that in an increasingly interconnected world 
persons are affected from political decisions, which are made in other than their nation states 
where they were not represented at all. That is even more problematic in an international 
system characterized by asymmetrical power relations between nation states. Second, a 
conception of democratic legitimacy which is limited to the input and quality of the democratic 
process in terms of the degree of participation and representation of citizens seems 
insufficient. Instead, the idea of output legitimacy has to be included, which comprises also 
the capacity of political collectivities to provide for effective political regulations and policies 
ameliorating the life chances and situations of citizens (cf. Zürn 1998). If effective 
governance is increasingly diminished, for instance, because multinational companies and 
international financial markets can no longer be controlled on a nation state level, 
international institutions are obviously necessary. Therefore, the normative aim put forward 
by accounts of cosmopolitan citizenship is that especially those international institutions and 
transnational organizations should be democratized which are increasingly responsible for 
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important economic, environmental, and security decisions or which are able to influence 
these matters more effectively (cf. Held, 1999). 
 
 
Transformation of What: Individual Rights, Memberships, Communities or of Self-
Governing Units? 
 
This inspections of several approaches of transnational and postnational citizenship 
suggests the conclusion that different aspects and dimensions of citizenship transformation 
should be distinguished much more explicitly and conceptually already from the outset. 
Above all, such transformations of citizenship caused by cross-border ties, transnational 
relations and global challenges, as the different approaches evaluated above show, should 
be differentiated according to two dimensions. First, it should be distinguished whether and 
to what extent a revision of national collective identity is announced or whether and to what 
degree also a transformation of self-governing units or even an expansion of jurisdictions is 
deemed to be happened or normatively considered as required. As showed above, some 
proponents of post- and transnational citizenship obviously think primarily of institutional 
changes which enhance the integration of migrants in immigration states and which might be 
connected to the granting of denizenship rights as well as to easier conditions of 
naturalization. This might be connected to a re-definition of the overall self-understanding of 
the political community as primarily integrated by means of political values and democratic 
procedures instead of cultural homogeneity. Such a revision of nationhood and relating 
changes of membership boundaries, however, need not transcend the territorial borders or 
alter the scope of governance. Also, institutional transformations toward some form of 
multicultural citizenship – in terms of, for example, antidiscrimination measures, affirmative 
action programs, group-differentiated rights for religious minorities, special representation 
rights for national minorities – do not expand previous jurisdictions. In these cases, the 
prefixes ‘post’ and ‘trans’ are obviously related to changes of nations but not necessarily to 
changes of state structures. Other theories also refer to some form of changes and shifts of 
self-governing units, particularly those which point to developments toward supra-national 
governance structures as in the European Union. However, often both kinds of 
transformation are intermingled in some way so that it is difficult to identify the main 
mechanisms which are referred to. Certainly, there may be a kind of interrelation between 
both dimensions, as, for example, Habermas (2004) claims that an nation-state internal 
revision of the basis of solidarity from ethno-cultural particularism to “constitutional 
patriotism” alleviates the expansion of solidarity patterns beyond national borders which in 
turn is a precondition for establishing supranational democratic governance structures. 
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However, by no means there is a necessary correlation between transformations of collective 
identity, on the one hand, and of governance structures, on the other hand.      
 
Second, changes of citizenship also should be differentiated according to the question 
whether they either concern predominantly individual persons and their spectrum of rights, 
what then might affect selected groups only, or to what extend these transformations have 
consequences for whole political communities and the prevailing understanding and 
institutionalization of democracy, rights, obligations and commonality. The obvious and 
appropriate institutional transformation of citizenship on an individual level, which includes 
the identity dimension as well as the dimensions of rights and political participation, is the 
acceptance of dual citizenship as the legal recognition of transnational experiences and 
orientations of transnational citizens. Their dual social, cultural and political ties shape their 
legitimate interest in participating in the self-governance of both of these different 
municipalities, regions and states as full citizens, what Bauböck (2007) calls “stakeholder 
citizenship. If these transnational identifications and participation are backed up by a 
corresponding spectrum of individual rights in both of the concerned countries through two 
citizenships, obviously transnational citizenship is synonymous with dual citizenship (cf. Fox, 
2005). A corresponding extension of citizenship on the collective level pertaining to all of its 
three essential dimension – political self-determination, individual rights and duties, and 
membership –, however, veers toward of what is usually called cosmopolitan or European 
citizenship.  
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These two differentiations of change can be summarized in the following schema: 
 
Figure 1: 
Aspects of 
Citizenship 
Transformation 
Nation 
(Collective Identity) 
 
Membership Boundary 
State 
(Self-Governing Unit, 
Jurisdiction) 
Territorial Border 
Individual 
Dimension 
Immigrant Integration 
Denizenship 
Naturalization 
Multicultural Citizenship Rights 
Dual Citizenship 
Collective 
Dimension 
State Neutrality 
De-Ethnization 
Republican/Civic Nationhood 
Collective Self-definition as 
Multicultural Society  
‘Constitutional Patriotism’ 
Multicultural Citizenship 
European Citizenship 
 
Cosmopolitan Citizenship 
 
 
Dual citizenship can be regarded as the most far-reaching factual cross-border expansion of 
citizenship, implying not only an internal transformation of the definition of membership but 
also a state- or governance-related change. The change or expansion, however, concerns 
merely the individual level. European and cosmopolitan citizenships, by contrast, indicate a 
transformation on a collective level as well and purport an expansion of a self-governing unit 
and the corresponding political community. In other words, whereas the former can be 
deemed as an expression of individual autonomy, the latter pertains to collective autonomy. 
Furthermore, dual citizenship, if the corresponding state regulations allow for it, is a matter of 
choice of the individual persons concerned. European citizenship, by contrast, is 
automatically acquired by all persons having citizenship of one of the membership states. 
Moreover, while dual citizenship combine two bundles of rights relating to two states bud do 
not change the level and scope of the rights tied to national citizenship, European citizenship 
as a multi-level structure of governance and rights also influence the extent of rights provided 
for on the national level inasmuch certain areas of regulation are transferred to the European 
level.   
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V. Transformations of Individual Rights  
 
As far as the element of individual rights is regarded as a necessary component of the 
institution of citizenship it is clearly not enough to look at transformation processes relating to 
changes of boundaries and borders of political self-governing units. Whereas changing 
conditions of political inclusion and access to full membership in a political unit is certainly an 
important dimension of citizenship transformation, also changes of individual rights in terms 
of their scope, level and content as granted to all citizens on an usually equal basis should 
be included as an another import aspect of citizenship changes. Furthermore, theories on 
changes of citizenship should be concerned with possible interdependencies of both of these 
dimensions of transformation and should ask the question, for instance, whether and in what 
respect an expansion of membership and territory may influence the substance of citizenship 
regarding changing levels and contents of individual rights, and, the other way round, which 
consequences redefinitions in content of citizenship rights may have for the conditions of 
access for newcomers to territories and memberships.  
 
Among the different dimensions of individual rights, social rights are a crucial case, because 
these rights are politically most precarious and contested. Social rights obviously involve 
more demanding corresponding duties on the part of fellow citizens than civic and political 
citizenship rights. While the latter sort of rights only implies rather negative obligations by 
fellow citizens, such as tolerance and non-interference towards the exercise of these rights, 
social rights require citizens to make positive contributions through taxes or within social 
insurance systems in the name of the social rights of others. This seems to presuppose not 
only a sense of common solidarity, on which basis citizens are ready to accept performances 
detrimental to their immediate interests, but also a system of effective government able to 
secure an arrangement of redistributive social policies.   
 
In many approaches of postnational and transnational citizenship, the influence of the 
European Union plays an important role. However, many of these sometimes rather 
optimistic accounts concentrate on changes of borders and boundaries but neglect at the 
same time challenges and shifts at the level of individual rights. For example, Soysal and 
Benhabib are predominantly concerned with citizenship transformations as a consequence of 
increased mobility and international migration. They seem to be concerned primarily with 
nation states as entities of social closure, which are deemed to be increasingly constrained, 
especially in relation to their capacities to control their borders and to define the conditions of 
membership access, by EU institutions. However, because they are not concerned with the 
extensiveness of citizenship rights and its changes, Soysal and Benhabib do not consider 
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that a restriction of nation-state sovereignty, even if it is conducive to the inclusion of 
migrants, may have adverse consequences to the political opportunities to uphold 
established standards of social security and corresponding social citizenship rights and, 
more generally, to allocate resources by raising taxes in order to be able for providing public 
goods, at least if there is no other level of effective governance which is able to take over this 
task. Thus, they tend to disregard that nation-state based citizenship rights has also been the 
main device for nation-state internal inclusion, at which the provision of welfare and the 
granting of social rights especially to wage earners played an extraordinarily important role 
(Marshall, 1950). Benhabib (2004, 147-169), in her description of EU-citizenship, indeed 
discusses different areas of social rights, such as access to pension schemes, health 
insurances, unemployment benefits and trade-union rights, under the perspective of an 
increasing inclusion of EU non-citizens, third-country citizens with permanent residence 
status and third-country citizens with temporary residence status. However, she does not 
consider changes with regard to the kinds and levels of social rights and benefits and 
transformations towards social deregulation and privatization of social risks, which also might 
be furthered by European integration in its current state. 
  
It is exactly the latter question, which is the starting point of more sceptical views on the 
prospects of European integration. Some authors even go so far to derive the prospect of 
increasing “post-national solidarity” (cf. Ferrara 2008) exclusively from EU-regulation 
concerning the principles of cross-border “portability” and “benefit cumulability” of social 
entitlements. This, however, neglects, first, that the scope and level of social rights or 
benefits are still determined on the level of individual member states and, second, that new 
rules expanding access of social rights to EU citizens can seriously affect the content of 
social rights toward downsizing. One very concrete example of the correlation of access and 
content of rights is the established case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
Although EU Member States in the past have tried to restrict free movement and access to 
tax-based social benefits of EU non-citizens to economic activity, the ECJ case law has 
increasingly destroyed these restrictions. For example, EU member states, by secondary 
Community law in terms of directives and regulations, attempted to constrain unlimited 
residence rights of non-economic actors by making these rights conditional on the 
possession of “sufficient resources” and a sickness insurance, in order to avoid social benefit 
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tourism of EU free movers and that they become an “unreasonable burden” on the 
established welfare systems of the member states.3   
 
However, as Christian Joppke describes in detail, the ECJ rulings, on grounds of non-
discrimination and by blurring the distinction between insurance-based and non-contributory 
social benefits, follow consistently a line of reasoning that makes EU citizenship a source of 
access to social rights to all EU citizens, independently of prior economic status categories. It 
is obvious that this must have consequences for the kind of social policies at the level of EU 
member states: “Because, in the absence of strong solidarities at European level, the 
enthusiasm of nation states to provide tax-based social benefits from which the rest of 
Europe cannot be excluded, and that may even be consumable anywhere in Europe, must 
cool down.” (Joppke 2010: 166) 
 
More generally, Claus Offe (2003) sees at least two basic dilemmas concerning the supra-
nationalization of social rights, one concerning the overall future prospects to transfer 
competent jurisdiction to the European level and one related to the current state, which still 
leaves the regulation and overall organization of social security, social services and 
procedures of wage determination as well as essential parts of overall economic and labour 
market policies to the individual member states. Concerning the first, a short-term consent of 
national governments concerning a transfer of competencies to the EU level is very unlikely 
because of very different welfare state characteristics and development stages in the 
different EU member states, such as the scope and level of social protection, status rights of 
collective actors, rates of economic growth and employment performances and, not the least, 
general institutional structures of welfare states. So far, the scope of EU governance only 
covers regulation concerning non-discriminatory access to labour markets and jobs and rules 
relating to health and safety at work. Although a further transfer of competencies in the policy 
areas of social protection and social services to the EU level would be desirable in order to 
avoid the erosion of popular support for European integration, the national political elites of 
the individual member states have little reasons to pass competencies to the EU level in this 
field because they either would lose economic competition advantages, if they have rather 
low standards of social regulation and low costs of labour on the national level, or would risk 
                                               
3
 Directive 2004/58/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 
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legitimacy problems towards their nation-state based constituencies, if they hold rather high 
levels of social security.      
 
The second dilemma, however, is even grave, as it primarily does not concern the remote 
future prospects of European integration in this policy area, but rather belongs to its mode as 
it is currently working. According to Offe, the still existing dominance of the often so-called 
“negative” market integration, as the EU strategy of combating any obstacles to free trade 
and free exchange of capital, goods, services and labour in the name of avoiding market and 
competition distortions within the EU, undermines increasingly, the longer it prevails, the 
nation-states effective means to regulate and constrain politically economic transactions as 
well as to provide for high standards of social protection. Although the EU member states, 
according to the principle of “subsidiarity”, maintain the nominal sovereignty in the areas of 
labour market, employment, market and social policies, they successively lose the actual 
capacities of “designing and implementing autonomous policies of social protection” because 
of an “EU-inaugurated EMU [European Monetary Union] and Single Market regime with its 
effective ban on autonomous policies of setting exchange rates, interest rates, and fiscal 
debt, as well as controlling capital movements and movements of goods and services across 
their borders.” (Offe 2003: 457f.) A more direct analogous mechanism is, certainly, the EU 
strategy of critical observation and abatement of any subsidy policies in EU member states 
which presumably lead to distortions of competition within the common market (cf. Lamping, 
2008). The present situation of EU integration, as distributing the governance competencies 
in the area of economic, labour market and social policies partly to member states and partly 
to the EU level, is probably one factor which contributed and still contribute to a general shift 
in European states concerning the allocation of tasks in the realm of social security from the 
state to markets, families and even civil society, and, thus, from de-commodification (cf. 
Esping Anderson 1990) to re-commodification. Also, the partial convergence of labour 
market and social policies in EU states toward so-called activation policies and workfare 
programmes, which are justified with changed interpretations of social justice as 
predominantly meaning equality of opportunities (essentially through labour market 
participation) and not of outcomes, might have been influenced also by this situation. As Offe 
worries, it is likely that, under these conditions, the European model of political “embedded” 
and “social” capitalism transforms itself into a politically unconstrained model of pure market 
capitalism resembling the Anglo-Saxon type (Offe 2003: 446). Tendencies toward 
privatization of social risks and the rise of precarious and low paid jobs in several EU 
member states as well as the increased frequency of official statements by policy makers 
who view social integration increasingly in terms of or at least dependent from labour market 
participation might back up such fears.  
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These remarks, however, are only aimed to illustrate that theories about transformation 
toward European citizenship, as certainly the most developed case of an institutional 
arrangement of governance beyond established nation-states, should include the dimension 
of developments and changes of the substance of citizenship as well. If accounts of 
European citizenship only focus on the question of who have access to a certain right without 
considering at the same time the issue of what is the content of the respective right and 
where it is defined, these will not be able to grasp the more complex dynamics of citizenship 
transformation. A consideration of both dimensions of citizenship transformation is especially 
important because it is plausible to assume that both dimensions of citizenship rights 
probably interact. An example might be, again, the predominance of something like an 
“activation philosophy”, which can be observed in several European states cutting across 
different policy areas, especially visible in labour market and social policies, on the one hand, 
and immigrant integration and naturalization policies, on the other hand. In all of these policy 
areas considerable political efforts are visible which are aimed at influencing the attitudes 
and behaviour of persons towards pro-activity and flexibility by means of laws and sanctions 
in order to enhance what meanwhile is usually called “employability”. Moreover, in both 
policy areas the corresponding measures, which make certain rights (social rights in the 
cases of labour market and social policies, residence and naturalization rights in the cases of 
integration and citizenship law policies) conditional on certain so-called integration 
performances, are accompanied with public and political discourses, which accentuate 
duties, responsibilities and obligations of citizens and citizen-applicants vis-à-vis the society 
and the state. These tendencies across many Western countries, especially in the context of 
workfare in the realm of social policies, indicate a far-reaching paradigmatic shift to a 
“contracturalization of citizenship” which transforms previously “reciprocal but non equivalent 
rights and obligation between equal citizens” into market-like voluntary and revocable 
contracts between individual persons and states that are based on quid pro quo exchange of 
equivalent resources or performances, leaving and treating “those unable to be a party to an 
employment contract (...) as nothing less than contractual malfeasants.” (Somers 2009: 69, 
72) With respect to social rights, these transformations of citizenship “from status to contract” 
(Handler 2004) amounts to a complete reversion, when considering Marshall’s (1992: 40) 
account: “Social rights in their modern form imply an invasion of contract by status.” 
Moreover, these developments are accompanied with an obvious changing significance and 
role of civil society and a corresponding increasing emphasis on “active citizenship” as 
voluntary work in several organizations. One might regard these trends toward condionality 
of citizenship even as a partial recurrence of an understanding of citizenship dominating in 
the 19th century, when many states excluded from voting those persons who did not have 
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enough income or property to pay taxes. To a certain extent, the new possibilities for 
emigrants to retain external citizenship in emigration states may be a somewhat 
corresponding tendency if these are based on the presumption that they make economic or 
other assumed important contributions to the benefit of these emigration states (cf. Rubio-
Marin 2006). These emigrant citizens have, compared to resident citizens, a privileged 
status, because they stand beyond the territorially related coercive power of the state to 
enforce collective binding decisions (cf. Fitzgerald 2008). If citizenship means a status 
conferring a certain set of rights and duties to persons of political community on an equal 
basis, these developments finally raise the question whether it is still adequate to talk of 
citizenship transformations and not instead of a system of increasing fragmented privileges 
for different categories of persons.  
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The above presented considerations on different forms of citizenship concepts and forms of 
transformations, such as dual, post- and transnational and cosmopolitan citizenships, are 
mainly of a conceptual kind. Departing from an evaluation and partly derived from an 
immanent critique of some prominent existing theories on several variants of transnational 
citizenship we propose to consider some important differences, aspects and dimensions of 
change more explicitly and systematically than it is often made. In sum, it is, first, necessary 
to distinguish transformations of nation and collective identity from changes of self-governing 
units and jurisdictions and also changes of citizenship on a rather individual level from those 
on a collective level. Second, it is important to consider not only changed conditions of 
citizenship inclusion and access to rights but also transformations of the substance of 
citizenship and the content of rights. Transformations of citizenship in its different variants 
can hardly be regarded as a gradual replacement of national citizenship by transnational 
citizenship. In the case of European citizenship one certainly can speak of a gradual 
expansion of citizenship within a multi-level governance structure. This development, 
however, as the case of social rights and policies within in European countries indicate, may 
undermine the substance and extent of rights as they have been established on the nation 
state level. Today, the concept and institution of citizenship as it has been developed in the 
past century seems to be in a certain dilemma: On the one hand, the problems which have to 
be regulated by effective political action seem to be increasingly beyond the reach of nation 
states; on the other hand, essential resources needed for an input-related democratic 
process, such as especially a collective identity or a common imagination of a community of 
cooperation, seem to be still limited to the nation state.      
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Chapter 3 
Consequences of Transnational Citizenship 
for Migrant Sending Countries: A Debate on Dual Citizenship 
Ahmet İçduygu and Deniz Sert 
 
 
Introduction 
 
One important way in which the theoretical deficit and the lack of genuinely comparative 
studies on the migration-citizenship literature have recently been addressed is through the 
emergence of studies of emigration and citizenship linkage.  Most of the literature on 
migration-citizenship debates of the last few decades, as observed in the cases of major 
migrant-receiving countries, has been widely a literature of immigration.  In other words, little 
attention has been paid to “what could be called the politics of emigration” (Brand, 2006; 
Green and Weil, 2007; Faist, 2007).  It is within this context, for instance, that the debate 
over the dual, or even multiple, citizenship regimes in several emigration countries has been 
a subject of increasing attention since the mid 1990s (Faist, 2007).  In order to see and to 
evaluate the main consequences of dual citizenship institution for emigration countries, this 
study aims at exploring the evolution of particular dual citizenship cases within formations of 
specific migration systems on a country by country basis.  While doing so, we take dual 
citizenship as an institution that transforms from being a consequence of national interests to 
being a consequence of a transnational space, within policies and practices of emigration 
countries. 
 
Thus, a comparative analysis of dual citizenship regimes in two well-known migrant-sending 
countries, namely Morocco and Turkey, will be tied in with an interaction between their 
transnational contexts and domestic socio-political formations to diagnose the transformation 
of the classical notion of citizenship from a nationality defined context to its new transnational 
character.  Morocco and Turkey provide us cases where we can examine the ways in which 
sending countries have perceived the issues of citizenship in the context of emigration flows.  
These cases are important; historically, because of their long established emigration history 
attached to the European countries; currently, because of the presence of large emigrant 
diasporas today; and analytically, because of changes occurred in emigration regimes over 
time.  However, it is important to note that our focus here is particularly on dual citizenship 
regulation of sending states as a tool of emigration policies, rather than a general discussion 
on citizenship and its related dilemmas. 
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As often noted, various elements of uncertainties that modern states face today make it 
much more difficult for the institution of citizenship to deal with the paradoxes of inclusion 
and exclusion (Miles and Thranhardt, 1995; Mohanty and Tandon, 2006).  Indeed, the 
presence of expatriated citizens or emigrants to a nation-state poses a question of this kind.  
As mentioned by Sassen (2002:5), “these signal a de-territorializing of citizenship practices 
and identities and of discourses about loyalty and allegiance”.  Without exercising certain 
rights and duties, without feeling a full sense of identity, and without carrying out various civic 
virtues, can these emigrants easily be seen as a part of the societies they are originated 
from?  This is a widely debated, but an unresolved question (İçduygu, 2005).  Considering 
the challenges of international migration in the age of globalization, for instance, some 
scholars emphasize a fundamental shift from national citizenship, which is a nation-based 
inclusion, to transnational citizenship, which is a more individual-based universal conception 
of inclusion (Fox, 2005; Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw, 2006).  However, as a type of 
transnational citizenship, for instance, dual citizenship has been questioned by other 
scholars who have contended that individual-based universal conception of inclusion cannot 
be implemented and enforced without the consent of nation-states (Kalekin-Fishman and 
Pitkanen, 2007). 
 
Having had the main problematic issues addressed in the debate on “what to do with the 
(dual) citizenship position of emigrants to the sending countries”, the main points of 
departure of the arguments of this essay are three-fold: first, and more generally, (dual) 
citizenship constitutes a dynamic sociological and political ground on which we can analyze 
the dynamic nature of migrant-sending states’ ongoing attempts to reinforce the boundaries 
of the national community by insisting upon the economic, political and cultural membership 
of those living outside the territories of these states; second, and more specifically, there are 
three defining elements of the analytical operation of citizenship, namely legal status, 
identity, and civic virtues, and in the age of globalization and in the context of international 
migration flows we have witnessed the increasing legitimacy crisis of such an operation of 
citizenship, whose manifestations have been observed in each of these elements as they are 
de-articulated and re-articulated in various migratory contexts; third, and more importantly, 
the modern notion of citizenship enables us to see that an empowerment of emigrants 
cannot be fully achieved without the implementation and dissemination of a more individual-
based universal conception of inclusion that is the transnational understanding of citizenship 
as it might be exemplified by the institution of dual citizenship. 
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Arguing that the notion of dual citizenship as a type of transnational institution can be 
conceived as a challenge to the ideal-typical model of conventional understanding of 
membership status of citizenship which might be characterized as egalitarian, sacred, nation-
based, democratic, unique, and consequential (Brubaker, 1990:381), this chapter seeks to 
explore the status of dual citizenship institution in the course of the two migrant sending 
countries, Morocco and Turkey, attached to the European migratory systems. This is done so 
by considering: (a) an evaluation of the notion of dual citizenship as an institution of 
emigration, (b) an overview of the history of international emigration flows in Morocco and in 
Turkey, (c) an elaboration of the transformation of dual citizenship institution in these two 
countries over time, through a change from a nation-based conceptualization to a 
transnational understanding.  It is important to note that the usage of migrant-sending or 
receiving country does not entail a two-dimensional perspective, but used only as analytical 
categories.  On the contrary, the chapter analyzes migration within a framework of 
transnationalism.  Following Fox’ argument (2005), what is meant by transnational here is 
that relatively dual citizenship is the only somewhat “authentic” form of transnational 
citizenship because of a simultaneous extension of rights, practices, and identities. 
 
The chapter is composed of three sections.  While the first section presents a theoretical 
debate on dual citizenship as a question of emigration, the second provides a descriptive 
analysis of the country cases of Morocco and Turkey.  The final section is composed of the 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
Dual Citizenship: A Question of Emigration 
 
In an increasingly mobile and interdependent world, the strict policing of the 
demarcations of national membership seems increasingly futile and 
counterproductive; dual nationality is simply the recognition of a changing world and 
can be a means to reconcile memberships in both the countries of residence and of 
origin (Jones-Correa 2001:1014). 
 
Although we can observe an emergence of increasingly interdisciplinary studies in migration 
research –for example, Brettell and Hollifield (2000)– its geographical limits focusing largely 
on the migrant receiving countries of the North and the West is quite bothersome.  There is 
little work on the global South, a lack of sending country perspective on migration, and lack 
of focus on emigration-citizenship linkage.  Within this framework, the literature on 
transnationalism serves as an important asset that link together origin and destination, and 
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dual citizenship is an important consequence of this transnational space.  The increasing 
occurrence of dual citizenship that preserves a bond between different citizenship elements, 
e.g., via creating overlapping rights and practices, with a simultaneous belonging of migrants 
to two different nation states is a significant factual and theoretically persuasive case of 
transnational citizenship transformation (see Gerdes and Faist, same volume). 
 
Within this transformation of the transnational space, the aspect of state sovereignty as the 
control of the borders, i.e., exit and entry of nationals and others, is extended to an other 
aspect of sovereignty, i.e., the implicit contract between sovereign state and citizen, which 
continues to be active even when the citizen is outside the territorial boundaries of the state 
(Brand, 2006:7).  Frequently, state sovereignty is related with territoriality without much 
regard to the populations.  Walker (1993) puts this issue into context by formulating that 
while the territorial principle long so crucial to state sovereignty marks a particular type of 
boundary between whom and what is inside and outside the political community, citizenship 
is another.  In theory, people inside the boundaries of a state are usually its citizens and 
included in its sovereignty.  In real world, however, the separation between the two bases of 
sovereignty, i.e., territory and citizenship, is becoming very common. 
 
In its common usage, citizenship essentially refers to either a membership status in a 
particular nation-state recognized in international law (Hammar, 1990:26; Safran, 1995:105; 
Brubaker, 1990:380) or to a sense of belonging to the national community represented by 
that nation-state (Mason, 1999; Castles and Davidson, 2000).  In fact, these two perceptions 
of citizenship totally dominate the scholarly literature on citizenship.  On the one hand, partly 
derived from the notion of nation-state and partly derived from the concept of sovereignty is 
the freedom of each state to decide whether a person is its member, in other words whether 
someone is a citizen.  Hence, formal state membership is called citizenship.  On the other 
hand, it could be argued that every nation-state needs the participation of all its members, so 
that everybody is meant to belong.  As noted by Brubaker (1990:380), debates about 
citizenship often turn into debates about nationhood: this is what it means and what it ought 
to mean to belong to a nation-state. 
 
If one defines state as a legal and political organization with the power to require the 
obedience and loyalty of its citizens, and nation as a community whose members are bound 
together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, and a national consciousness, then it is 
possible to formulate citizenship within the range of possible definitions of membership.  
Citizenship has a formal aspect as a legally acknowledged membership status between the 
individual and the state.  Citizenship also involves a real or an imagined community 
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membership of a nation.  A central theme in debates on the membership notion of citizenship 
has been the duality of membership, as seen in the concept of citizenship as a membership 
both of a nation and a state.  For instance, Hammar (1990:37) argues that:  
 
Even if citizenship in a legal sense implies membership of the state, it is often 
viewed to be just as much membership of a nation, especially in states where 
nation and state largely coincide. As we have already seen, the two forms of 
membership are often mixed up and it seems to be very hard to clearly 
distinguish them from each other. As the claim of most nation states is that 
there is congruence between state and nation, membership in one is taken to 
mean membership in the other as well. 
 
What is noteworthy about much of the debate around taking citizenship as a membership of 
a nation is that this model of membership mostly implies a sense of belonging.  This sense 
assumes the presence of a shared national identity, or it requires necessities for fostering a 
national identity. It is assumed that an individual has a sense of belonging to a nation if and 
only if he or she identifies with the rest of the people forming the nation.  In other words, 
citizenship seems to be referring to national belonging in the sense of membership of a 
cultural community.  It has been argued that belonging to a shared national identity is 
required in order for the citizens of a state to avoid alienation from their social and political 
institutions.  The main argument is that the citizens of a state identify with their major 
institutions and practices if they think that there is a deep reason why they should associate 
with them –that is a sense of belonging provided by the belief that citizens share a history, 
ethnicity, mother tongue, religion, culture or conception of the good (Mason, 1999). 
 
Taking citizenship as a formal state membership is seeing its legal status aspect.  
Considering citizenship as a membership to a nation or belonging to shared identity is 
emphasizing its identity aspect.  The former involves the formal dimension of right and duties 
and the latter refers to the substantive dimension of participation and identity.  It is supposed 
that these two aspects are necessary conditions in practice for the realization of the liberal 
understanding of citizenship.  Both aspects of citizenship take the nation-state as the 
normative reference point.  However, the way in which one should evaluate the changing 
dynamic nature of citizenship should go beyond this reference point.  It is within this context 
that the institution of dual citizenship is one of the significant sites at which the continuing 
interplay of membership status and belonging to shared identity can be elaborated more 
analytically and critically where we observe a transformation of citizenship as a political 
agency (see Kalev, Jakobson and Ruutsoo, same volume).  It is the dual citizenship that 
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makes both migrant-sending and migrant receiving states feel challenged by the 
conventional notion of citizenship and often puzzled by accounts of the membership aspect 
and belonging aspect of citizenship.  Thus, dual citizenship can have different meanings and 
functions in different political settings with different justifications (see Gerdes and Faist, same 
volume). 
 
Within this context, what happens to migrant-sending states when they are faced with the 
phenomenon of naturalization of their citizens is that they lose their comfortable certainties 
concerning the position of their expatriated citizens.  What follows this stage, using Giddens’ 
terms (1996), is that an “ontological uncertainty –or insecurity” becomes a constitutive 
element in states’ macro level institutional strategies.  International migration creates new 
challenges for the institution of citizenship, and consequently states question the basis for 
having their citizens in a national community.  As these challenges emerge, states tend to 
get more involved in emigration policy, i.e., with the lives of their citizens residing abroad 
where nation-states partake and react on processes of transnational change.  Thus, as 
explained by Bauböck (2003) political transnationalism is not considered here as a result of 
political activity across territorial borders, but as changes and overlaps in the boundaries of 
membership in political communities within a necessity of overlapping affiliations of people, 
i.e., emigrants, to geographically separate polities, i.e., sending and receiving states. 
 
In what follows, there are five explanations on the sending-states involvement (Brand, 2006):  
The first goes back to macro-historical explanations that see transnationalism as a 
phenomenon produced by a particular stage of unequal capitalist development between the 
centre, the global North, and the periphery, the global South, which has caused the push of 
labour from the poorer states to the wealthier ones in the context of greater possibilities for 
communication and travel between the origin and destination countries (Basch et. al., 1994).  
Secondly, there are international politics explanations, which overcome such ahistorical and 
region-based explanations, and consider the treatment of the expatriates by the host states 
as a source of sending-state policy toward their communities.  Such explanations also focus 
on ethnic lobbies as a venue, where sending-state can exert influence in certain bilateral 
relationships.  Thirdly, there are the economic explanations which concentrate on the 
employment effect of emigration where exporting labour can serve as an economic safety 
valve in a situation of high or potentially high unemployment.  These explanations also look 
at remittances as a reason for involvement in emigration policy.  The status of emigrant 
citizens change from bare recognition and absent citizens, to “national heroes” as the states 
of emigration seek to encourage emigrants to direct financial resources homeward, in the 
form of remittances, or direct contributions styled as taxes and investments (Barry, 2006).  
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 56 
Fourth, there are domestic political explanations, which characterize the political systems of 
many sending states of the global South by varying degrees of authoritarianism where citizen 
is a subject rather than a participant (Brand, 2006).  As explained by Hammar (1989:86), 
“citizenship has different meanings in the countries of emigration and countries of 
immigration, in old and new states_ in totalitarian and liberal democratic states”.  Once 
sending states engage in a process of political opening or liberalization, there may be a 
relatively automatic response by the state also to change its behaviour toward expatriates, or 
the expatriates themselves may take action to force the state to deal with them on changed 
bases (Brand, 2006:18).  According to Barry (2006), this is very much made possible by 
technological advancement, especially the developments in the areas of transportation and 
communication that provide emigrants opportunities for remaining actively engaged with their 
home countries and states the capacity to reach its emigrants.  Finally, there are 
security/stability explanations, which consider expatriate communities as places of refuge for 
political exiles, thus, requiring an effective surveillance for the security/stability of the state 
(Brand, 2006:19). 
 
When emigration policy entails citizenship policy, it is obvious that most migrant-sending 
states today prefer the blood principle of citizenship.  Based on national practical interests, 
these countries wish to keep close contacts with their citizens abroad, and therefore tends to 
encourage emigrants to retain their citizenship and transfer it to their children.  Of course, 
concerning naturalization policies and practices in migrant-receiving countries, no one can 
expect the migrant-sending states to have any sympathy for a process in which several 
hundred thousands of its citizens abroad will definitely be lost.  Acknowledging the reality of 
the permanent presence of its emigrants abroad, and considering the ongoing process of 
access to citizenship rights in the receiving states, these states today tend to stress the 
importance of legal regulations which permit the emigrants to qualify for naturalization 
without giving up their original citizenship.  Accordingly, from the viewpoint of the migrant-
sending states, dual citizenship is increasingly seen as an important and practical tool for the 
integration of their emigrants in the receiving societies. 
 
It seems that dual citizenship provides an opportunity for the migrant-sending states to 
overcome several negative consequences of permanent settlement of their citizens abroad 
while at the same time offering some practical solutions to the naturalization difficulties 
experienced by the migrant-receiving states and emigrants themselves. Since the 
renunciation of native citizenship is often considered to be an enormous psychological and 
practical barrier to naturalization, it is widely held that acceptance of dual nationality by the 
receiving and sending states increases the proclivity of immigrants to naturalize (Brubaker, 
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1989; Miller, 1989).  Although a basic consensus is achieved on the main advantage of dual 
citizenship, which is to facilitate an easy and quick solution to the anomalousness of 
emigrants’ status in the migratory process, the inconveniences of dual citizenship have also 
been emphasized.  For instance, it is argued that dual citizenship will create some 
complicated situation, which cannot be squared with egalitarian democratic norms, such as 
dual military obligations, dual loyalties, and dual political rights.  As pointed out by many 
proponents of dual citizenship, it is apparent, however, that these inconveniences can be 
limited by bilateral and international agreements.  The content of dual citizenship in itself 
reveals that the process of acquiring the citizenship of another country without giving up the 
original citizenship involves consequences for governments of both sending and receiving 
states as well as for the international migrants.  For instance, emphasizing the idea of 
“everyone should be the citizen of one country and no one should be a citizen of more than 
one” (Council of Europe, 1991:3), many emigrants living abroad have worried about the 
application and some consequences of dual citizenship.  From this perspective, and closely 
related to the debates about citizenship in the migrant-sending states are the emigrants’ 
perceptions and attitudes concerning their own position in the processes of access to 
citizenship and citizenship rights.  Against this background, sometimes emigrants and the 
governments of their home countries negotiate different forms of citizenship.  For example, 
primarily drawing on the Mexican case, Fitzgerald (2008) argues that the emigrants and the 
sending states bargain on a form of citizenship, which is based on greater voluntarism, 
greater emphasis on citizens rights over obligations, and the legitimacy of multiple affiliations.  
Next section analyzes different periods of this process of negotiation in the context of 
Morocco and Turkey. 
 
 
Dual citizenship in the cases of Morocco and Turkey: Some practical and theoretical 
concerns 
 
After the end of World War II, Western Europe engaged in a massive project of post-war 
recovery and compensation for its war losses.  Consequently, particularly during the 1950s 
and 1960s, it experienced large scale labour migration from the underdeveloped areas of the 
world such as the Mediterranean Basin and South Asia, in order to supply the labour 
shortages in their recovering post-war economies.  The migration of labour within, or to, 
Europe was by no means a new phenomenon: consolidation of capitalism as the dominant 
economic system in the 19th and early 20th centuries was already accompanied by the 
migration of peripheral peoples to fill the demand for labour in the newly industrializing 
countries (Castles and Kosack, 1985; Portes and Bach, 1985).  However, migration to 
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Western Europe after 1945 was different for its two major characteristics: increasing 
numbers and enlarging geographical scope.  Until the mid-1970s about 30 million people 
entered the labour market in Western Europe, mainly from the Mediterranean basin and its 
old colonies –from Algeria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.  This movement, which began in 1945, 
gained momentum in the fifties, expanded dramatically in the sixties and early seventies, and 
then ceased in mid-1970s, was one of the greatest population movements in human history, 
increasing the population of Western Europe by nearly 10 million as a result of net migration 
(Castles, 1984:1). 
 
While the receiving countries of Western Europe saw the employment of this immigrant 
labour as temporary and of limited duration, as time passed, many migrants realized the 
continuing advantages of remaining abroad, and the host countries also found that the need 
for labour would be a continuing requirement rather than a temporary one (Castles, 1984).  
With the liberalization of family reunification policies, many immigrants were joined by their 
partners, eventually becoming permanent residents and/or citizens of their host countries.  It 
was within this context that migrants from Morocco and Turkey entered the labour market in 
Western Europe, first as temporary workers, and eventually becoming permanent residents 
and citizens. During this period, naturalization and citizenship issues gained more 
importance for both the sending and the receiving countries. 
 
Within this background, debates over the politics of dual citizenship in the context of 
emigration could range in time from the national policies of the second half the 20th century to 
the transnational content of the late 20th century and early 21st century.  We concentrate here 
on a period of transition from national to a transnational paradigm as experienced by the 
Moroccan and Turkish states; elaborating the changing perceptions of dual citizenship.  As 
far as the historical background of migratory flows from these two states are concerned, it is 
possible to distinguish three main periods: first, mostly state-regulated labour emigration from 
the 1960s to the mid-1970s, which was based on bilateral agreements between states and 
assumed to be temporary; second, changing face of emigration from the mid-1970s to the 
1990s, which was largely characterized with family reunifications and becoming more 
permanent; and third, the new phase of emigration in the age of globalization, from the 1990s 
onwards, which is more transnational in character. 
 
Most of the literature on the dual (multiple) citizenship in the last few decades has focused on 
immigration with little attention given to the notion of dual citizenship as a question of 
emigration (Brand, 2006; Faist, 2007; Green and Weil, 2007).  We propose to take the view 
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of migrant-sending countries over the politics of citizenship, particularly focusing on the 
notion of dual citizenship. As far as the migrant-sending countries, such as Morocco and 
Turkey, are concerned, the institution of dual citizenship studies has raised fundamental 
questions about nation and diaspora communities from the perspective of these states, 
focusing on citizenship rights and duties such as voting, military service, property rights, 
entry and exist procedures as well as reflecting the issues of belonging, identity, and loyalty.  
Consequently, among others, the following questions emerge: how have the migrant-sending 
countries sought to maintain with their citizens abroad, and why; and, what are the functions 
of dual citizenship within this context?  At this stage, it is important to reinforce that while 
there are many similarities between Morocco and Turkey, there are also important 
differences.  On the one hand, Turkey emerges as a relatively liberal democratic state where 
political aspects of emigration become more important than its economic features.  On the 
other hand, Morocco remains to be a monarchy where economic aspects of emigration 
prevails its importance. 
 
Still, in both cases we see the transformation of their dual citizenship regimes from being a 
consequence of national interests to being a consequence of a transnational space.  The 
main point of transformation is that there are two periods of standpoints, politics and policies 
of the countries of origin towards dual citizenship: In the first phase, these countries see dual 
citizenship as a tool for keeping the ties of emigrants because that is perceived in their 
national interests.  In this first phase, they are not really concerned about the fate of their 
emigrants abroad and how they are treated in the destination countries and whether they are 
incorporated or integrated there.  In the second phase, by contrast, countries of origin are not 
only one-dimensionally concerned with their national interests, but also with their emigrants’ 
treatment in the destination countries, promoting their interests and rights, and also being in 
favour of their naturalizations.  To this aim, the countries of origin try to attune their own 
citizenship rules to the respective citizenship regulations of the corresponding destination 
countries.  This transformation is a result of the recognition that keeping ties with emigrants 
abroad is also beneficial in cases they will not return eventually, given that they still 
contribute in some way to their development from abroad. 
 
This transformation is going beyond the national interest perspective, which is indicated with 
our reference to methodological nationalism (see below), but also showing a sort of change 
of the national interest itself.  A higher degree of integration in the receiving states enhances 
the migrants’ endowment with financial, cultural and social capital, which eventually 
increases their potential contribution to the development of countries of origin.  In return, the 
countries of origin re-interpret their national interests, which unintentionally has beneficial 
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consequences for the individual citizens and their rights.  Next sub-sections develop how 
these changes occur in relation to which policies and regulations at what time. 
 
 
The first phase: Dual citizenship as a consequence of national interests 
 
As Turkish and Moroccan migrants became most sizeable non-EU immigrant populations 
living in Europe, their states of origin began to be involved in a sequence of bureaucratic 
efforts to emphasize the boundaries of their national community by insisting upon the 
economic, political and cultural “nationalness”, that is Moroccanness or Turkishness, of those 
living outside their territories (Brand, 2006).  In the meantime, the receiving states of Europe 
were also responding to the situation.  Although these responses were not in a standardized 
fashion, there were some familiar elements:  To begin with, in view of rising anti-immigrant 
racism, new bodies were set up within receiving state and NGO institutions in order to defend 
immigrant human and other rights.  Next, an array of grounds have emerged, providing for 
some degree of political participation for immigrants at least on the municipal level.  Also, 
some immigrant and host-state-initiated organizations have developed to deal with a range of 
problems in relation to immigration.  Immigrants’ status in these institutions ranged from 
arrangements from full enfranchisement to approaching citizenship.  These institutional 
responses of both the receiving and sending countries presented how they tried to tackle the 
challenge to identity and sovereignty caused by the “insider without” and the “outsider within” 
(Brand, 2006:56). 
 
Within this period, what determines the early concerns about dual citizenship in Morocco and 
Turkey was a type of “methodological nationalism” which implies “parallels between 
nationalist thinking and the conceptualization of migration” (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002: 301). 
These countries were concerned with “consolidating the homeland” by guarding their citizens 
abroad and promoting policies they hoped would strengthen the links between their 
emigrants and homelands. Consequently, the institution of dual citizenship was seen as a 
functional tool for part of a larger process of keeping ties with the expatriated citizens and of 
saving the notion of a cultural nation. 
 
 
Turkey 
 
Turkish Citizenship Law (Law No. 403, dated 11 February 1964) is the main piece of 
legislation on citizenship.  Until 1981, this law did not permit dual citizenship arrangement 
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(İçduygu, 1996; Kadirbeyoğlu, 2007, 2007a).  With the change in the Law, dual citizenship 
became legal so long as the migrants acquiring another citizenship informed the government; 
otherwise they could lose their Turkish citizenship.  According to the Turkish Citizenship Law 
(Law No. 403, dated 11 February 1964), there has been ex lege acquisition of citizenship 
through which children of Turkish mothers or fathers are automatically granted citizenship, 
whether the child was born in Turkey or not.  Consequently, it is always the case that 
children of Turkish emigrants are easily able to get Turkish citizenship.  Furthermore, those 
children, who had lost their Turkish citizenship because of their parents, can acquire Turkish 
citizenship by using their right of choice within three years from the day they reach the age of 
majority.  As a result, for the children of migrants who live abroad it has been uncomplicated 
to take and keep the status of Turkish citizenship. 
 
It appears that in the first two decades of Turkish emigration, as the Turkish state viewed the 
emigration of its citizens as temporary labour migration, there had been no concern of dual 
citizenship.  Later however, as the temporary migration evolved to permanent settlement, 
there had been increasing worries about the question of how to keep ties with expatriate 
citizens.  Hence, the Turkish state ended up with both “de facto and de jure tolerance of dual 
citizenship” for several normative and pragmatic reasons such as the official national self-
understanding of Turkish identity, the significant number of citizens abroad, the economic 
ties those citizens have with Turkey, and the increasing demand from civil society actors for 
the acceptance of dual citizenship (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2007a).  The main rationale behind the 
government interest towards dual citizenship was related to the nature of national self-
understanding that was partly civic-republican and partly ethno-cultural (Akın, 1988).  
Consequently, expatriate citizens were encouraged not to lose their ties, even if they became 
citizens of other states. 
 
 
Morocco 
 
In Morocco, citizenship law is based on jus sanguis, or descent, where citizenship is 
automatically acquired by birth from at least one Moroccan parent.  This has always been 
helpful for the children of Moroccan emigrants who live abroad, as it makes possible for them 
to easily obtain and keep the Moroccan citizenship (Brand, 2006).  With the introduction of a 
new family law in the early 2000s, Moroccan women now are also able to pass on their 
citizenship to their children (Ennaji, 2010; Krieg, 2010).  Similar to Turkey, some groups get 
the right to acquire Moroccan citizenship, such as children born in Morocco to foreign 
parents, female spouses of Moroccans, and persons who have rendered “exceptional 
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services” to Morocco (de Haas, 2009).  Moroccan citizenship is practically inalienable.  
Constitution does not allow original Moroccan identity to be lost except under exceptional 
circumstances, and then only by a ruling by a committee presided over by the prime minister.  
Thus, it is almost impossible for emigrants to relinquish citizenship, and it is automatically 
passed on to the second and even third generations (de Haas, 2009).  Considering that 
permission to renounce Moroccan identity has never been granted since the country’s 
independence, emigrants obtaining citizenship of their country of settlement has to 
automatically acquire dual citizenship. 
 
Morocco’s policy of not relinquishing citizenship is considered by some European politicians 
and governments, especially the Dutch government, as an obstacle to their integration 
policies.  Accordingly, the Dutch government asked Morocco to stop automatically granting 
citizenship to Moroccan descendants as part of efforts to abolish dual citizenship as a means 
to further migrants’ integration (de Haas, 2009).  The Moroccan authorities refused this 
request on the grounds that it was an unwanted interference in their internal affairs.  
Similarly, in 2006, right-wing members of parliament publicly questioned the loyalty of 
Khadija Arib, a Dutch Labour Party member of parliament who is also one of the two Dutch-
Moroccan members of the migration working-group in Morocco, which advises the King by 
arguing that Arib’s dual position is incompatible because of conflicting loyalties, therefore she 
had to choose (de Haas, 2009).  Correspondingly, in Belgium, Fatiha Saidi who is a member 
of parliament for the Socialist Party did not want to join the Moroccan migration working-
group because she did not want to work for institutions of two different states (de Haas, 
2009).  
 
 
The second phase: Dual citizenship as a consequence of the transnational space 
 
As illustrated above in the cases of Morocco and Turkey, after over several decades of 
different experiences of emigration and naturalization of emigrants in many countries around 
the world, the effect of acquisition of citizenship on the position of emigrants and on the origin 
countries continues to be hotly debated.  It is even more intensely debated in the era of 
transnational migratory settings (Faist, 2007; Pitkanen and Kalekin-Fishman, 2007).  At the 
centre of the debate is the relative importance of the origin countries’ citizenship policies and 
practices in the likelihood of dual citizenship and if this likelihood is a cause or an effect for 
the question of an optimum position of emigrants. The cause side of the debate views the 
positive effect of liberal dual citizenship policies and practices on the likelihood of increasing 
incorporation into the social, political, and economic spheres of both sending and receiving 
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countries that would not have occurred otherwise.  Implicit in this position is, on the one 
hand, the assumption that the desire to integrate to the receiving country and thus the 
demand for acquisition of citizenship can be manipulated by liberalizing the dual citizenship 
policies and practices.  On the other hand, the expectation that the wish to keep close ties 
between emigrants and sending countries and consequently the demand for transnational 
citizenship in the form of dual citizenship can be provided by making dual citizenship 
arrangements possible.  The cause side optimistic assessment of the migration and 
citizenship linkage is exemplified by the relatively relaxed dual citizenship procedures of 
traditional emigration and immigration countries (İçduygu and denay, 2008). 
 
Advocates of the effect side of the debate argue that more rigid dual citizenship policies and 
practices have produced two conflicting results: first, more clear desire to incorporate to the 
social, political, and economic spheres of the receiving countries, and then to try to take out 
the citizenship of these countries; second, increasing reluctance to integrate into the 
receiving countries, but ironically also being reluctant to return home, and then staying in 
limbo.  In the absence of liberal dual citizenship procedures, emigrants who desire to acquire 
dual citizenship will be in search of new membership status that carries a transnational 
character.  The effect side of the argument views the desire to live in an environment of 
transnational relations and thus attempt to incorporate to the various spheres of both sending 
and receiving countries, as a necessary precondition for the construction of dual citizenship 
institution.  This position indeed determines the demands for dual citizenship policies and 
practices in many European countries (İçduygu and denay, 2008).  Undoubtedly however, 
emigration countries such as Morocco and Turkey have opposite views towards these 
conservative approaches on dual citizenship. 
 
While these debates are taken place in many migrant-receiving states, the presence of 
diaspora communities and the ongoing emigratory flows continue to pose both challenges 
and opportunities for many migrant-sending nation-states and their citizens. Today many 
nation-states have their expatriates who are the citizens of other countries. Thousands of 
people have dual or multiple citizenship and live in more than one country. Thousands are 
disenfranchised because they cannot become citizens in their country of residence. In short, 
many people have faced with a crisis of their citizenship because of international mobility. 
The anomalous status of citizens reveals that new approaches to citizenship are needed, 
which take account of new understanding of citizenship: for instance, as Ong (2006:501) 
noted, transnational practices enhance the capacity of immigrants to negotiate national 
spaces and to claim citizenship-like entitlements “as free individuals to confront globalized 
insecurities by making calculations and investments in their lives”. The crucial question here 
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is whether the current policies and practices allow for a progressive form of dual citizenship, 
and what parameters one can think of for this possible form, which is likely to be compatible 
with the realities of transnational communities. Ultimately, what remains very imperative from 
these debates is the need for a critical re-thinking about the construction of an institution of 
dual citizenship which implies a type of transnational citizenship (Faist, 2007). 
 
 
Turkey 
 
As noted earlier, to maintain ties with Turkish migrants abroad, who increasingly opt for 
permanent residence in their host countries and choose to renounce their Turkish citizenship, 
the Turkish state amended its Citizenship Law to legalize dual citizenship in 1981 (İçduygu, 
1996; İçduygu et. al., 1999).  The large number of Turkish citizens living abroad and their 
economic importance for Turkey can explain why tolerance of dual citizenship has increased 
in the official rhetoric and practices.  Within the context of this change, Turkish citizens who 
would acquire the citizenship of another country would first apply to the authorities and get 
permission for withdrawal from Turkish citizenship. After acquiring another country's 
citizenship, there was still an opportunity to keep Turkish citizenship by returning the required 
documents to the Turkish authorities within a three-year period after receiving the permission 
papers. Of course, this dual citizenship application would work only if the receiving nation-
states also applied the dual citizenship principles.  
 
However, as some migrant receiving nation-states do not allow dual citizenship, Turkish 
citizens living in those countries have faced the dilemma of either withdrawing from Turkish 
citizenship or remaining as aliens in the countries in which they live. This dilemma becomes 
even more complex as Article 29 of the Citizenship Law indicates that a person who has lost 
Turkish citizenship would be treated as a foreigner and such person may only benefit from 
the rights of the foreigners as recognized by Turkish law in matters such as residence, 
acquiring and transferring real estate, inheritance and labour. Accordingly, many emigrants 
have been reluctant to give up their Turkish citizenship since they may face the loss of some 
of their legal rights in Turkey (İçduygu, 1996: 150). Repeatedly hearing the complaints of 
emigrants on such inconveniences, in 1995 the Turkish state made a change in the law, 
allowing those who held Turkish citizenship by birth and yet had acquired another country's 
citizenship, and their inheritors, to benefit from the rights of Turkish citizenship. Based on this 
legal change, the application of the so-called “pink card” regime protected some of the 
original citizenship rights of those who held Turkish citizenship by birth but had acquired 
another country’s citizenship (Çağlar, 2000). This has been an ad hoc arrangement, which 
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legitimates a new membership status implying something more than being a foreigner but 
being less than a citizen. This has actually been a move from a dual citizenship 
understanding to a sort of dual nationality principle.  As indicated by Faist (2000:271), dual 
nationality is different from dual citizenship in that rights under the former are more restricted 
than under the latter in which a person holds the passports of two nation-states and has full 
rights and duties in both. For instance, holders of the Turkish “pink card” cannot vote or hold 
political office in Turkey or serve in the Turkish army. 
 
Hammar (1989:81) argues that the debate over dual citizenship involves a debate over the 
meaning of citizenship.  The peculiarities of the meaning attributed to the term citizenship in 
Turkey and the changing nature of this meaning may be elaborated in the context of 
emigration-citizenship debate.  On the one hand, as often happens in most migrant-sending 
states, Turkey essentially prefers the blood principle of citizenship. Based on practical 
national interests, it wishes to keep close contacts with its citizens abroad, and therefore 
tends to encourage emigrants to retain their citizenship and transfer it to their children. On 
the other hand, acknowledging the reality of the permanent presence of its emigrants abroad, 
and considering the ongoing process of access to citizenship rights in the receiving states, it 
also wishes the emigrants to acquire the citizenship of the receiving nation-states. Thus, the 
Turkish State initially tended to stress the importance of legal regulations that permit the 
emigrants to qualify for naturalization without giving up their original citizenship, and dual 
citizenship was obviously seen as an important and practical tool for the integration process 
of its emigrants in the receiving societies.  However, when the migrant-receiving states did 
not have the regulation of dual, or multiple citizenship, one-way application of this regulation 
by the sending-state was not at all practical, and often caused inconveniences for the three 
main actors of a migration setting, namely the migrants themselves, and the sending and 
receiving nation-states. Practically, this one-way application appeared to be the acceptance 
of dual nationality, but the rejection of the notion of dual citizenship (Faist, 2000:272).   
 
 
Morocco 
 
There is also a growing awareness within the Moroccan state apparatus that emigrants’ 
social and economic integration into destination countries does not have to undermine their 
contribution to Morocco’s development (de Haas, 2009; Collyer, 2004).  Emigrants’ economic 
and political integration is considered to be a desirable development, because of the belief 
that correctly-positioned migrants can play a key role in attracting investment in Morocco and 
stimulating trade.  Besides, the Moroccan state realized that better off and integrated 
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migrants are also in a better position to send larger sums of remittances to family and friends 
in Morocco.  Accordingly, in 1990, the Ministry of the Moroccan Community Abroad was 
established to promote social, economic and cultural action aimed at nationals living abroad; 
to follow the migratory movements of Moroccans; to participate in relations and international 
negotiations of all types relative to emigration and to the living conditions of Moroccans 
abroad; and to develop programs to facilitate the reintegration of the emigrants upon their 
final return (Brand, 2006: 75).  At the same time, Morocco began to adopt an increasingly 
favourable attitude towards naturalization, dual citizenship and voting rights for its migrants 
abroad, a trend that also continued in 2000s.  
 
Through an in-depth discourse analysis of official documents, Brand (2006: 66) notes that 
Morocco put together the most serious and multi-faceted consideration of the expatriates to 
date in its 2000-2004 State Plan.  While affirming state sovereignty over the emigrant 
population by stressing that relations between emigrants and Morocco are very deep, the 
document emphasizes that the “government is to oversee efforts intended to reinforce 
Moroccan identity in order to avoid Moroccans’ opting for integration into their host countries” 
(Brand, 2006: 67).  At the same time, it is underlined that the character of Morocco’s relations 
with the host countries, particularly with the European Union, implicitly depends at least in 
part upon the nature of relations Morocco has with the emigrants.  Therefore, it was 
important both to defend emigrants’ rights –Ministry of Human Rights was the designated 
organ to do so– and to preserve the lines of their attachment/belonging to Morocco as well 
as encouraging their participation in the country’s development.  Brand (2006:68) states: 
 
This document is thereby the first to treat [emigrants] as full human beings and fuller 
citizens, in the sense of the state’s manifesting a serious concern for their welfare and 
success.  The state implicitly seems to have understood that for its call to maintain 
identity to generate a positive response, it must demonstrate its commitment to 
provide something akin to the protection or concern for its citizens that underpins the 
moral authority of the sovereign state. 
 
All these reflect a shift in thinking in which the development contribution of migrants is not 
forcibly linked to return migration and that transnationally oriented and integrated migrants 
are perfectly able to engage with their countries of origin without necessarily returning.  Thus, 
there is “a gradual evolution in the state’s perception of the emigrants, from that of a 
Moroccan abroad as one less unemployed worker at home, to that of a contributor to the 
national economy, and finally that of a multi-faceted asset with economic, social and cultural 
ties to the kingdom” (Brand, 2006: 69). 
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Concluding remarks 
 
This essay began by raising three interrelated questions. The first, i.e., how the migrant-
sending countries deal with the citizenship status of their emigrating members, is puzzling 
given the transnational developments in recent decades when individual emigrants and their 
families are faced with changes in their legal membership status, identities, and civic virtues. 
The second question, i.e., to what extent some novel formulation of citizenship institution, 
such as dual or multiple citizenship might offer innovative responses to the emigratory 
realities, was inspired by the transnational transformations. The third issue, i.e., how are the 
dynamics and mechanisms of migrant-sending states’ ongoing attempts to reinforce the 
boundaries of the national community by insisting upon the economic, political and cultural 
membership of those living outside the territories of these states, remains important as 
citizenship institution transforms itself from a national context to a transnational one. Explicit 
in these three questions are a relatively less known but increasingly emerging query about in 
what ways the institution of citizenship in the migrant-sending countries have experienced 
change as an outcome of transnational influence. 
 
Citizenship status of international emigrants as it is related to their own home countries is as 
discussed in the case of Morocco and Turkey here relational and transnational. The 
construction of dual citizenship institution within this framework involves transnational 
articulations: emigrants perceive and experience their citizenship through a “dual (or even 
multiple) settings” that is often linked to de-territorialised transnational identifications. But this 
de-territorialisation is inclusive of all related transnational spaces, where the related nation-
states tend to make a good use of economic, political, cultural and social benefits while they 
try to divorce themselves from the unintended negative consequences. In the last two 
decades, most migrant-receiving states were too reluctant in coping effectively with the 
challenges of the institution of dual citizenship, and tended to be more critical of this 
institution. Meanwhile, however, dual citizenship became a particularly delicate issue for 
migrant-sending states in the process of transnational restructuring of their relations with the 
diaspora communities. In the earlier periods, for these sending states, the institution of dual 
citizenship was mostly perceived through an understanding of methodological nationalism 
which encouraged emigrants’ to keep their ties strong with their home countries.  In the later 
periods, dual citizenship was determined by a transnational approach, which acknowledged 
the dynamic exchanges between sending and receiving communities and states. As far as 
the cases of Morocco and Turkey are concerned, it seems that the institution of dual 
citizenship emerges as a type of “multi-nationalized” citizenship which is functional for the 
discourses and practices of transnational spaces where international migrants act and react 
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as the transnational actors of social, economic, political and cultural spheres both in their 
home countries and their new settlement countries. 
 
What becomes clear out of the surveys of these two well-known migrant-sending states is 
that some basic economic, political, and social concerns determine the changing positions of 
these states’ interest to the institution of dual citizenship. These dynamic positions are the 
decisive transnational outcomes as emerged through the recent differences observed in the 
cases of Morocco and Turkey: today the rhetoric of dual citizenship is mostly an issue of 
political and social concern in Turkey, while it is widely a concern of economics in Morocco, 
due to the priorities of these states related to their emigrants’ linkages in the transnational 
spaces. 
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Chapter 4 
Building up a Transnational Polity? 
Political Transnationalisation and the Transformation of Statehood 
Leif Kalev, Mari-Liis Jakobson, Rein Ruutsoo 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this article we seek to develop an analytical approach to political transnationalisation. 
Transnationalism is a concept mostly developed by social anthropologists and economists 
resulting in rather limited links to political processes (Bauböck, 2003). At the same time, 
politics as the field of allocating and legitimating power and individual political agency is 
clearly relevant for transnationalisation.  
 
There are many perspectives for defining “the political” (see Heywood, 2002: 3-25 for an 
outline). Here we focus on the capacity of human beings to shape their future using political 
institutions, determining the political regime and the instruments for governance. This 
requires a political community of citizens capable to arrange their common affairs. “The 
diagnosis of social conflicts transforms itself into a list of just as many political challenges 
only if we attach a further premise to the egalitarian institutions of rational law: the 
assumption that the unified citizens of a democratic community are able to shape their own 
social environment and can develop the capacity for action necessary for such intervention to 
succeed.” (Habermas, 2001: 60). 
 
Contemporary human political life has mainly been organised in the form of state, a central 
rule within a certain territory vis a vis a certain population. Although a state is the usual 
example of a polity dominant for several centuries, we can find indications of other types in 
history and can project other types also in the future (i.a. Albert et al, 2009; Ferguson et al, 
2000). Especially in the literature on transnationalisation and globalisation it is often claimed 
that political unity can also occur without territorial unity and over the boundaries of states. 
Thus we develop the broader categories of polity and political space to avoid methodological 
nationalism but to retain the key characteristics of human political organisation. A typical 
contemporary polity is characterised by statehood in terms of systemic governance 
complemented by citizenship as citizen political agency in case of democratic governance. 
There are also other political spaces besides full polities. 
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Most of the literature on transnationalisation of politics (i.a. Vertovec, 2009; Østergaard-
Nielsen, 2003) handles the subject of political transnationalism in a rather particularistic 
perspective. The transnational strategies and practices of individuals have gained a lot of 
attention, while the context of political regime (e.g. how to sustain a functioning democracy in 
the context of transnationalisation) and governance are often left aside (with the exception of 
migration policies). By addressing the transformation of the political space, we aim to create 
a framework that treats political transnationalisation in a wider perspective, acknowledging 
the existence of the impact of both individuals and the institutional structures we often take 
for granted.  
 
The central problem we address, is: what are the opportunities for the transnational polities 
to develop? What are the chances that the transnational political space transforms into a 
coherent polity? Or how would the dominant type of polity – the state – accommodate to the 
emerging transnational political spaces? Our analysis begins by defining the transnational 
political space and developing a typology of these spaces. Next we will discuss the main 
characteristics of a democratic polity and analyse whether and which spaces outlined are in 
accordance with these criteria and thus assess them as alternatives to the state as a polity. 
In the third part, we will examine the possibility of states adapting to the transnational 
circumstance. We will do this by outlining different statehood settings and their opportunities 
within transnational political spaces.  
In conclusion, we analyse the likelihood of different types of transnational political spaces to 
develop in contemporary statehood settings and identifying the key factors supporting 
political transnationalisation. 
 
 
Transnational political spaces 
 
The scholarly discussion on transnationalism has in the last decades been developing with 
accelerating speed, starting with the basic idea of the two-directional cultural and goods 
exchange created by migrants (cf. i.a. Sutton, Makiesky-Barrow, 1975), of actually having 
effective personal footage in two or more societies (Chaney, 1979: 209) and circulating 
rather than migrating (Richardson, 1983: 176). This has lead to regarding embeddedness in 
cross-border exchange as a normal part of the contemporary social status of people and 
outlining the possibility of relative stability of transnational social spaces building upon people 
in or in between various national societies (Glick Schiller et al, 1992). 
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Related to politics the concept “transnational” gained relevance with the writings of Joseph 
Nye and Robert Keohane (i.a 2008 [1971]) and other representatives of the constructivist 
school in international relations. They offer a macro-level insight into the post-methodological 
nationalism idea – the states not being the sole key actors in world politics. Such an 
approach is also articulated by Ferguson et al (i.a 2000; Ferguson, Mansbach, 2008; 
Ferguson, Jones, 2002) – that world politics is conducted in polities – political communities 
within which there is more interaction than outside, and which feature specific functional 
institutions. A polity could encompass states, organisations, individuals and their networks 
that are relevant for its functions. However, a polity is only one ideal typical type of a political 
space and not all transnational political spaces as theorised in relevant literature comply with 
that definition. Thus, a more general definition of transnational political spaces is needed.  
 
The concept of transnational spaces is most often associated with the writings of Thomas 
Faist (i.a. 2000a, 2000b), indicating a border-crossing network of relationships: “transnational 
social spaces are combinations of ties, positions in networks and organisations and networks 
of organisations that reach across the borders of multiple states” (Faist, 2000a: 191).  
 
From a systems theoretical perspective transnational spaces are autopoietic subsystems that 
organise themselves according to the conditions in the environment – i.e. unequal 
development (as a premise of migration, flow of remittances etc), principal cultural 
differences (that do not enable thorough integration in the “receiving” society, but rather 
adaptation to its rules), relative underrepresentation in some political institutions (that could 
result in remaining extra-institutional and peripheral or in a demand for equal rights) are all 
“environmental” triggers that design the essence of transnational political spaces.  
 
A transnational political space is also a functional system, where the collective will-formation, 
decision-making and governance is conducted, rules and norms for other spaces are created 
depending on the internal power relations and sources of legitimacy. Thus, it is a kind of a 
meta-space to other transnational social spaces.  
 
As systems theory suggests, the openness of the systems differs. Some systems might be 
more resistant to transformation (more stably orthodox in Bourdieu’s terms) due to some 
internal characteristics. For example, although there is a large amount of non-citizens in state 
A, the modes of gaining citizenship are not reviewed due to a strong mono-ethnic state 
tradition; or although people from state B residing in state C have transnational attachments, 
they do not engage nor even feel the need to engage in politics on a transnational level. In 
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the more flexible systems, heterodoxy prevails and various new political projects might be 
proposed.  
 
Thus in theoretical terms, a transnational political space may be an ad hoc space that has no 
sustainable institutions and emerges barely due to a topic that requires political action, but it 
could also resemble a coherent polity or something inbetween. This is also the case with 
thematic literature: it constructs the transnational political space of various components, 
ascribes it different functions and scope. We will attempt to systematise these constructions 
according to the significance ascribed to the transnational political space. 
 
The weakest type of transnational political space is a tunnel-like formation between two or 
more coherent polities. Especially migration-centred writings (i.a Guarnizo et al, 2008 [2003]) 
depict it as "various forms of direct cross border participation in the politics of their country of 
origin /---/ as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country” 
(Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; cf. Bauböck, 2003: 701). In other writings, the emphasis is on the 
role of the transnational civil society institutions. However, these networks are composed of 
voluntary associations organised around shared interests and cannot stand as a surrogate 
for the political community per se, which acts as the addressee of claims made by the 
organisations and groups of civil society. Thus such political transnationalisation is only 
subsidiary to the nation state level. According to Kymlicka (2003: 291) “the weak 
transnationalism of advocacy networks is predicated on, even parasitic on, the ongoing 
existence of bounded political communities”. 
 
A more thorough perception of the transnational political space stems from the multi-level 
approach which depicts the transnational setting as an additional level of governance. 
Transnational regime theory (Bennett, 2004; Lipschutz, 2000), understanding of the “rise of 
legalism” (Schmit, 2004, cf. Djelic, Sahlin-Andersson, 2006) and soft law (Mörth, 2006) see 
the transnational political space upheld by negotiation networks that produce “norms that 
promote semivoluntary compliance over force in dealing with common issues.” (Bennett, 
2004: 128) As Slaughter (cf 2008) points out, the transnational level fosters cooperation 
between various governmental or local institutions, agencies etc. It is a network of 
cooperation, not a sovreign body. Global democrats sketch a multilayered, global democratic 
order in which no single layer or site is dominant (Pogge, 1992: 58; Young, 2000: 266). As 
the multilayered scheme also involves significant decentralization to the sub-national level 
and robust democratic politics is seen truly possible only at the local level, the argument runs 
that global democracy would, in fact, translate into more, rather than less, „real” democracy. 
But no matter how forcefully the principle of subsidiarity is applied, the global democratic 
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project would still entail the implementation of global principles and standards (e.g. 
(re)distributive principles, human rights standards) that would rely on coercive enforcement 
agencies (Benhabib, 2004: 113). Hence, one can’t escape the need to ensure the democratic 
legitimacy of political institutions above the state level. 
 
The most extensive vision of the transnational political space – the radical one – 
conceptualises it along the lines of a polity (Bauböck, 2003). It is not only ideally exercised in 
the multiplicity of „sites“, but there is no systematic arrangement of the levels of governance, 
either. There are numerous competing and overlapping autonomous power centres acting as 
habitats in Bauman’s (1992) sense, their influence and persistence depending on the interest 
of the consumers/”citizens“ to relate themselves to this particular habitat. The radical 
transnational political space could be viewed as the tunnel and the multi-level space merged: 
it combines both a vibrant global or transnational civil society and the transnational 
governance regimes, thus giving it some democratic legitimation. As Price (2003) notes, 
these institutions enable to fulfil almost all the stages of policy development: agenda setting, 
developing solutions, building networks and coalitions of allies and implementing the 
solutions. The system is understood as working if there is adequate information available for 
citizens who thus can act as rational consumers. Kuper (2004) suggests that this could be 
organised using (cross-border) formal advocacy and accountability agencies, akin to public 
ombudsmen, access of information agencies or the public curator's office would provide 
citizens “crucial, limited ranges of more independent and accessible information about 
political actors” while also acting on their behalf as “professional contesters”. In this model 
states are ought to be replaced and we can speak of a world entirely structured according to 
the rational offer and demand logic of micro-economic market model.ˇ 
 
Type of 
transnational space 
Components Functions Scope 
Tunnel-like Participation in national politics 
Advocacy groups and coalitions 
 
Extra link for solving occasionally 
occurring transnational issues 
Modest 
Multi-level Networks of sectoral institutions; 
Advocacy groups and coalitions 
Constant hub for coordinating 
sectoral policies of different 
localities 
Moderate 
Radical Advocacy groups and coalitions; 
Governmental/municipal institutions;  
Special transnational governance 
institutions 
Full-scale governance of the 
transnational space 
Extensive 
Table 1: Typology of transnational political space constructions. Source: authors 
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Thus, transnational political space can be conceptualised in several ways, depending on the 
observer’s focus (determining the components and functions brought into the fore) and 
ambition but also, whether the locus is on micro-, meso- or macro-level components of the 
transnational space. Transformation to any of the three types of political transnational spaces 
requires adjustments of the existing political institutions through both macro, meso and micro 
level transformations as summarised in the following table. Whereas radical version has very 
high expectations the others remain more modest and thus more probable. It is worthy of 
mentioning that radical version can be found in some theoretical writings while empirical 
research reflects preliminary tunnel-like and partially also multi level conceptualisations of 
transnational political space. 
 
Type of 
transnational 
space 
Expected direction of 
macro-level 
transformation 
Expected direction of meso-
level transformation 
Expected direction of micro-level 
transformation 
Tunnel-like 
Accommodation of states 
(postmodernising) and 
international governmental 
organisations 
Strengthening of transnational 
advocacy networks addressing 
state institutions 
Strengthening of transnational 
citizen political agency based on 
the usual model of democratic 
citizenship 
Multi-level 
Emergence of systematic 
setting of multi-level 
governance with various 
relevant levels including 
the state institutions 
Emergence of advocacy 
networks and multi-level 
governance institutions 
transcending national political 
spaces 
Strengthening of transnational 
citizen political agency operating at 
various levels but roughly 
corresponding to the model of 
democratic citizenship 
Radical 
Emergence of dynamic 
political habitats 
competing with each other 
[Same as macro] 
Emergence of transnational agency 
in line with the model of rational 
consumerism 
Table 2. Possible transformation of the key elements of transnational spaces. Source: authors 
 
 
A democratic polity: statehood and citizenship 
 
In many recent centuries, political life has been organised mainly in the form of state. 
Although it has been challenged by the “methodological nationalism” debate in 
transnationalisation studies (Glick Schiller, Wimmer, 2002), some characteristics of the state 
outlined in state theory are more universal, also characteristic to the more abstract concept 
of polity. Hence, we should be able to identify the key structural requirements for a 
functioning polity by abstracting the features of the state. In concise form, Mann (1993: 55) 
has defined the state as “a differentiated body of institutions and staff that embodies 
centrality, because political interactions are coming from or are aimed at the centre, and that 
administers a limited territory over which it executes authoritative and binding regulations 
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supported by physical power.“ In addition to law and coercion, a state is also 
communicatively built through a common communicative space including education, 
standardization, common myths of history, national identity etc. (see Kalev, 2009). 
 
The dynamics between centralising institutions and the people they seek to organise into a 
coherent political system is the key to the understanding of state-type political organisation 
but also any other polity. For our purposes it is important to emphasise the heterogeneity of 
these processes. The state elites and institutions are diverse and contestation within them 
results in policy-making being in constant flux. Even more heterogeneity is found among the 
populace. We will follow the understanding that the state institutions generally attempt to 
create coherence within the territory (Weber, 1978: 54–56; Mann, 1993: 54–63) while the 
other actors are ambivalent in this respect: they may be supportive, opposing or neutral (see 
Jessop, 1990: 3-10). 
 
From the many perspectives in analysing statehood (see i.a. Hay et al, 2006; Dryzek, 
Dunleavy, 2009) our focus is on its capacity to organise systematic governance and establish 
human democratic political agency. Examining these key features enables us to analyse to 
which extent different political spaces conform to the requirements of a full polity. 
 
In terms of systematic governance, we can see two main functions of polities – cohesion and 
effectiveness. First, a polity generates some kind of common binding rationality enabling the 
member to see each other as partners or adversaries, not enemies (see Habermas, 2001; 
Mouffe, 2005: 1-8). The conflict of participants should be embedded in a consensus among 
them on belonging to a polity and on the rules of game. Members of polity should be able to 
distinguish themselves from the others in a way enabling them to perceive the wins and 
losses of members as affecting common outcomes. Everyone has to face the possibility of 
losing in any specific decision – but everyone must have the disposition to see it as losing to 
those who belong among “Us,” and not some kind of foreign power, “Them” (Baurmann, 
Zintl, 2006: 63). 
 
Second, a polity should have effective mechanisms for both achieving and effecting policy 
decisions. Fairly achieved and practically implemented policies enable the belief in effective 
common activity. Statehood as a systematic model of governance entails at least the 
following key roles of state institutions (Pierre, Peters, 2006: 215-216, adapted): 
1. To provide an agreed upon mechanism for establishing priorities, and for making 
choices among competing priorities. The political process, usually through a 
legislature of some sort, provides the necessary legitimation and the means for 
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making decisions that have the force of law. 
2. To reconciliate the goals and programmes that, even with legislative choices, may be 
conflicting or at minimum, inconsistent. Although less formalised means have some 
potential the general means of producing policy co-ordination is through institutions 
such as cabinets and central agencies. 
3. To implement policies, to actually steer economy and society. Implementation has 
conventionally been considered the province of public bureaucracy and even if it uses 
non-governmental actors and the instruments of new governance, these tend to 
function in the shadow of hierarchy and to be backed by the possibility of using state 
authority. 
4. To monitor policy results, generate feedback and accountability to understand the 
consequences of previous decisions in order to be able to steer effectively. In any 
society the feedback element is crucial, to provide for on-going correction and change 
of policy, but for democratic governments the accountability element provides the 
information basis needed for citizens’ political decisions. Although some private 
sector watchdogs can be useful, the ultimate responsibility for sufficient and 
uninterrupted accountability resides with public institutions. 
 
These features of sustainable systemic governance could be understood as universal across 
various polities. For a democratic polity we need another feature – citizenship establishing 
individual political agency. Here, the key question is the emancipated status of a person in 
polity usually understood as the right to participate in defining public preferences and 
exercising power whereas the contrast to former passive status of subjects is manifest. “The 
transfer of the sovereignty from the body politic of the king to the body politic of citizens is a 
major turning point in the history of the western democracy.” (Turner, 1990: 211) 
 
In the context of the transnationalisation debate we can differentiate between two logics of 
political citizenship: the civil and the democratic. According to the civil logics the 
emancipation of a citizen is primarily enacted through practice of individual rights and is 
guaranteed by the rule of law. The democratic logic has the key interest in the ways citizen 
agency can potentially be performed in practice. 
 
The democratic logic prescribes the state with an obligation to provide an empowering 
structure for participation and demands some cohesion from the society. Citizen political 
agency and participation require significant interaction and mutual awareness and hence 
appear as collective rather than individual. Correspondingly, democratic structures have to 
be built up in order to guarantee democratic political agency. Political leaders would have to 
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create political institutions that would provide citizens with opportunities for effective political 
participation, influence, and control. To take advantage of these opportunities, citizens would 
need to be about as concerned and informed about the policy decisions of political 
organizations. This necessitates the engagement of citizens in public debate and discussion 
of the alternatives, which in turn preconditions political competition by parties and individuals 
seeking office who would present these alternatives both about internal as well as 
international governance in a way engaging for the public (Dahl, 1999: 31, abridged). 
 
The radical authors of civil logic (i.a. Kuper, 2004) suggest abandoning the conception of 
democratic legitimacy implicit in deliberative, participatory and republican conceptions of 
democracy where laws are legitimate only if citizens can participate in the process of making 
them. Instead, citizens would exercise control over authorities in a more formal manner 
giving general feedback on governance. The world could be conceptualised as the dynamic 
spheres of authority whose foundation is not legitimacy per se, rather a capacity to “evoke 
compliance” within their respective domains (Rosenau, 2002; Ferguson, Jones, 2002). They 
would constitute “a locus of mobilization that agglomerates and pursues [citizens'] concerns 
and yet does not require that citizens act together with high levels of mutual awareness”. In 
addition, citizen agency could be exercised “voting by feet,” i.e. punishing authorities by 
abandoning them and joining some other. 
 
The civil logic is in difficulties to meet the key concern of political citizenship, i.e. the effective 
interconnection of citizen political agency and the exercise of power through institutions. It is 
hard to see the motivation mechanisms for establishing and maintaining sufficient 
transparency agents when even in nation state specialised to systemic governance there are 
serious deficiencies in formulating and implementing policies (see Dunleavy, O’Leary, 1995; 
Hay et al, 2006; Dryzek, Dunleavy, 2009). Also, why should citizens be more active in civil 
setting than in polyarchies that are citizen-centred by definition? Changing one’s sphere of 
authority and place of residence is in practice usually time-consuming and rather than 
compel authorities people can accept non-agency as a price for decent living (see the 
literature on denizenship, i.a. Hammar, 1990). The NGOs in global civil society rely upon the 
support of governments and many of them are not democratic (see Axtmann, 2010). 
 
It cannot be demonstrated that meaningful citizen political agency could be set up on the 
basis of civil logic. Hence, democratic polities have to be based to democratic logic of 
political citizenship. Also in this case, citizenship can be globally sensitive or globally oriented 
(see Parekh, 2003; Axtmann, 2010). 
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We have identified three key characteristics of a democratic polity: cohesion, effectiveness 
and democratic citizenship. The transnational political spaces meet these only partially. A 
tunnel-like space doesn’t have the ambition to replace state and can thus rely on it in all the 
main characteristics. It can achieve some limited cohesion and effectiveness but this is 
related to additional personal or group opportunities not aimed at substituting polity. A multi-
level space can achieve effectiveness but is in difficulties with cohesion and democratic 
citizenship as it entails transparency problems. A radical space is in difficulties with all three 
characteristics of polity. 
 
In sum we can see that in the foreseeable future the transnational political spaces are not 
likely to replace states as the core of polities. This doesn’t exclude the possibility of the 
spaces to develop in line with states, enrich and possibly alter the ways polities are 
functioning. Hence, we should examine the ways statehood is currently transforming to come 
into terms with transnationalisation and identify the points of possible coeffect. 
 
 
Transformation of statehood 
 
During the last decades, we can see an ongoing debate on the implications of globalisation 
for the state. We can distinguish between globalisationists, statists and transformationists 
(Held et al, 1999; Sørensen, 2004, Vertovec, 2009). The globalisationist (or retreat or 
liberalist) scholars argue that the state is significantly weakening or even fading and being 
replaced by global or alternative structures. The statist (or sceptic or state-centric or realist) 
scholars deny this and claim that in broad terms the central role of the state remains broadly 
in line with the modernity with normal dynamics. Transformationists represent an analytical 
compromise seeing states proactively transforming as state institutions seek to maintain 
relevance in changing conditions (Sørensen, 2004; 2006). 
 
Nowadays, there is a rather widespread consensus on the continued relevance of states in 
transnational politics even among the globalisationist scholars (Held et al, 1999: 9; Beck, 
2005; Vertovec, 2009) broadly in line with the transformationist approach. The above 
discussed cohesion and effectiveness of the polity are seldom denied and dissent on 
democratic citizenship remains limited. However, the patterns of transformation of state are 
continuously debated. 
 
Corresponding to the transformationist approach, we understand governance as a complex 
adaptation and steering of society that may be carried out by different actors in the society in 
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cooperation with the state institutions in addition to the traditional patterns of modern 
government (mass democracy and bureaucratic administration). The strategies range from 
ètatiste state institutions’ dominance to network-centred governance legitimated by state 
actors (Peters, Pierre, 2006). However, in all of these the state institutions keep a role of 
maintaining control and allocating and legitimating authority. 
 
We see state institutions as active shapers of their operation environment, and not simply as 
reacting to changes or as decidedly negative contra-players to transnationalisation. State 
institutions seek to find adequate strategies to channel the globalisation and 
transnationalisation processes to acceptable settings. Diversifying the strategy repertoire 
they seek to retain a dominant position in society and keep a critical standard of cohesion 
organised along national borders. These strategies outline the space of opportunities for 
transnationals and, more broadly, for all citizens and are, thus, important parameters to 
analyse transnationalism. Of course, citizens need not only to accommodate but can out try 
alternative strategies. 
 
With regard to the general patterns of transformation we broadly follow Sørensen’s (2004) 
approach differentiating the modern, weak (postcolonial) and postmodern state. These are 
ideal types and a state in practice is probably a mixture with some dominant(s). Sørensen 
discusses the types of state with key interest in the transformation from modern to 
postmodern statehood. Our approach differs in three main aspects. First, we use the types 
without expecting the transition from modern to postmodern state to be inevitable and 
universal. Second, we don’t so much conceptualise these types as only fixed logical options 
but as dynamic and contingent outcomes of statisation strategies. Third we treat the types as 
ideal types of consolidated markers of different organisatory logics of governance. 
 
The modern statehood setting is the classical centralised state where the state 
institutions co-ordinate or steer various aspects of life. As an ahistorical type of state the 
modernising setting is characterized by the attempts of state institutions to build up solid, 
centalised and controlled structures, if necessary, resisting the globalising trends. 
Migration is seen as a phenomenon that might perhaps enhance some spheres of life 
(e.g. economy, skills) and therefore also state-making. At the same time the modern 
state is conceptualised as a nation-state which makes transnational migration 
problematic and unwanted. 
 
The postmodern statehood setting could be described by diffusion and multilateralism – 
many of the processes that were seen as conducted by the modern state, are now 
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arranged on supra-state, local or societal arenas. The transnational character of the 
world is acknowledged as well as the inevitability of migration and the generation of 
transnational communities. These issues are proactively addressed with a focus on 
transforming these processes into more manageable forms. 
 
We can distinguish two types of strategies the state institutions following the postmodern 
model, can undertake: either proactive or comfort-seeking. The institutions that have chosen 
the proactive strategy can even take advantage of the new situation that potentially meant a 
setback for the states, becoming the protagonists of transnationalisation and attempting to 
govern the transnational networks themselves, “colonising” the transnational space. The 
institutions of comfort-seeking states might prefer giving up several actions, delegating 
governance to the better equipped, and taking a pragmatic particularistic role: institutions 
might “specialise” on a very specific function, e.g. accountancy expertise or intermediating 
the interests of some group or just offering stamps, citizen status and other bonuses of 
statehood. 
 
In the weak statehood setting, the main ambition of the ineffective public institutions is 
maintaining at least some grip over society but their success is usually sporadic. 
Therefore, some governance is performed independent from the state institutions and 
some aspects are missing altogether. Nation-building processes have usually failed and 
rather, tribal, local or ethnic communities prevail (Sørensen, 2004). Migration is rather 
uncontrollable by the state and seen threatening the flailing statehood or just being 
neglected. 
 
The statehood settings differ in their treatment of citizenship. The modern setting 
emphasises the ideal type modern citizenship being unitary and unique, sacred, associated 
both to the political as well as the cultural domain, coinciding with the individual residents of 
the polity and entailing important political and social privileges for the holders of citizenship 
(Brubaker, 1989; Schmitter, 2001). 
 
The postmodern setting emphasises the possibilities of multiple citizenship. While a 
significant part of the discussion has been related to legal rules (see (i.a. Hansen, Weil, 
2002; Aleinikoff, Klusmeyer 2002; Martin, Hailbronner, 2003), in the context of 
transnationalism it is easily conceivable to speak of a sociological conception of actual 
multiple citizenship exercised in multiple (nation) states. Another approach is 
represented by the constitutional patriotism of Habermas (1994; 1996; 2001) 
emphasizing the possibility to build up a multi-level federal setting developing 
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democratic politics and governance to a new level. The weak statehood is ambivalent in 
this debate as it is in difficulties to establish any meaningful citizenship in competition 
with other identities and power centres.  
 
On the basis of citizenship expectations we can derive notable differences among the 
statehood settings on the basis of their orientation and ability to come into terms with 
transnationalisation. Postmodern state represents a proactive pattern of governance to 
embrace transnationalism. Modern state primarily tries to downgrade transnationalism. Weak 
state strategies are quite irrelevant in the context of very low practical ability to govern. The 
key parameters of the statehood settings with regard to transnationalism and the respective 
arena of opportunities for transnationalism is summarised in the table below. 
 
RECEIVING STATE 
 Modern Postmodern Weak 
Modern Great efforts or letting go 
(adapting to the receiving 
or remaining loyal to the 
sending country). Double 
affiliation problematic. 
Asymmetry that might make the 
transnational act in concordance 
with the political aims associated 
with the sending country, but use 
the arenas provided by the 
receiving one. 
Hectic environment where the 
transnational might try acting out the 
policies of the sending state in 
control gaps of the receiving state. 
Yet, the environment difficult to cope 
with and might therefore disclaim 
affiliation. Adapting to the new state 
problematic due to few recognizable 
and working channels. 
Postmodern Great efforts in adapting 
to the practices presumed 
by the modernizing state; 
yet possible to maintain 
affiliations that have been 
significant in the sending 
society. 
Expansive opportunities for 
transnational practices 
Hectic environment that enables to 
retain previous affiliations, and 
perhaps also socialize them in the 
new state. This might be obstructed 
by the weak state attempting to fill 
the role of a modern state. Drawn 
towards the opportunities of the 
postmodern state. 
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S
T
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Weak Efforts in order to blend 
into the modern state; 
alternatively retaining 
bonding ties with home 
community 
Enabling environment that 
maintains important ties in 
community of origin. May become 
the arena of promoting 
community's interest. 
Hectic environment that enables 
functioning in the desired way. 
Occasionally the state's power 
demonstrations or assaults from 
rivalling clans might cause ruptures. 
Table 3. Matrix of opportunities for transnational political spaces created by statehood settings. Source: authors 
 
These variations illustrate the heterogeneity of transnational contexts created by the different 
statehood settings. Especially in the case of the tunnel-like transnational space the 
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opportunities for transnationalisation are severely affected by the states on its both ends. We 
can presume asymmetrical tunnels emerging, e.g. in case of modern and weak statehood. 
Also in the multi-level transnational political space the differences will be notable although 
partially mediated by multi-level governance arrangements. The characteristics of anchoring 
states must be taken into account in comparison to different political spaces. 
 
The discussion above indicates that the operative state institutions can probably retain their 
relative position regardless of the type of the political space flexibly using various adjustment 
strategies. Sørensen (2004), summarizing a considerable amount of empirical and 
theoretical material, remains rather moderate even about the phenomenon we phrased as 
the frontline of proactive adaptation – the postmodern statehood – and the existence of three 
types of statehood indicates that many governments oppose more ambitious political 
transnationalisation. 
 
Although the transnationalisation of the power structure of state institutions is in principle 
possible it is difficult to show that the state authorities had sufficient motivation for giving up 
statehood. At least for now, the state institutions are not abandoning the state type operating 
structures and governance practices, although they potentially adapt these to the changing 
circumstances. And even in this case, at least some state institutions are likely to retain an 
effective role in the transnational political space, for example performing a regulating function 
as a meso-level actor. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this article we discussed the opportunities for political transnationalisation from the 
perspective of the basic logics of statehood and citizenship summarised in the form of polity. 
In the discussion conceptualising the political space and its forms we indicated three main 
types or levels of transnational political spaces that have different ambition of structuring the 
political life. The tunnel-like spaces complement and use states. Multi-level models are 
projected towards the emerging systemic setting of multi-level governance with a still notable 
presence of the nation state. The radical version conceives transnational political spaces 
replacing states in a market model. 
 
Transnational political spaces are not likely to replace the state as a full polity characterised 
by cohesion, effectiveness and democratic citizenship. The tunnel-like spaces don’t have the 
ambition to substitute states, the multi-level spaces imply the preservation of these features, 
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and if needed, in a state-like form. The radical spaces as discussed in contemporary 
literature are unable to offer working alternative polities. On the contrary, the state institutions 
by large define the opportunities for global civil society and governance and the patterns of 
statehood significantly influence the chances for transnationals and transnational political 
spaces. 
 
At the same time there are clear opportunities for transnational political spaces to develop 
and enrich political structures. To clarify these opportunities we will conclude with analysing 
the likelihood of different types of transnational political spaces to develop in contemporary 
statehood settings and identifying the key factors supporting political transnationalisation. 
 
We distinguished three general settings of statehood in the context of state institutions’ 
responses to globalisation. Postmodern statehood setting tries to positively accommodate to 
the changes in environment including transnationalisation by applying a more diversified 
pattern of governance – be it proactively (colonising) or reactively (cloaking). Modern 
statehood setting is targeted to reflexive straightforward counter-activities to changes by 
strategies aimed at re-strengthening the features of the modern state. Weak statehood is 
characterised by inability to systematically accommodate to changes and occasional and 
inconsistent activities by state institutions. 
 
It is clearly visible that the postmodern statehood setting offers the most room for 
transnational political spaces and thus gains from them, whereas the weak statehood setting 
remains ambiguous. In case of the modern statehood setting most of the chances for 
transnationalisation have to be gained by bypassing state institutions, which regard 
transnationalisation as in conflict with their aims. However, there are some opportunities in all 
settings and at large and the statehood setting is not necessarily an obstacle for tunnel like 
transnational political spaces. 
 
In addition to the postmodern statehood, globally oriented national citizenship and substantial 
multiple citizenship serve as factors facilitating political transnationalisation. Here ensuring 
meaningful citizen political agency has become the key qualifying aspect. While the 
strategies aimed at re-strengthening the unitary model of political citizenship are generally 
incompatible with transnational political spaces (although some of their tunnel like versions 
may be tolerated), the transformation towards substantial multiple political citizenship is well 
compatible with weak and generally compatible with multi-level type of transnational political 
spaces. 
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The tunnel-like transnational political space has the opportunities to evolve in all the main 
statehood settings. The multi-level type of space is primarily dependent on the interest of the 
state institutions and the success in establishing a systemic multi-level setting of governance; 
in case it evolved, there would be clear avenues of synergy between transnationalisation and 
statehood. The radical version is unlikely to gain ground due to the lack of motivation of state 
institutions. It is conceivable in case of extreme weakness of state institutions such as in 
failed states. However, as the radical space has the polity deficiencies discussed above, it is 
unlikely to be sustainable, not to mention democratic. 
 
In conclusion, although political transnationalisation has not been theorised exactly 
thoroughly, the probability (stemming from the statehood) that the transnational political 
space would evolve in real life, is considerable. As noted in Table 4, especially the micro- 
and meso-level expressions characteristic to the tunnel-like and multilevel transnational 
space are likely to expand. The most fertile statehood setting for political transnationalisation 
is probably the postmodern statehood, for it is the most flexible and positively minded about 
it. Weak states are also a suitable ground, although mainly for the emergence of tunnel-like 
transnational political space, since the multi-level transnational space also preconditions 
some coherence on the state-level and local level. Although the modern states do not 
reserve transnationalisation any spot in their state strategy, it might still emerge in the tunnel-
like form, primarily due to its citizens’ migratory plans or some extra societal attention.  
 
Type of 
transnational space 
Compatibility with 
modern statehood 
Compatibility with 
postmodern 
statehood 
Compatibility with 
weak statehood 
General likelihood to 
evolve 
Tunnel Satisfactory Good Good Considerable 
Multi-level Some Good Some Some 
Radical No No 
Only in case of 
failing state 
Dubious 
Table 4. Transnational political spaces in contemporary statehood settings: compatibility and likelihood to evolve. 
Source: authors 
 
We have demonstrated that there is some ground to speak of political transnationalisation 
and the emergence of transnational political spaces. The internal diversity and various 
alternative types of these concepts must be recognised to build up an adequate framework 
for relating their logics to the ones of statehood. Similarly, statehood should not be 
understood as timelessly fixed and intrinsically rigid but as possibly evolving in a number of 
main directions of transformation. 
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This way we can see that these concepts need not to be inevitably opposed and their 
intrinsic logics be seen as straightforwardly contrasted. Many of the directions of their 
transformation offer good opportunities to see the connections to political 
transnationalisation. This enables us to conceptualise transnational political spaces and 
statehood in a dynamic way and brings out the considerable ground available for empirical 
research. 
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Chapter 5 
Broadening Exchanges and Changing Institutions: 
Multiple Sites of Economic Transnationalism 
S. Irudaya Rajan and V.J. Varghese 
 
 
In the short run, as we can see already, it is likely to be a world of increased 
incivility and violence. In the long run, free of the constraints of the national 
form, we may find that cultural freedom and sustainable justice in the world do 
not presuppose the uniform and general existence of the nation-state. This 
unsettling possibility could be the most exciting divided of living in modernity 
at large. (Appadurai, 1997: 23) 
 
Transnationalism is seen as something that runs against the state and driven primarily by the 
participating people and non-governmental agents, overlooking the role of the state in 
formalizing transnational spaces. The present paper, drawing from the Indian-Punjabi 
experience, argues that transnationalism has become a compelling economic imperative 
manufacturing institutional change at multiple levels with an active involvement of the state. It 
questions the dominant understanding of transnationalism as beyond and despite the state 
and as something that is weakening the nation state. The paper looks at institutional 
transformations in terms of an array of alterations in administrative frameworks at all the 
national, sub-national and local levels to facilitate diverse forms of economic exchanges and 
seeks to explore the degree of convergence/divergence between the transnational practices 
of the ‘people’ and the ‘state’ in an increasingly transnational world. The discourses of 
belonging being construed at national, sub-national and local levels to reinforce 
transmigrants’ multiple layers of homeland ties is also examined in an attempt to complicate 
the notion of voluntarism implicated in transnational exchanges and to fore-figure the 
considered initiatives from the sending/home institutions/societies.       
 
The concept of transnationalism though said to have made its entry into the intellectual 
lexicon during the early twentieth century, its acceptability as a paradigm to understand the 
immigrant state of being with multiple and intersecting belongings came much later after the 
cold war (Waldinger and Fitgerald 2003: 4).  The incredulity towards the paradigm of 
assimilation has brought transnational affiliations and consciousness into the forefront of 
migrant belonging with an essential dual orientation or ‘bifocality’ in everyday life (Castles 
2002, Vertovic 2007, 2007a). Immigration and transnational being are seen as upsetting 
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forces to a nation centred notion of boundedness on the one hand (Wimmer and Schiller 
2002, Heisler 2001: 229-35) and a challenge to the nation state itself on the other (Soysal 
1994, Baubock 1994, Joppke 1998, 1999). Though a distinction has been made between 
‘trasnationalism from above’ that of states and corporations and ‘trasnnationalism from 
below’ that of people (Smith and Eduardo 2006), as a concept and as a field of research, 
transnationalism privileged the people to people contact across national borders as its focal 
point, calling researches on multi-sited lives and ethnoscapes (Marcus 1995, Appadurai 
1996). As a consequence, the role of the state and political agency in formalizing the largely 
informal transnational spaces through new institutions and discreet discourses has been 
largely overlooked. The present exercise by focusing on the working of economic 
transnationalism at national, state and local levels will discuss the institutional change it 
brought in the case of sending country and the statist interventions to formalize trsnantaional 
economic exchanges. The first section will delineate India’s national regime of 
transnationalism, while the second section delineates the attempts on the part of the state 
government of Punjab to bag its transnational resources through a powerful invocation of the 
sub-national identity and ethnic solidarity. The last section discusses how economic 
transnationalism works at the local level, often sidestepping the national and sub-national 
structures to reinvent local affiliations of the migrants and transnational citizen through a 
discourse of ancestral locality. This often undermines and exceeds the attempts to formalize 
the transnational flows at the national and sub-national levels, but in turn influencing the sub-
national and national policies. Such intersecting claims over the transnational resources with 
the help of discreet layers of attachment also place the federal, state and local structures in 
competition for transnational resources.       
 
Migration is seen as an integral part of development and as inter-independent variables 
(Skeldon 1997). As against the ‘brain drain’ presupposition it is increasingly recognized that 
though certain paths of development can generate migration, migration itself can be a 
facilitator of profound changes in the economy and society that can be considered to be 
‘development’ (Skeldon, 2004). Among the various forms of transnational exchanges, 
remittances have become a major component of the foreign exchange earnings of a number 
of countries, resulting in the acceptance of emigration for work as a means of alleviating 
poverty and ensuring development (Harris, 2005). This has also led to a realization that 
emigration can be ‘managed’ to promote development (Skeldon, 2008b). It is also seen that 
as against a permanent loss of its best brains and labour, circular migration would become a 
means of suitably using the human capital of developing countries for the task of reducing 
world poverty (Harris, 2005). Unrestricted immigration and settlement has been seen as a 
greater trouble by the receiving countries too as it accentuates conflicts within native society 
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in terms cultural contradictions and resource distribution. Circular migration is thus seen as 
the best form of migration as it serves the interests of receiving countries apart from 
supporting development in sending countries through remittances and investments by return 
migrants, thus eventually reducing migration pressures (Vertovec, 2007; de Haas, 2007). 
The more optimistic theories of ‘brain circulation’ and ‘brain exchange’, accordingly redefined 
dependency positively as mutual and accentuating transnational economic exchanges as a 
developmental and distributive strategy.   
 
The notion of a one-to-one linear relationship between migration and development is 
however problematic as it presume that development in sending countries will reduce 
migration. Such conclusions have been plagued by some serious conceptual difficulties as 
migration and development share a complex, reciprocal and multi-dimensional relationship 
(de Haas, 2007; Skeldon, 2004). It is yet again presumed, in absolute terms, that migration is 
caused by lack of development and that poverty and lack of opportunity at home force people 
to migrate. But this is not often the case. It is found that it is rarely the poorest who move and 
rarely the poorest countries that participate most in the global migration process (Skeldon, 
2008). It is also revealed that development in the areas of origin did not slow down out-
migration, instead it often accelerate out-movements. The emigration experiences of Kerala 
and Punjab, two states with an incredible emigration record in contemporary India, is 
revealing in this connection. Kerala is seen as a least out-migrating state at least till 1960s. 
The subsequent flow of people from the state various labour receiving countries in the Middle 
East, South East Asia and the West has been such that the Malayalees as a group began to 
be seen as a people with certain intrinsic migratory proclivity. By 1998, 1.36 million people 
from the state were working in other countries (Zachariah et.al, 2002:17). The number of 
emigrants from Kerala has increased to 2.16 million in 2008 (Zachariah and Rajan, 2009: 1). 
The emigration of low/unskilled emigrants from the state is also on the rise- if 92,044 workers 
were given emigration clearance in 2003, the number has increased to 150,475 in 2007 and 
to 180,703 in 2008 (MOIA, 2009: 46). Even in the case if Punjab that sends most of its 
emigrants out of the channel of emigration clearance has registered substantial increase in 
this regard between the same period- 24,963 in 2003 to 53,942 in 2007 and to 54,469 in 
2008 (Ibid). The number of persons seeking authentication of certificates from the NRI 
Commissioner’s office, Government of Punjab, for migration particularly to countries in the 
West has also been increasing steadily. These are states with visible rural prosperity due to 
transnational remittances and investments of various kinds. The total inward remittance to 
the state of Kerala in 2006-07 was about 20 percent of the state’s NSDP (Zachariah and 
Rajan, 2007: 11). However, migration continues to remain a major mobility option for many, 
attracting more people and newer groups, with newer destinations. Such experiences from 
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different contexts allowed the contemporary views on migration to depart from the earlier 
premise of the push-pull theories. What was previously seen as a phenomenon driven purely 
by economic compulsions and opportunities, began to be viewed a vehicle for mobility in a 
much broader sense.                                
 
The ongoing process of globalisation is seen by its advocates as furthering diverse 
exchanges including labour across national borders and unambiguously positive. The 
poorest regions of the world, in that sense, would need more globalisation rather than less 
(Bhagwati, 2004). However, the movement of people across national borders for employment 
is largely excluded from the ongoing process of globalisation through financial integration 
(Tapinos and Delaunay, 2000). It is pointed out that in a considerable number of countries, 
migration management responsibilities have been transferred from their labour to interior or 
home affairs ministries, taking it away from the domain of employment and work to that of 
policing and national security (Taran and Geronimi, 2003). Still, the conditions of 
globalisation through economic integration through transnational flow of capital, goods and 
technology have accelerated the mobility of labour across national boundaries. Global 
estimates of people living outside their homeland have more than doubled from 75 in 1975 to 
180 million in 2000, in spite of forceful national restrictive regimes. (Taranand Geronimi, 
2003). Nonetheless, globalisation and labour mobility are also said to have generated 
growing inequalities and exclusion not only within nation states but also between nation 
states.  Fragmentation has been identified as an intrinsic part of globalization. 
Transnationalism is seen as contributing significantly to the ongoing transformations 
associated with globalization (Vertovic 2007b: 150). As against attempts to configure 
globalisation through impositions of drastic changes on local communities from above, 
countervailing attempts are on to configure it from below with a more equitable vision 
(Castles, 1998; Rosenau, 1997).4 Transnationalism is also understood as contributing 
significantly to this, apart from making significant shifts in the nation state model (Vertovic 
2007b: 157). The ‘globalization from below’ model and transnationalism of the sending 
countries/societies finds a convergence at this vantage point. The labour sending countries 
like India are increasingly considering economic transnationlism as a realistic conduit for 
attracting transnational resources through its migrants and transnational citizens for its own 
development, a resource arguably to counter a discriminatory globalization. This resulted in a 
                                               
4 Migration is often seen as a reason and result of the wide-ranging changes encapsulated in what is called 
‘globalization’.  
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series of series of robust statist interventions aimed at institutionalizing transnatinal ties and 
structuring what we call national regimes of transnationalism.5        
 
 
India’s national regimes of transnationalism 
 
India’s shift in perception on emigration and Diaspora is said to have come significantly late.  
The switch over from a notion that see emigration as a depletion of assets and brains to 
viewing the Indians abroad as a strategic asset of the nation came very recently (Kapur, 
2004). India is seen as missed an enormous opportunity by excluding the Diaspora from its 
post-independent development (Lall, 2001). Though belated the governmental efforts to take 
migrants and transnational citizens of India on board in a vigorous manner is underwritten by 
nationalistic considerations. The establishment of a separate ministry for looking after the 
affairs of the overseas Indians, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), in 2004 is 
considered to be an important step in this direction. The MOIA is mandated to “promote, 
nurture and sustain a mutually beneficial and symbolic relationship between India and 
overseas Indians” (MOIA 2007: 6) It is expected to ensure the welfare and protection of the 
overseas Indians while emigrating, while being in expatriate life and after returning from 
overseas work. It seeks to ensure and promote beneficial relationship with Indian people 
abroad, the ‘Global Indian citizen’. This was coincided by a new ‘representational regime’ 
with categories like ‘Overseas Indian’, Non-Resident Indian’, ‘Person of Indian Origin’, etc. 
are either created or reinvented as new signifiers as well as administrative categories. 
  
Definitive change in the attitude of the Indian state has a slightly longer history than the 
MOIA. The Indian cosmopolitanism as represented by the category of ‘British Indian’, which 
came into being following migrations from India during the colonial time, speak more about 
the broken promise of ‘imperial citizenship’ (Metcalf 2007, Singha 2006, Edwards 2008: 451). 
The community that was seen as ‘imperial auxiliaries’ (Tinker 1974), under the cold war 
cosmopolitanism were looked upon with lack of enthusiasm by the independent Indian state 
as evidenced from the policy of either ‘return home’ or ‘indigenize’ themselves in their 
country of residences (Edwards 2008: 452). Nehru was unambiguous in his conviction that 
                                               
5 Administrative structures and mechanisms put in place by a nation state according to its own concerns of 
development to attract transnational resources together constitute national regimes of transnationalism. These 
regimes not only institutionalize transnational ties within a national framework and reinforce notions of original 
belonging but also take its migrants and Diaspora on board as carriers of transnational capital. An evaluation of 
the success of such state interventions is not attempted here.   
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the primary allegiance of the overseas Indian community is to be to their respective countries 
of residence. The end of cold war and the introduction of new economic policy in the late 
1980s which was open to transnational capital brought a change in the Indian state 
strategies to its overseas people.6 The Indian state was strategies from then onwards has 
been aimed at promoting the emotional and economic ties with its ‘overseas citizen’. The 
‘High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora’ (HLCID) appointed by the Indian government in 
2000 to survey Indian diaspora and to make recommendation to promote a ‘global Indian 
family’ and citizenship have made important recommendations reinforcing the state initiatives 
in this direction further (HLCID 2001, Edwards 2008: 444-45). The NRIs who were seen 
hitherto as the ‘not-required Indians’ soon got a metamorphosis as the ‘national reserve of 
India’ in the media representations (Edwards 2008: 454).    
 
The government of India’s perception of Overseas Indians as a “vast reservoir of potential 
investors, entrepreneurs and corporate leaders whose enterprise can be deployed in India” is 
defined in a framework of mutually beneficial relationship between India and overseas 
Indians. India’s radiant economic growth in recent years and its status as a much sought 
after investment destination in the contemporary world has been consistently projected to 
attract enterprises of overseas Indian’s into the country. This maneuver at one level 
underscores India’s credentials as an attractive business location and thereby induce 
profitable capital investment, but at another level through resorting a nationalist discourse 
and invoking the original belonging of overseas Indians attempts to “try and make the 
overseas Indian an active participant in the India growth story” (MOIA, 2008: 43). The duality 
is mutually sustaining wherein on the one hand overseas Indians were called upon to 
contribute to the development of their home country and gain from the robust growth of India 
on the other.  
 
The governmental recognition of NRIs as an ‘important economic constituency with the ability 
and willingness to invest in the emerging opportunities in their country of origin’, bolstered by 
a liberalized policy framework for ensuring NRI investments through the automatic and 
Government route, resulted in creation of new institution for the purpose. This is done within 
the larger liberalized Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Regime of India with added incentives 
                                               
6 The change in attitude is first politically manifested in India’s strong intervention during the crisis in Fiji in the late 
1980s (T.P. Sreenivasan, former Indian diplomat, in a conversation). The change was also necessitated by large 
scale temporary migration of Indian workers to the Gulf region from the 1970s onwards and was reinforced by the 
liquidity crisis in the early 1990s (Edwards 2008: 453)    
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for NRIs.7 The Reserve Bank has granted general permission to NRIs/PIOs for undertaking 
direct investment in Indian Companies under the automatic route, purchase of shares under 
Portfolio Investment Schemes, investment in companies and proprietorship/ partnership 
concerns on non-repatriation basis and for remittances of current income. NRIs/PIOs no 
more have to seek specific permission for approved activities under these schemes.8 The 
government of India broadly offers five different routes to the NRIs for making investments: 
an automatic route with repatriation benefits9; investment with the approval of a high 
Powered inter-ministerial body with full repatriation benefits10;  other investment opportunities 
with repatriation benefits in the form of domestic mutual funds, investment in bonds issued by 
public sector undertakings, purchase of Shares of Public sector enterprises being disinvested 
by Government of India, investment in government dated securities or Treasury Bills;11 
investments up to 100 per cent equity without repatriation benefits; and other investment 
possibilities for NRIs without repatriation benefits like investments in non-convertible 
debentures, money market mutual funds, deposits with companies and commercial papers.12   
 
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) offers various incentives in the form of tax exemptions and 
liberal repatriation schemes. Income from the investments made by NRIs/PIOs out of 
convertible foreign exchange in their Non Resident External Rupee Account (NRE) and 
Foreign Currency Non Resident Account (FCNR) are totally exempted from tax. The income 
from NRI investments in securities in mutual funds, bonds and savings certificates; dividend 
                                               
7 FDI up to 100 percent is now permitted on the automatic route in all sectors/activities except: (a) activities 
requiring industrial license under the Industries Development and Regulation Act,(b) proposals where the foreign 
investor had an existing joint venture/technical collaboration /trademark agreement in the same field of activity, (c) 
proposal for acquisition of shares in an Indian company in the financial services sector & where SEBI (Substantial 
Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulation, 1997 is attracted and (d) all proposals falling outside notified 
sectoral policy /caps or under sectors in which FDI is not permitted. FDI in gambling and betting, lottery business, 
atomic energy, retail trading and agricultural or plantation activities (other than tea plantations) are prohibited 
sectors.  See, Sector Specific Guidelines for Foreign Direct Investment, in GOI, 2006: 89-97.  
8 Automatic route of FDI does not require any prior approval either by Government of India or RBI. The investors 
are only required to notify the Regional office concerned of RBI within 30 days of receipt of inward remittances 
and file the required documents with that office within 30 days of issue of shares to foreign investors (HOI: 12-15). 
9 http://dipp.nic.in/invindia/invind.htm 
10 http://finmin.nic.in/fipbweb/fipb/fipb_index.html 
11 Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2003. Manual on Foreign Direct Investment in India: Policy and 
Procedures, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Government of India, New Delhi.    
12 Manual on Foreign Direct Investment in India: Policy and Procedures. GOI, 2006: 13-14. 
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declared by Indian companies and long term capital gains arising from transfer of equity 
shares in a company and /or equity oriented schemes of mutual funds are also free from 
taxation. When an NRI/PIO returns to India for permanent residence, the money and the 
value of assets brought by him/her into India and the value of assets acquired by him out of 
such money within one year immediately preceding the date of his return and at any time 
thereafter are totally exempt from wealth tax for a period of seven years after return to 
India.13 There is considerable exemption to the NRIs and PIOs from the gift tax too. Any sum 
of money (gift) received by a citizen of India from NRIs/PIOs to any relative or on the 
occasion of the marriage of the individual or under a will or by way of inheritance or in 
contemplation of death of the payer are exempted from any form of gift tax.14 
 
The RBI also liberalized supports NRI investment in India through indirect channels like that 
of loans.15 Similarly the NRIs are also entitled to get loans from Authorised Dealers (ADs) 
against the security of shares or immovable property in India for personal or business 
purposes and for acquiring residential accommodation in India. However, such loans are 
non-patriable and hence the loan amount cannot be credited to the NRE or FCNR accounts 
of the NRIs. Authorised Dealers can also loans to NRIs or a resident in India against the 
security of term deposits in NRE, FCNR and NRO accounts. Under Foreign Exchange 
Management Act (FEMA) regulations a foreign citizen who is resident in India can purchase 
Immovable Property (IP) in India without any approval from the RBI. He/she is also not 
required to file any declaration at the time of purchase of such IP.16 NRIs/PIOs can freely rent 
out their immovable property, without seeking any permission from the RBI. The rental 
income being a current account transaction is repatriable outside India, subject to the general 
                                               
13 The wealth tax in India is otherwise too minimal. The Finance Act 1992 has considerably reduced the scope of 
wealth tax. With effect from 1st April, 1993, wealth tax is being levied only on nonproductive assets like urban 
land, buildings (except one house property), jewellery, bullion, vehicles, cash over Rs.50,000/- etc. The current 
rate of wealth-tax is 1% on the aggregate market value of chargeable assets (HOI: 33-35).  
14 The term "relative" is defined as: (1) spouse of the individual; (2) brother or sister of the individual; (3) brother or 
sister of the spouse of the individual; (4) brother or sister of either of the parents of the individual; (5) any lineal 
ascendant or descendant of the individual; (6) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the individual; 
and (7) spouse of the person referred to in (2) to (6) (HOI: 36-38).  
15 See for details HOI 43-45 
16 However, investment in agricultural property, plantation and farmhouse is prohibited for all classes of persons 
resident outside India, be it NRIs/OCIs/ foreign citizens or other foreign entities. Also, the citizens of eight 
countries, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, China, Iran, Nepal. Or Bhutan (whether resident in India 
or not) are prohibited from acquiring or transferring any IP in India without prior approval of the RBI.  
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tax rules of the country.17 NRI/PIO is also permitted to remit upto $1,000,000 per year out of 
the balance in his Non Resident (Ordinary) account/sale proceeds of assets (inclusive of 
inheritance/settlement). The banks are also permitted to issue International Credit Cards to 
NRIs/PIOs without prior approval of the Reserve Bank of India.18 The Reserve Bank of India 
has taken further steps to simplify financial transactions by NRIs/PIOs, particularly with 
regard to transfer of interest, partnership assets, gift shares, mutual funds, deposits with 
Indian firms and  companies out of domestic sources, etc. 
  
       There was also attempts on the part of the state to systematize and streamline flow of 
transnational resources for philanthropic and charity works. The government has put a liberal 
framework in place for the NGOs, in the forms of Societies, Trusts and Non-Profit 
Companies, to receive contributions from overseas to carry out charity/philanthropic work in 
India. The major institutional requirement is that all Indian NGOs that receive foreign 
contributions should get a clearance from the Ministry of Home Affairs in the form of a 
permanent FCRA registration or prior permission on a case-to-case basis.19 Any NGO that 
receive foreign funds under FCRA is required to open and use an exclusive bank account for 
foreign funds. Moreover, income received by any religious and charitable trust or institutions 
(an area of significant contribution from the Indian Diaspora) registered with the income tax 
authorities is not taxable as long as the income is utilized for the set objectives of the 
organization (HOI 48-51).   More recently, the government of India realizing the potential of 
transnational Diaspora resources through the channel of philanthropy, has established an 
India Development Foundation (IDF) to promote philanthropy amongst the Indian Diaspora.  
Apart from promoting philanthropy, IDF is supposed to “align Diaspora philanthropy with the 
national development goals and to provide a platform to the Diaspora for channelizing their 
philanthropic initiatives through creditable NGOs and institutions.”20 
 
The government of India is also taking concrete measures to strengthen and reinforce the 
emotional ties that transnational Indian citizens share with their motherland. The category of 
Persons of Indian Origin was created and a PIO Card scheme was introduced in 1999, much 
                                               
17 If IP is purchased through loans, the entire rental income, even if it is more than the prescribed installment, 
should be adjusted towards repayment of the loan. (RBI Master Circular No. /02/2006-07) 
18 RBI Master Circular No. /04/2006-07 
19 This is as the requirements of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) of 1976.  
20 The proposed national migration policy document (unpublished).  
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before the formation of MOIA, in an effort to give a formal recognition and bureaucratic 
authorization to such enduring bonds. The Person of Indian Origin (PIO) is defined quite 
broadly to accommodate all aspiring foreign citizen (1) who at any time held and an Indian 
passport, or (2) whose parents or grand parents or great grand parents was born in and 
permanently resident in Indian or (3) those whose spouse is a citizen of India or a Person of 
Indian origin as per (1) and (2). A PIO card holder is entitled to visit India without a visa for 15 
years; no separate student visa or employment visa is required for taking admission in 
educational institutions and taking up employment in India; not required to register with the 
Foreigners Registration Officer if continuous stay does not exceed 180 days and is entitled to 
get all benefits and facilities available to the NRIs in economic, financial and educational 
fields. The validity of PIO Card is 15 years and Gratis PIO Card may be issued to an 
exceptionally eminent person of Indian Origin, who plays an important role in building bridges 
between India and the country of his/her adoption, if he/she expresses a desire to obtain the 
PIO Card.21 Further, more recently on the recommendation of the HLCID, the Government of 
India had introduced a scheme of Overseas Citizenship Of India (OCI), by which 
aspiring/eligible PIOs are given Overseas Citizenship of India. The scheme is operational 
from December 2, 2005.22 OCI has been introduced by statute as a new category of 
citizenship to facilitate life-long visa, unrestricted travel to India and certain economic, 
educational and cultural benefits. The scheme has got its limitation and cannot be as full 
'dual citizenship' since it does not confer political rights.  “A foreign national, who was eligible 
to become citizen of India on 26.01.1950 or was a citizen of India on or at anytime after 
26.01.1950 or belonged to a territory that became part of India after 15.08.1947 and his/her 
children and grand children” is eligible for Overseas Citizenship of India.23 An OCI shall be 
entitled to have the benefits of multiple entry, multiple-purpose life long visa to visit India, 
exemption from registration with Police authorities for any length of stay in India and parity 
with NRIs in financial, economic and educational fields except in the acquisition of 
agricultural or plantation properties. However, “[p]ersons registered as OCI have not been 
given any voting rights, election to Lok Sabha / Rajya Sabha /Legislative Assembly / Council, 
holding Constitutional posts such as President, Vice President, Judge of Supreme Court / 
                                               
21 A citizen of Afghanistan, Bhutan, China, Nepal, Pakistan or Sri Lanka any time are not eligible for PIO Card; 
See for further details HOI 61-66.   
22 This was done by amending the Indian Citizens Act of 1955, which disallow citizenship for overseas Indians.  
23 If the applicant had ever been a citizen of Pakistan and Bangladesh, he/she will not be not eligible for OCI; See 
for the details of the scheme HOI 55-60.  
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High Court etc” (HOI 2006). The transnational citizens of India has responded 
overwhelmingly to the scheme and according to the latest updates around 400,000 OCI 
documents have been granted by the government of India till December 2008.24 The MOIA 
has also taken other important measures to reinforce the ties of Overseas Indians with India. 
Scholarship Programme for Diaspora Children (SPDC), started in 2006-07, with an objective 
of making “higher education in India accessible to the children of Overseas Indians and 
publicize India as an education hub”25with 50% of scholarship reserved for children of the 
PIOs and the rest for the children of NRIs.26 The Know India Programme (KIP) another 
initiative of MOIA aims at “associating closely the younger generation of Indian Diaspora with 
India.”27 Very recently MOIA has launched ‘Tracing the Roots’ Programme which aims at 
assisting Persons of Indians origin in tracing their roots in India.28 The government had also 
constituted Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award (PBSA) in 2002 which will conferred on a Non-
Resident Indian, Person of Indian origin or an organization or institution established and run 
by the Non-Resident Indians or Persons of Indian Origin in recognition of their 
contributions.29 
 
The institutional changes of these kinds are bolstered by a new discourse of state 
nationalism that is increasingly open to overseas Indians. Arguably it presupposes a 
redefinition of nation in such a way to accommodate its transnational citizens. The nation is 
imagined beyond its territorial confines by the state and systematized and formalized it 
accordingly with multiple governmental technologies promote formal sense of belonging and 
extending diverse services to overseas Indians. The statist notion of nation has this 
undergone re-formalization to take the nation beyond a ‘national space’ to a transnational 
space’. However, as the preceding discussion indicates the rationality runs behind 
                                               
24 Out of this 400,000 150,000 have been received and issued in India and the rest from various Indian embassies 
abroad. http://overseasindian.in/2009/mar/news/20092403-105002.shtml 
25 Every year 100 scholarships are given under this scheme. http://moia.gov.in/showinfo1.asp?linkid=520  
26Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 2009. Scholarship Programme for Diaspora Children 
(SPDC) for Higher and Technical Studies in India, Information Booklet and Application Form, 2009-10, New Delhi, 
Government of India. 
27 http://moia.gov.in/showinfo1.asp?linkid=546 
28 http://moia.gov.in/shared/linkimages/203.doc 
29 The maximum number of Awards each year is fifteen. Non-Resident Indians and Persons of Indian Origin shall 
continue to be considered for Padma Awards and Padma Awardees shall be eligible for Pravasi Bharatiya 
Samman Award. http://moia.gov.in/showsublink.asp?sublinkid=824 
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transnationalisation of the nation is primarily national.  Nation states are increasingly relying 
upon ‘development’ for its self-legitimization, wherein the state centric bio-politics is 
fundamental to it. Nation state, in search of resources for the same, found its transnational 
citizens and non-resident citizens a highly potential source to mobilise capital for 
development. This is done with a nationalistic rhetoric where overseas Indians are called 
upon to contribute to the development of their home country on the one hand and a given 
chance to gain from the ongoing development of India. It is the same economic imperatives 
of the country that enabled the state to provide diverse services to its ‘overseas citizens’ 
along side systematic attempts to reinforce their emotional bonds with the home country. 
However, identities are always intersecting and the ‘national’ is bound to be coeval with the 
regional and the local, resulting in claims at the sub-national and local levels for transnational 
resources on the one hand and affinities/belongings on the other.  
 
 
Sub-national rhetoric of global punjabi community 
 
The Punjabi Diaspora has a long history, so also the transnationalisation of the Punjabi 
society (Talbot and Thandi, 2004, Ballard 2003, Helweg 1986, Ballard and Banks 1994, 
Visram 1986, T ha nd i  2 00 6 ,  T a t la  199 8 ,  T a t la  an d  Dus enb er y  20 10 .  The 
Overseas Punjabi links with their homeland has taken multiple economic manifestations, 
including conventional remittances, flow of money through transnational service industry like 
heritage tourism, air-transportation, travel and emigration servicing, telecommunications, 
trade in cultural goods, entertainment industry, etc. and philanthropic contributions. The 
Punjabi Diaspora has been seen as a community that retains a meaningful link with their 
homeland and Diaspora philanthropy is perhaps the most unconventional forms of economic 
exchange through which the home-linkage has been reinforced in recent years. It is pointed 
out that though the practice of Punjabi diaspora taking up projects of ‘private giving for public 
good’ has got a longer history, the philanthropic remittance has become more significant 
magnitude, quality and creativity only in the last couple of decades (Roberts, 2005; Thandi, 
2006).  It is pointed out that there is a positive change in recent times that NRI investments 
for establishing large memorial gates in the countryside and towns in memory of their 
ancestors has given way to investing money productively on development projects (Singh, 
2008). The diaspora philanthropy seeks its justification in arguments like civic duty, loyalty to 
village, gratitude payback, sense of identity and so on, but bolstered strongly by the Sikh 
religious and moral philosophy (Thandi, 2006). It is estimated that the NRIs have contributed 
altogether a whopping amount of over Rs.1,600 crores during the last five years to the 
villages in Doaba region of Punjab (Awsthi, 2008). The growing inflow of money into the state 
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through multiple channels and a larger recognition of the economic potential Punjabi 
diaspora for the development of their home state, the government of Punjab embarked on an 
institutional transformation drive to channalise the resources of Overseas Punjabis for the 
development of the state and to strengthen the Punjabi diasporas affinity with their home 
state through new institutions and services. 
 
The Punjab government has also taken steps to encourage overseas Punjabis to invest in 
Punjab, by taking advantage of the ‘emotional and sentimental ties with their motherland’. 
The major forms of remittance until recently were in the forms of accumulation of household 
assets or NRI deposits. Overseas Punjabis have invested heavily on agricultural land too, 
which is often cited as a reason for the exorbitant cost of agricultural land in the state, 
making purchase of land and cultivating it profitably became an unfeasible option for the real 
cultivators. However, it was in the New Industrial Policy of 1996, the government of Punjab 
came out with concrete policies to attract NRI investment in large and medium scale 
manufacturing units. The policy offered various incentives to the NRIs towards the 
development of agro-based units, tourism, electronic industry and export oriented industrial 
ventures (Thandi and Talbot, 2004). For promoting NRI investment concrete steps were 
taken like setting up of an exclusive Focal Point in Mohali for NRI entrepreneurs, reservation 
of industrial plots for allotment in all industrial estates in the state, preference for Punjabi NRI 
entrepreneurs while finalizing industrial proposals and creating of a Special Cell to provide 
Single Window clearance for investment proposals from Punjabi NRI entrepreneurs were 
taken, apart from a robust campaign calling Overseas Punjabis to participate the in the 
development of their home state (Thandi and Talbot, 2004). Other incentives included 
measures like a 5% concession to the Punjabi NRI investors in land tax. However, 
irrespective of such initiatives the NRIs continue to be lukewarm in investing in Punjab and 
low quality of governance, high level of corruption, bureaucratic hurdles and difficulties with 
business partners in India are often cited as reasons for the same. This has resulted in a 
situation where some of the incentives like the 5% concession in land tax were withdrawn by 
the government of Punjab.                   
 
The government of Punjab has established a Department of NRI Affairs headed by the NRI 
Commissioner in 2002 to give special attention to matters related to overseas Punjabis. Prior 
to this the NRI matters were looked after by an NRI cell in the Central Secretariat of Punjab 
and attached with the Rural Development and Panchayat Department. The institutional 
change has resulted in increased governmental interest in the affairs of overseas Punjabis. 
Realizing the quantum of money being pumped into rural Punjab for philanthropy and village 
infrastructure by the overseas Punjabis, the Department of NRI Affairs sought to incentivise 
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and formalize such contributions, by instituting the ‘NRI-GoP Rural Infrastructure 
Development Fund’. Through the ‘Plan Scheme NRI 2.35’, which allowed 50 percent of 
matching grants by the GoP for all Village Development programmes initiated by NRIs, the 
government of Punjab sought to provide an ‘enabling and facilitating platform’ for overseas 
Punjabi contribution for development of their villages. This was initiated with a view to 
“ensure full participation of the NRIs and NRI NGOs into the village infrastructure 
development activities.” A High Level Committee called the Punjab NRI Committee for 
Development (PUNRICD) is constituted for promoting and implementing the scheme. Since 
the scheme aims at providing to the ‘overall benefit of the general masses and overall 
community development of the area’, the government has decided that such projects should 
not be restricted to hospitals, libraries, drinking water, sewerage disposal, public latrines, 
street lights, sport stadium, but can include all projects that would be beneficial to the people 
of all walks of life.30 The scheme also ensures ownership of public property by the respective 
villages and Village Development Committee (VDC) formed in individual villages is not only 
responsible for the implementation of the project but also for the maintenance of the built 
infrastructure.  
 
The modalities set by the government of Punjab for the ‘Plan Scheme NRI 2.35’ give control 
in village development schemes initiated by the NRIs in the villages. All projects coming 
under the scheme should get an approval from the Higher Power Committee (PUNRICD), 
which is headed by the Chief Secretary of Punjab.31 Every project should come through the 
District NRI Committee for Development (DINRICD) headed by the concerned Deputy 
Commissioner who with the help of specifically empanelled civil/public health/construction 
engineers assess the viability of the project and check the detailed estimates of it. On 
                                               
30 The government of Punjab has published a suggestive list of projects which include projects of water 
management services covering the entire water circle, various village infrastructure projects, village renewable 
energy infrastructure, village health care and education infrastructure, establishment of Citizen Service Centres 
with broadband connectivity for providing government and other services, creating common infrastructure for 
running special programmes like controlling female foeticide, adult literacy programmes, old age homes, schools 
for physically and mentally challenged, AIDS Control, Vocational training centres, etc.  provision of infrastructure 
for specialized job oriented training courses like textile and garment manufacturing, agricultural related skills and 
technical skills of various kinds. (Plan Scheme NRI 2.35 document, Government of Punjab.         
31 Principal Secretary Finance, Secretary Planning, Secretary Rural Development, a representative of an 
NRI/NGOs to be nominated by CNRI, Deputy Commissioner of the concerned District, MD NRI Sabha and 
Commissioner NRIs (Member Secretary) are the other members of the Committee.  
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clearance of the project by PUNRICD, the Commissioner of NRI Affairs will transfer the funds 
(the government share) to the concerned Deputy Commissioner. It is also decided that to 
ensure full ownership and subsequent responsibility of repair and maintenance of the 
infrastructure, the implementation of the projects should be carried out by NRI NGOs through 
the Village Development Committees. A panel of certified engineers, maintained by the 
concerned Deputy Commissioner, will provide technical assistance to the PUNRICD and 
DINRICD wherever required. The government share would be 50 % of the total estimated 
cost. As per the set modality, once NRI/NGO/VDC spend 25% of the total cost first out of 
their share, they can apply for 25% of the government share to be released. NRI/NGO/VDC 
has to spend the rest of their share in the third stage for getting the remaining share of the 
government released. The Department of NRI Affairs retains its prerogative to inspect the 
standard and quality and progress of any ongoing project apart from accounts, as and when 
the Department feels so. However, launched in 2004 the ‘Plan Scheme NRI 2.35’ did not 
make any spectacular progress as any other attempts to formalize and ‘governmentalise’ 
such private initiatives.  
 
Apart from attempts to maximize overseas Punjabi contribution to philanthropy and village 
development and formalize it through the framework of ‘Plan Scheme NRI 2.35’, the 
government of Punjab of late has come up with many services specifically aimed at overseas 
Punjabis to promote and strengthen their bonds with the home state. Apart from setting up 
the Department of NRI Affairs, which is in charge of matters related to overseas Punjabis, the 
government has also established NRI police stations, fast track courts for NRI cases and 
supported NRI Sabha. NRI police stations are opened in six places (Jalandhar, SBS Nargar-
Nawanshahr, Hoshiarpur, Kapurthala, Ludhiana and Moga) with its jurisdiction over the 
concerned districts to address the grievances of the overseas Punjabis, particularly their 
disputes with relatives and neighbors relating to property issues, etc. Fast track NRI courts 
have been set up for the speedy settlement of cases pertaining to overseas Punjabis. The 
NRI Sabha, an NGO of overseas Punjabis with more than fifteen thousand registered 
members, has been supported by the government of Punjab in redressing their grievances 
and ensuring their welfare. The Sabha works in close coordination with the government of 
Punjab and has become a body with significant influence in the Punjabi public sphere.                      
 
The attempts of the state government of Punjab fundamentally rely on the sub-national 
identity and ethnic solidarity of Punjabis across the world. The sentimental and emotional 
affinity of Punjabis with their motherland and their enthusiasm for its progress is invoked and 
employed for garnering resources for development and keep them deeply attached to the 
state. It is also important to note that it was after the separatist Khalistan movement, which 
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was significantly supported economically and ideologically by the Punjabi diaspora, it 
became also imperative for the state to discourage diaspora financing for subversive 
activities and channalise it productively for the developmental needs of the state. This turn 
reinforces a distinct Punjabi cultural identity beyond the territorial confines of the sub-nation 
into a global Punjabi identity.         
 
 
Call of the ancestral village for development  
 
However the most visible form of economic transnationalism in rural Punjab continues of the 
Overseas Punjabi investment in their respective ancestral villages. Such investments are 
guided by multiple rationalities, which includes celebration/exhibition of their overseas 
success in their home locality, a sense of ‘giving something back’ to their ancestral village, 
preserving memories of their ancestors/parents, a moral obligation to promote religion in its 
place of birth and sometimes a genuine interest in the welfare of the people of their native 
village.  It is often pointed out that such investments started with contributions to religious 
places, erecting memorial gates32 and spending on spectacular like festivals, sports, etc, but 
has given way eventually for investments on human development and village amenities 
through setting up or supporting educational institutions, dispensaries, hospitals, 
crematoriums, sport stadiums, street lighting, sanitation, clean drinking water projects, etc. 
Such investments were mostly done initially with individual initiatives and most often without 
formal frameworks or structures. Such informal investments continue to exist even today 
particularly in the form of contributions to gurudwaras and religious institutions, local 
festivals, sports events, etc. of late the overseas Punjabi investments in rural Punjab began 
to flow through formal channels particularly to charitable institutions and societies, non-
profitable organisations, NRI trusts, Village welfare associations and Village Development 
Councils and NGOs. This has also brought another important change – if the overseas 
Punjabis under their own self-motivation making investments earlier, now there is significant 
effort from the native village society to garner resources from NRIs from the village. Apart 
from welfare associations and development councils in the villages, educational institutions, 
hospitals, gurudwaras, local organizers of festivals and sports events establishes a 
sustaining relationship with ‘local NRIs’ and try to harness resources from them for all 
                                               
32 Such memorial gates erected by the overseas Punjabis in honour of their ancestors or parents are ubiquitous in 
rural Punjab.  
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activities that are considered to be for common good of the village. The transformation 
underlines the reciprocal space of economic transnationalism, where local effort and NRI 
interest come together.   
 
The experience of village welfare associations’ efforts at village development by making use 
of transnational resources also allowed NGOs run by NRIs themselves to get into the scene 
and actively take village development efforts with NRI support forward in a systematic 
manner. The Village Life Improvement Foundation (VLIF) started in 1999 by an NRI from 
USA is perhaps the first initiative in this direction. VLIF harness resources from the NRIs in 
close collaboration with the Village Development Councils of the respective villages 
undertake development projects in the concerned villages. VLIF working with a motto of 
“modernizing villages: our villages, our pride” particularly focus on providing amenities like 
clean drinking water, underground sewerage, water treatment plant, concreting of streets, 
solar street lights and computer education apart from initiating people empowering schemes 
and job creation and entrepreneurship in the village. The government of Punjab 
operationalise its “Plan Scheme NRI 2.35” through such NGOs. VLIF has already completed 
6 village development projects already, of which the Kharaudi has been acclaimed as a 
model and a dozen of other village projects are in the pipeline. Indo-Canadian Village 
Improvement Trust (ICVIT), headed by a Canadian NRI from Punjab is another important 
NGO undertaking similar works in villages with the support of overseas Punjabis. Such 
village development initiative also resulted in intra-diaspora exchanges, wherein overseas 
Punjabis in different countries come together for the developmental activities of their ‘own’ 
village. VLIF though was founded by an Punjabi NRI from USA it was spearheaded equally 
by an NRI from Canada and UK. Similarly through contributions to their village from different 
national space, innumerable overseas Punjabis develop an intra-diaspora space within a 
transnational space.     
Along side, overseas Punjabis themselves, with the support of some natives, formed Trusts 
and Charitable societies and funded several institutions in the village for the benefit of their 
ancestral village. This includes hospitals, dispensaries, schools, collages, training institutes, 
old age homes, etc. If one takes the example of medical support system, it could be seen 
that many prominent NRI villages have hospitals and dispensaries with varying quantum of 
investments and expertise. It is also interesting to note that often the NRI renditions about 
their developmental initiatives in their respective villages is critical about the failure of the 
state government in this regard which allowed them to embark on the ‘righteous mission’ of 
providing better life to people. The main reason for lack of NRI investment in Punjab is 
explained in terms of a corrupt bureaucracy, extreme politicized governance and lack of 
supportive structures. It is pointed out that the governmental involvement in the village 
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development programme through its “Plan Scheme NRI 2.35” too lukewarm, with essentially 
empty talks.33 The transnational initiatives stake its claim on biopolitcs, upon the failure of the 
native government. On the other hand, the flow of resources into villages for development 
and philanthropy from transnational locations allowed the national government to institute the 
IDF to promote philanthropy amongst the Indian diaspora and the state government the NRI 
village development scheme with its 50 percent financial contribution and control. 
 
The institutional transformation in terms of alterations in administrative frameworks as a 
result of the potentiality of transnational resources has resulted in changes at the national, 
sub-national and local levels. Though intersecting, these identities are invoked effectively to 
take the overseas Indians/Punjabis on board as essential categories at each level. This often 
done, particularly at the national and sub-national levels, in a language of extending diverse 
services to transnational citizens, allowing them to participate in the ongoing development 
drive in India and attenuating formalistic notions of citizenship. Nonetheless, the emergence 
of transnationalism and its economic potential for a ‘sending country’ hardly weaken and 
incapacitate nation state. Instead economic transnationalism allows the nation state to 
expand its hand to newer domains. The nation state not only device a careful claim over the 
transnational resources for its development but also brought many of the economic 
transactions of its transnational citizen under surveillance and regulation through liberalized 
banking to NRIs. The offer of overseas citizenship offered a formalistic frame of belonging to 
the motherland and at the same brought them under a new unbound seriality. The national 
government is also keen to promote diaspora philanthropy, but more importantly to align it 
with “the national development goals.” The increasing involvement of the Punjab government 
in the NRI village development initiatives also at another level points to the expanding 
domains of involvement by the nation state to formalize transnational exchanges. The state 
through institutional changes from time to time would find newer relevance for the ‘national’ 
in an increasingly transnational world. This do not suggest that the state would be able to 
capture all the migrant processes under a formal regime, as the trasmigrants certainly would 
have their own ways of negotiating the state strategies and imaginatively making use of the 
transnational spaces instituted by the state.                     
 
 
                                               
33Jangveer Singh, “Village Story: Active NRIs, non-resident govt” 
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20090107/main8.htm  
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Chapter 6 
Institutional Entrepreneurs Shaping Transnationalizing 
Labour Markets 
Mika Raunio 
 
 
Mobility of labor challenging the national institutions  
 
The direct34 impacts of the economic migration - remittances sent to the country of origin and 
“illegal” and legal work done in the countries of destinations - are significant at the global 
level. The amount of remittances was estimated to be about 300 billion USD in 2007 
(Vertovec 2009, 8). Obviously, the value of work done by the migrants must be much higher, 
since some do not send any remittances and those who do, also consume significant part of 
their incomes in the place of residence. To compare, just about 30 countries in the world had 
their GDP over 300 billion USD in 200835 and total foreign direct investment outflows of 
multinational companies (MNCs) were just a bit more than double, 779 billion UDS in 2005 
(Dunnign and Lundan, 2008: 19). So, amount of remittances and especially the work done to 
by migrant workers, play important role in the global economy. Thus, the mobility of labor is 
without doubt in the preferences of many economic actors from individuals to MNCs and to 
sending and receiving nation states. In addition, according to Cohen (2006) especially mobile 
people, address the challenges for the nation states and their institutions (ibid., 2006: 5). 
 
This puts a lot of pressure to change the existing institutions to better fit with the globally 
mobile workforce, since well established institutions creating trust and routines also lower the 
transactions costs in international business, including fees paid by employees and employers 
in international recruiting services. 
 
Labor market practices are acquiring transnational forms, when employees, employers, 
recruiters, educators, policy makers and regulators are making border crossing bilateral 
agreements adjusting regulation and building recruiting practices between the two or more 
                                               
34 Competences, new firms and innovations that migrants bring to more suitable economic environments, 
transnational business contacts, population growth and so on may be seen as indirect, but still highly significant 
impacts of the economic migration.  
35
 World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 7 October 2009, Comparing total 240 economies. 
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countries and providing supportive training programs. Recruiting cause transaction costs for 
different parties, often these are fees for employees and/or employers. Transnationalisation 
in labor market have acquired institutional forms for example between the Mexico and the 
United States in 1950s, between Turkey and Germany in 1960s and also recently especially 
between the several labor exporting Asian countries and importing countries in the West and 
in the Middle-East. (Abella, 2004: 201, Martin, 2004: 121; Hugo  & Sthal, 2004; Sassen, 
1999: 134) Transnationalization in this article refers to emergence of border crossing 
recruiting patterns between two countries and to supporting socio-economic spaces. 
Transformation is the process, where formerly institutionalized national patterns of 
recruitment (with supporting practices and regulations) are becoming more transnational.  
 
In new institutional theory (see DiMaggio & Powell 1991; North 1990) the role of agency - 
organizations and interest groups who aim to change the existing institutions - is strong. 
More specifically the change agent is defined as institutional entrepreneur. In this article, 
institutional entrepreneur refers to agent who aims to change the institutional environment 
more supportive for their transnational activities. Article proposes that role of institutional 
entrepreneurs and their stronger involvement to institutionalization process in close 
interaction with employers and regulative authorities, could be partial answer to avoid known 
handicaps and problems that now exists in many international recruiting practices. In 
addition, very different situations of institutional entrepreneurs promoting the 
transnationalizations of the labor market are discussed to point out, that there are no “one 
size fits all” solutions for this role. However, the article aims to recognize the key qualities 
and tasks of the institutional entrepreneur in the context of challenging institutional change 
i.e. in case of health care sector that already has strong national institutions, since it is not 
possible to deal with whole variety of different cases here, and one example is sufficient to 
point out the essence of the issue.  
 
In context of international migration market forces and social networks have been extensively 
studied (Hugo & Sthal, 2004: 174) and according to Bach (2009) governments and 
employers play crucial role especially in development of health care migration (ibid. 2009: 
230). However, while this article focuses on theoretical and conceptual dimensions of the 
question, examples are drawn from business services sector organizing the health care 
professional’s recruiting – labor broker firm and adult education center – to illustrate the 
argument that role of agency who actually implement the service in the constraints of the 
regulations and demand should be studied carefully. Quality and ethics of these services 
play crucial role in formation of cognitive institutions, i.e. routines that create the everyday 
practices for the labor broking and recruiting.  
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Institutions and institutional entrepreneurs in transnational labor markets 
 
Institutions 
 
As defined in the introductory chapter of this book, the core definition of institutions refers to 
quality, that they are “organizing relatively stable patterns of human activity” (Turner, 1997: 
6). Human agency may cause unpredicted and substantial changes, whereas more stable 
structural factors, institutions, are often obstacle for the change. Single actions and 
continuous interaction of agents adapt, transform, upgrade or lock-in36 structures at the level 
of both the organization and the environment. (Boschma & Frenken, 2006a, 2006b) In some 
areas of culture structures are quite durable (religion, political beliefs, etc.), but even these 
often change over time and many other areas of culture change can be frequent and 
widespread. (Nelson, 2004: 26-27)  
 
Institutions refer to systems of values that may influence the acceptability of new routines in 
a certain region or country. Institutions may also form the system of incentives that can guide 
the search-process to find solutions for socially perceived problems. In different domains 
different logics are present and for example in economic domain economic rewards are 
significant while in political domain political rewards are important. Both are steered by the 
rules and regulations based on shared values or contracts. (Lambooy, 2004) 
 
The recent view to institutions is based on the “new institutionalism” whose main contributors 
were Douglas North (1992) in the field of economics and DiMaggio and Powell (1973) from 
sociology. They emphasized the existence of several institutions that consists the institutional 
environment for the actions. Systems or constellations of several institutions create wider 
societal structures that enable and constrain, but do not determine actions of agents. New 
institutionalism also explains the change with recognizing, not just institutions that steer the 
behavior of individuals according maximized benefits (rational choices) or normative 
                                               
36 Lock-in, refers to deterministic development path of the region when emergence of novelty and dramatic 
changes are not likely to occur. It is crucial how regional economies can break free from old “negatively-locked-in” 
paths of development. Martin and Sunley (2006) strerss, that evolution of regional economy may turn from phase 
of positive lock-in to phase of negative lock-in. 
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institutions (fear of negative feedback), but also cognitive institutions. Cognitive institutions 
explains, that people follow routines and act as they do, because they do not know what 
could be the real alternative. Existing routines are taken for granted. Institutionalized routines 
are well known by the people and they think these routines are “right” way to do things. 
There are several different institutions in the labor markets in general, but many of 
institutions are line of business or country specific or related to practices or regulations and 
some of them are cognitive, like recruiting practices, while others are normative (regulations), 
etc. Recruiting patterns in health care sector is just one of many.  
 
In addition, new institutionalism emphasis historical continuum, i.e. previous actions may 
influence the attitudes of the other agents in the new round (tit for tat) and there is always 
certain level of path dependency restricting the possible choices due to choices done earlier. 
The problem that path dependency causes for the development is the “lock-in” situation, 
when historically created institutions and routines steer the actions to the direction, that do 
not support the development anymore, or may be even harmful, for the well being of the 
community. Often human agency may have significant impact on the possibilities to break 
loose from the rather conservative development and path-dependency. (Lambooy, 2004)  
 
In economic history the common assumption has been that economic growth has been 
possible only after state has been able to offer sufficient infrastructure and institutional 
environment for the trade and business. This was also assumption in North’s early writings, 
but he had to reassert his view, since it seemed that also traders own arrangements may 
create sufficient structures at the early phase of development and small scale business is of 
course possible without any larger organizations or institutions. (Kallioinen, 1997: 55) 
However, it is evident, that large scale business and trade substantially benefits from the well 
functioning institutions creating trust and stability.  
 
According to Nelson there is lot of common between North’s definition and sociological 
definition of institution, but the key difference is that sociological stress the norms and beliefs 
rationalizing the action in given context, whereas North emphasis is on game theory and on 
the self-reinforcing nature of institutionalized behavior.” (Nelson, 1995: 80-81) 
 
New institutional views stress also the interaction between the organizations and institutions 
as they shape each other. More precise definition of agency is institutional entrepreneur 
which is based on DiMaggio’s (1988) notion institutional entrepreneurship. According the 
Leca, Battilana and Boxenbaum (2008) institutional entrepreneurship “characterize organized 
actors with sufficient resources to contribute the genesis of new institutions in which they see 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 118 
an opportunity to realize interest that they value highly” (ibid., 2008: 4). Institutional 
entrepreneurship refers to agents or network of agents, who are able to change institutions 
and who are able to mobilize other agents to support the change. Thus, not all agents who 
participate the transformation of the institution are institutional entrepreneurs. (Battilana, 
2006: 657)  
 
 
Recognizing the institution and institutional entrepreneur 
 
According to Leca and Naccache (2006) agents are not disembedded from existing 
institutional environment and there is no need for the “crisis” that reveal the dysfunctional 
institutions, but this is just what new institutionalism was trying to avoid. Instead, institutional 
entrepreneurship should provide a model of change, where agents can create and change 
institutions “without disembedding from the social world.” (ibid, 2006: 628)  
 
Institutional entrepreneur should be embedded to institutional environment it is about to 
change. This refers to rather narrow definition of the institution in empirical cases. In this 
paper, it is obvious, that implementation of international recruiting is not considered as 
strategic tasks of the national ministries or health care employers, but the labor broking firms. 
When education and training consists the significant part of the process, it well fits to 
international tasks of the adult education organizations also, whose main task is to serve the 
local employers and to promote regional economic development. These agents are clearly 
embedded to environment of labor broking practices. Of course, ministries are key agents in 
institutional change as they create regulations and policies and employers are key agents by 
creating demand and conditions for the demand, but they are rather creating institutional 
constraints for the recruiting practices, than institutionalizing the recruiting practices as such.  
 
The other useful distinction should be made between the institutional entrepreneur and 
traditional “lobbyists”. Different interest groups, government bodies and other political 
groupings who aim to change existing institutions by impacting on political and economic 
decision making may be seen as “lobbyists”. The difference is, that they are not creating the 
actual commercial service or product by themselves that would require new institutional 
forms. However, in those fields where government bodies or other public agents also 
implement the service or policy that they promote, they may be seen as institutional 
entrepreneurs. For example ministry or department of ministry may lobby for certain policy or 
set of laws that it is aims to implement or city or immigration department of city may lobby 
immigration strategy for relevant interest groups, and it is also implementing the strategy in 
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practice. The institutional entrepreneur then differs from lobbyist in a sense, that it also 
implements the routine that it promotes. 
 
In sum, transnational recruiting patterns are separated, though strongly related with, political 
guidelines and regulations of public authorities or employers attitudes and demands in the 
same field. In practice, institutional entrepreneur may really be embedded just one of the 
institutional environments that it is able to change, other related fields it has to change 
through networking with allies (embedded) in those fields.   
 
 
Evolutionary change without institutional entrepreneur  
 
Other point to made, is that not all institutionalization processes of transnational recruiting 
patterns require strong institutional entrepreneurship and intentional efforts. This is case 
especially when there are not widely spread and profound existing institutions that should be 
(partly) replaced, but the field is rather “free” or new institutional forms do not require many 
changes in existing practices. In these cases, change may take place rather “naturally” as 
the wider environment “evolves”.  
 
For example many economists, sociologists and geographers have seen transnational 
corporations (TNC) as the main institutional form37 of transnational practices. They have 
structures, resources, practices and networks that create paths for much of the transnational 
activities (Vertovec 2009, 8.) John Salt (1992) suggested already at early 1990s that the 
increasing importance of migration of highly skilled is related to the process of 
internationalization of large employers and that the particular form of movement is dependent 
on the evolution of corporate business structures. (Salt, 1992: 484) In practice, these firms 
have organized their human resource management in transnational form including recruiting, 
testing and relocation services, etc. The working language is often English and official 
diplomas are not required from certain country or at all. (Raunio & Forsander, 2009) The 
transnationalization of the recruiting practices may be seen as “natural” outcome of the 
organizational form that TNCs have acquired. They have not changed existing institutions as 
                                               
37 Institutions are sometimes also referred as form of modern corporation, financial system or educational system, 
etc. They may be firms like GM or IBM were organizational exemplars of norms given to certain organizational 
form prevailing at time. (Nelson 1995, 80-81)  
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much as they have built novel competitive institutional structures at the top of the existing 
ones. 
 
Other form “natural evolution” may be seen for example in cases of regulative changes (in 
political domain) and creation of common labor market areas of  Nordic countries (including 
Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark) in 1950s and of EU to which Finland joined 1994 
and Estonia 2002. Both were significant institutional changes in the political domain and 
opened up the channels for the mobility especially from Finland to Sweden on 1960s and 
1970s and from Estonia to Finland in late 1990s and 2000s when the demand and supply of 
the workforce and income levels were significantly unbalanced between the countries.  
 
Cultural, ethnic and geographical proximities are high between the Finland and Estonia and 
Finland and Sweden (especially distance between the capital cities of Finland and Estonia is 
just 60 kilometers so Tallinn is closer to Helsinki region, than any of the big city-regions of 
Finland). Importantly many Estonians can speak Finnish, while Swedish is the second official 
language in Finland, although this does not mean that all Finns speak Swedish even 
moderately. So these factors do not create high barriers in terms of language, ethnic 
appearance or cultural habits. In fact, employment rate of Estonians in Finland is same as 
Finnish and even higher than employment rate or the Finnish return migrants (Myrskylä, 
2010: 34), so their integration to labor markets is extremely good. Since Estonian 
independence from early 1990s hundreds of small, mostly Estonian, labor brokers steered 
tens of thousands Estonians to Finland, while thousands of Finns went to Estonia. Especially 
in construction industry transnational recruiting patterns are institutionalized over time and it 
has been estimated that there are bout 15 to 20 000 Estonian construction workers in 
Finland while there are 15 000 unemployed native Finnish construction workers in Finland. 
However, these small brokers cannot be seen as institutional entrepreneurs, since they 
reacted institutional changes in regulative and market environments in culturally and 
politically favorable environment rather than created the change by themselves. They acted 
as entrepreneurs, not as institutional entrepreneurs.  
 
Transnational labor markets are existing already many narrowly defined niches of the 
economy also in Finland, especially in the fields, where change may take place in rather 
“natural evolutionary” process without strong institutional obstacles and without need for 
determinant institutional entrepreneurs’ intentional efforts. But in case of health care sector 
transnationalization is still in early phase. Thus, this process offers good window to analyze 
the role on institutional entrepreneurs in the creation of institutions.    
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To conclude, it is important precisely to define, what are the institutions under the study, what 
is their key structural environment and what is the transnational dimension in this particular 
case? For example in this case, transnational is seen as alternative and complementing form 
for national patterns of recruiting. National patterns of recruitment refer to established 
practices, where employees are sought through local networks of individuals, often through 
people working in the employer organization or educational institutions where relevant 
education is given. Also open vacancies are announced mostly regionally or nationally in 
some cases and when recruiting firms or leased labor is used, the wish of employers may be, 
to have “native” workers (Raunio, et al. 2009.)  
 
Transnational refers to linkages, that are not international, i.e. constructed by states, but 
individual agents like firms, people, NGOs, etc and there is certain amount of border crossing 
reciprocity and constant interaction between the agents. (Faist, 2000; Vertovec, 2009: 3.) 
Agents may create transnational community or community of practice (Wegner 1997) where 
linkages between the agents are not direct. Institutionalized transnational recruiting patterns 
then refers to interactive links between the countries, where non-state agents organize the 
mobility of the labor with rather stable routines and structures.  
 
Border crossing recruiting patterns between two countries are necessarily not transnational 
as such, if there is no certain amount of constant interaction between the agents. Further 
they are not institutionalized, if there is no stability and longevity in these practices. However, 
border crossing recruiting is likely to create transnational social spaces due to mobile 
employees and due to labor brokers, who organize the process in two or more countries over 
longer periods of time. Even in cases, where work done in the new location, would serve just 
local or national labor markets and recruiting would be mostly one way process, the 
recruiting patterns and activities may be transnational. Transnational recruiting refers 
channels that include several mechanisms, modes of operations and social interaction 
between the two distant places. For example testing, training and recruiting practices may be 
built transnationally between the two locations. Often, these channels also require 
negotiations and agreements between the economic and political agents of the two regions 
and evidently, create transnational social spaces amongst the individuals. Transnational 
patterns of recruitment may then be institutionalized, although employers maintain their 
national modes of operations and work as such is done in national labor markets according 
to national rules and the recruiting is based on the need of the one national labor markets 
only.  
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Institutional entrepreneurs transnationalizing health care sector 
 
Health care as specific field of labor markets 
 
According to Bach (2009) there are several distinctive features in migration of health care 
professionals that require different policy goals and interventions compared to other labor 
based migrants. Social consequences in sending countries and macro level problems like 
hindering the achievement of United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals in poverty 
reduction are evident and severe. While those impacts are important background for the 
phenomenon, factors related to institutionalization are more relevant for this paper. Health 
workers mobility is influenced strongly by the regulatory frameworks of individual 
governments that control the training, recruitment and deployment of health professionals, 
which makes it much more strongly embedded with national institutions, than for example 
mobility of ICT professionals. (Ibid 2009, 203-205.)  Health care occupations, especially at 
nurse and doctoral levels, require also good communication abilities and understanding of 
different local dialects used by the patients, and some understanding of the local health care 
system.  
 
Also in case of Finland National Supervisory Authority for Welfare and Health (Valvira) grant 
upon the application the right to practice authorized professions (like medical doctor, nurse, 
etc.) and to use the occupational (like hospital chemist, assistant nurse, etc.) title of health 
care professionals. Occupations are then strongly protected against the non-EU applicants, 
while in case of applicants from EU, their diplomas have to be accepted equally. Although 
diplomas are equal, employer often requires the ability to use Finnish language in work.   
 
Two illustrative examples are projects aiming to set up long term recruiting and education 
cooperation with China and Philippines in the field of health care. Importantly, both countries 
are active labor exporter and they do have transnational institutional structures to support 
recruiting of labor. These include intentional over education of nurses, existing agreements 
concerning labor exporting with several countries, national agencies organizing the 
recruiting, etc. They are also culturally very distant from Finland, so also these institutional 
factors should be overcame. It should be noticed, that these two projects are rather 
illustrative examples than actual case studies. Aim is not to study these cases in particular, 
but illustrate the concept of institutional entrepreneur through them.  
 
The first example is project initiated by the city of Lahti and semi-public (independent public 
utility of publicly owned education concern) organization of adult education center in Lahti. 
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Often semi-public adult education centers’ role in general is interesting, since they do not 
come purely form political or from economic domains, but their role is politically defined to 
support the economic life of the region and provide services for the employers. 
Consequently, many of them are very actively involved also to development projects in order 
to create novel transnational recruiting models with testing, training and coaching services 
between Finland and selected countries38. Projects are important source of funding and tool 
for service development for these organizations. They are also main providers of work life 
related training and education for the immigrants. 
 
The aim of the example project is to develop and test the international recruiting model that 
would ensure the availability of the health care personnel, when regional and national labor 
markets are not able to provide needed professionals. The aims of the project include: 
network building with relevant Finnish and Chinese authorities and other actors and also 
between the China and Finland, developing a recruiting model, ensuring the sufficient skill 
level of arrivals including the understanding of the Finnish health care systems working 
principals and adjusting to work within Finnish work environment and developing integration 
models supporting the work based migration.  
 
Second example is the project or rather goal of Opteam, private recruiting and labor leasing 
firm. The firm is market leader in Finnish labor markets concerning the international 
recruiting. Leadership is related to labor leasing in very international and the biggest single 
European construction site, nuclear plan of Olkiluoto, where Opteam has played significant 
role in providing skilled labor from Europe to Fibland. However, Opteam plans also to import 
nurses from the Philippines. According to managing director of Opteam, they have invested 
250 000 euros to joint operation with university hospital to recruit nurses from Philippines and 
over two million euros to health care sector’s recruiting projects altogether. Opteam’s goal is 
to recruit about 20 000 nurses from the Philippines, which would significantly expand their 
business. (Hankonen 2010) 
 
In fact, in both examples, the motivation for change is to increase business opportunities and 
it seems that they focus on the building of service concept, that would be clearly 
transnational, but which would require as little as possible, transnational practices from 
                                               
38
 Often as part of the European Social Fund’s project, i.e. implementing the supranational organizations political 
goals. 
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employers or from policymakers. If the capabilities of service providers are good enough and 
qualifications, training, language, regulations or relocation do not cause difficulties for the 
employers or regulative authors (transaction costs are low), they are likely to accept the new 
transnational practice.39 
 
 
Qualities of institutional entrepreneur: Capability to collective action 
 
According to Battilana (2006) social position and capability to create appropriate alliances 
are extremely important qualities for institutional entrepreneur. Social position consists from 
agent’s organization and his or her position within the organization, organization’s weigh in 
the given field, social networks and groups that agent belongs and agent’s official position in 
the wider field. (ibid., 2006). In this article agency refers mostly to individual organization, but 
it should be noticed, that in real life and in theory, there is virtually always certain individual or 
small group of individuals within the organization(s), who could be seen as actual institutional 
entrepreneur. However, in this context the key issue is, that there are single agents, who 
may intentionally change the institutional structures.  
 
Social position and links with higher status individuals refer to both formal authority and 
social capital. Formal authority refers to those who have a legitimately recognized right to 
make decisions, like the authority of the state. Social capital refers to informal networks, 
which may provide access to information and political support. Social capital may offer 
possibilities to collective action among otherwise unlikely stakeholders. Also connections with 
different fields are significant. (Battilana et al, 2009: 82-84). In case of adult education center, 
they had authority of the mayor of the city as a head of the project and already in early stage 
they co-operated with the Commission for Local Authority Employers who represents the 
interests of Finland's municipalities and joint municipal authorities on the labor market. Local 
authorities employ about one fifth of all employed labor force in Finland and especially they 
employ most people working on health care centers or in hospitals. The invitation to first 
network meeting for relevant employers and authorities was, to give an example, sent out 
                                               
39
 The data is partly acquired from project focused on the “internationalization services of the labor markets” in 
Helsinki region and included 63 personal interviews with recruiting firms, other service providers and the relevant 
civil servant. (Raunio, Pihlajamaa & Carroll 2009) 
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also by the Commission for Local Authority Employers and the meeting was held in their 
premises in Helsinki. (Nieminen 2009)  
 
In case of Opteam they also use for example their professional magazine “Optimist” to 
enhance their social legacy. Magazine includes several interviews with business leaders, 
well know politicians and immigrants, whose views support the idea of international 
recruiting, and especially, recruiting of those groups that are in the focus of the Opteam. Also 
directors of Opteam are placed to same pictures and stories with ministers, top civil servants 
and top business leaders, which helps to dispel the fears and doubts concerning the bad 
image of the international recruiting business. In addition, they organize for example free 
seminars concerning the integration issue, where their services are presented and invited 
speakers are well known Finnish business leaders and celebrities as well as members of 
parliament. (Optimist, 2008; Opteam, 2010) These actions are close to traditional “lobbying” 
of different interest groups, where the views and attitudes of certain decision makers are 
aimed to change.  
 
Not just social position, but also social skills to implement the cooperation and to evaluate 
the position of themselves and others in the field are required from the institutional 
entrepreneur (Battilana et al, 2009: 81). In case of building transnational connections, also 
specific capability to communicate in, and between, two distant regions are needed. 
Transnational social skills are well defined by Rosenau & Koehn (2002) as transnational 
competences that enable agents to “participate effectively in activities that cut across two or 
more national boundaries” (Rosenau & Koehn, 2002: 110-114).  
 
In case of adult education center, the organization and especially project manager had track 
record of co-operation with China and Opteam had its branch and training facilities in 
Philippines. In a sense, these agents were already transnational, or edge of it, since their 
everyday practices took place in both locations. It should be noticed, that already these 
qualities, social position and its promotion and transnational social skills, rule out quite many 
potential agents, who may have interest to shape existing institutions.  
 
In addition, Leca and Naccache (2006) suggest that institutional entrepreneurs should not be 
seen apart from the existing institutions and institutional disembeddedness is even 
impossible point of departure. To be successful the right logics in the right context have to be 
recognized as well as the values and interest of the other actors who may support the 
change. (Leca and Naccache 2006, 644)  
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Both example organizations are clearly embedded to institutional environment – border 
crossing recruiting patterns – that they are about to change. They may be seen as captains 
of the trade ships in the era before the national institutions that secure the overseas trade: as 
captains of those ships were selected based on their trustworthiness and capabilities to 
deliver what they promise in business sense and to keep the transaction costs bearable 
(Ojala 1997), similarly international recruiting practices should be in trusted hands and out of 
the reach of the pirates, as long as supporting institutions will replace the personal networks 
and/or capability and track record based “swift trust”.  If these new “captains” will be strongly 
involved in this process, they will be embedded in emerging institutions.  
 
Further, and maybe even more importantly, capability to build appropriate alternatives to do 
things should be considered. In case of health care sector, special requirements like ethical 
aspects and official qualifications of employees are important.  New service concepts have to 
answer to these needs. Human resource director on health care sector had a strong view 
and long experience how to rule out the low quality alternatives. He had a lot of experience 
about the low quality offers, that they could not even consider, but all suggestions so far were 
rejected (Raunio et al 2009).  
 
“We have received and will receive offers and we have discussed and listened what they 
have to say. So far, it has been quite easy to say, that not now, because their business ideas 
has often been really at the level of idea. They have proposed co-operation in recruiting and 
training, but conversation has revealed that they haven’t done their home works. Some have 
been even surprised that we have for example National Supervisory Authority for Welfare 
and Health, who is a gatekeeper for registrations (of health care personnel). When basic 
knowledge is inadequate, it is quite easy to say, that we are not going to develop your 
business plan. We are ready to discuss, when the home work are done. Door is open for all 
of them, however, and please do approach us when your concept is ready. There are 
National Supervisory Authority as a gatekeeper, educational institutions i.e. how the training 
is organized and ministries and how the process in funded, what is the share of public 
funding and so on. Professional service provider should have a ready concept and existing 
networks“ 
Human resource director, health care sector  
 
The co-operation with market leader firm changed the situation and it was evident that the 
key trigger to change existing patterns of recruiting from national to transnational was based 
on the quality of the service concept, in addition to market demand of course. The service 
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provider needed the field specific capabilities to build feasible alternative to the market with 
strong ethical and regulative preconditions.  
 
The embeddedness, need of formal authority and social capital refers to institutional 
entrepreneurs, who have rather solid position in the location where they are about the act, or 
good social competences to enter this social domain of power. These requirements rule out 
many organizations and makes it obviously challenging also adult education center and 
market leader firm in labor leasing , who are obviously very strongly embedded with 
institutional structures of Finnish and international labor markets.  
 
 
Actions of institutional entrepreneur: Divergent change implemented through framing  
 
The key activities of institutional entrepreneurs based on earlier literature according to 
Battilana, et. al (2009) are  1) developing a vision including sharing the vision of the need for 
change with followers, 2) mobilizing allies, people and organizations,  to gain support for and 
acceptance of new routines and 3) motivating others to achieve and sustain the vision. 
Implementing change that builds on existing institutions is challenging and change that 
conflicts with existing institutions even more so. Especially latter case needs the mobilization 
of allies, since those who benefit from the status quo defend existing beliefs and practices in 
order to maintain their established privileges and social positions. (Battilana, Leca and 
Boxenbaum, 2009: 78)  
 
Framing is the process where novel ideas are introduced for the key agents in the most 
suitable form and in the context where they are easier to accept. Framing may aim to reveal 
the failing of the existing routine and expose problems with prevailing institutionalized 
practices (diagnostic framing.) Framing may also concern projects that differ strongly from 
existing institutions and thus they have to be introduced less radical as they are to reduce 
fear, incomprehension or apparent irrelevance (prognostic framing) or introducing compelling 
reasons to support the new vision (motivational framing). So, institutional entrepreneur have 
to identify the state and interests of those in target and frame the new mode of operation or 
routine to appear as congruent with the existing institutions as possible. Also neutral 
“common good” may be emphasized. To create discourse that resonates with the values and 
interests of potential allies the “rhetorical strategies” and even specific “institutional 
vocabularies” including structures of words, expressions, to communicate the vision may be 
used to change institutions by articulating, manipulating and recombining institutional logics 
(Fligstein, 1997 according to Battilana et al, 2009: 79-83.)  
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Example of framing is the discourse of recruiting and labor leasing firms, who use the 
rhetoric of ethical recruiting and labor shortage, when they communicate with the key allies. 
Especially labor shortage is used when communicating with key customers and ethical 
issues and multicultralism when communicating with ministries and other key public agents. 
For example editorial of “Optimist”, professional magazine of market leader firm in labor 
leasing in Finland, states  
 
“Who builds the houses and takes care of elders? Where medical doctors come from in the 
future? (J) We have a labor shortage, although there is no shortage of people. (J) Ethical 
principles of Opteam include the practice, where placement fees are not charged from the 
employees. (J) We hope that as many as possible of them (Philippines nurses who came to 
Finland through Opteam) stays in Finland. It will happen, if they find their own community 
here and employer, who boldly dare to take new steps towards multicultural work community 
and tolerant attitudes”. (Optimist 2008a)  
 
The vocabulary above includes key concepts and discourses of public debate and they are 
backed up with statistics and other references that increase the reliability of the message, 
that emphasis the emergence of new community which significantly contributes Finnish 
society, if bold employers are ready to support it.  One crucial question concerns the ethical 
issues and evidently this arise also in case of Finland.  Head of the international affairs of the 
Finnish Union of Health and Social Care Professionals (Tehy) presents very traditional 
counter arguments: 
“Is it right to build your business on the distress of the people and dysfunctional societies? 
From individual nurse’s point of view, job in Finland may be considered to be a jack pot in 
some sense, but real losers are Philippines health care sector, society and the nurse’s 
family.”   
Also issues like corruption and lowering quality of health care in Philippines due to migration 
of the best professionals are covered. The ethical issues are one of the most important areas 
where recruiters have to proof the quality of the process for the public sector employers 
(hospitals and municipalities) and civil servants. (Hankonen 2010.) These questions are well 
known in the recruiting industry and in case of Opteam especially, which is going to enter to 
these markets in Finland with determination. So, they also aim to answer the ethical dilemma 
with convincing arguments. In their magazine the ethical issues are discussed with former 
health care minister of Philippines, who strongly support the ethical recruiting and gives very 
similar guidelines for the ethical recruiting as Opteam’s service concept promises to provide. 
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“At last someone is interested in about ethical recruiting. (J) I think it is high time for the 
ethical recruiting.” (J) I call my model win-win situation, where receiving country gets nurses 
and Philippine health care sector benefits as well.”  
(Jamie Galvez Tan, former minister of health care in Philippines in Optimist) 
 
 
It is easy to recognize rhetorical strategies and use of right vocabulary also from these 
phrases. The former minister of health care, medical doctor, professor and consultant of 
WHO, UNDP and World Bank, Mr. Galvez from Philippines, is convincing person and also 
discuss with the same “level” with the ministries and other officials in Finland.  In the same 
context it is mentioned, that Opteam donates medical equipments to Philippines and the 
possible role of Finland as the forerunner in the ethical recruiting is emphasized, if politicians 
just understand to grab the opportunity. (Helin 2010) Opteam also established a fund “Time 
to give back” which announces loans for nurses who wants to move to Finland. With loan 
money they can support themselves during the training in Philippines and buy flights to 
Finland. The interest rate for loans is reasonable (5 %). Fund may also give stipends for 
those who enter to nurse training. (Hankonen 2010) In addition, other means were used to 
shape the attitudes, or cognitive institutions. For example social media and personal blog 
writings concerning the life of the foreign employees in Finland are used.   
 
Also adult education organization uses the framing to sell its idea. In addition to already 
mentioned examples like authority of the mayor (who represent also the important client to 
recruit health care personnel to Lahti), they present very detailed and convincing 
documentation of the partners and their current activities in China. According to their report, 
they contacted through embassy of China’s trade department with China International 
Intellectech Corporation (CIIC), which is owned by the state of China and one of the biggest 
firms focused on the international recruiting of Chinese workers and development of the 
human resources. The turnover of the CIIC is over 1,2 billion dollar, it has recruited and 
trained Chinese workers to 76 countries and also Finnish telecommunication firm Nokia has 
used its services. There has been also more than 60 000 expert level recruits as well and 
from year 2000 CIIC has co-operated with Europe and United States in recruiting of Chinese 
medical professionals. They have also created a study program and tests according to British 
standards, which has made it possible for Chinese students to find employment from Great 
Britain. Also Chinese ministry of Trade supports the co-operation with Finland in this case for 
the CIIC, which is important in China. (Nieminen 2009)   
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Also other potential partner, Weihai International Economic & Technical Co-opearative LTD 
(WIETC) is approved by Chinese ministry of trade and it has co-operation with more than 20 
countries in international recruiting and more than 37 000 experts from different fields have 
been recruited through its services. They also co-operate with some Chinese nursing schools 
and it is one of the ten Chinese organizations, which is certified to train and recruit Chinese 
nurses to Great Britain according to contract done between the governments of China and 
Great Britain.  (Nieminen 2009)   
 
The strong founding in China as well as Chinese relations with western countries, Finnish 
telecommunication firm Nokia and health care sector are important part of the framing work, 
where the credibility of the new alternative is introduced to key gatekeepers convincing way. 
It provides a picture, where recruiting from China is common practice and not as big change, 
as one would assume at the first glance. So called diagnostic framing, has been done 
already earlier, in many public debates and statistics showing that Finnish social and health 
care sector cannot survive without foreign workers. These figures are presented, in detail, in 
above mentioned documentation too. It should be noticed, that framing requires a lot of 
effort, knowledge and existing networks, and when in high quality, it should not be seen in 
negative terms as selling speech only, but rather as a valuable learning process for the 
gatekeepers.  
 
 
Discussion – entrepreneurs and collective actions 
 
In addition to examples above, there are several other similar cases that aim to change 
attitudes and establish routines in order to support the selection of their novel practice. From 
this point of view in can be claimed, that Finnish labor markets are in the process of 
transnationalizing, and, in some narrow fields, has already acquired some institutionalized 
forms. In case of examples used in this article, it may be said, that institutional entrepreneur 
do not initiate or implement the whole structural change, but they may play important role in 
formation of certain, more narrowly limited institutions, like transnational recruiting patterns 
from Finland to Asia. It seems evident that institutional entrepreneur should be able to 
transmit the change from one field to other in order to make it acceptable in the eyes of the 
all significant gatekeepers and to initiate the change also in related institutional fields by 
contacting the agents, who are embedded  to these institutional environment. Political field 
and ethics are strongly present in health care field, which suggests, that profound changes in 
wider institutional environment or structures are not likely take place due to individual agent’s 
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effort only, but it is more realistic to try to recognize the group of the institutional 
entrepreneurs, who promote the same or parallel changes.  
 
In fact, recently in studies of institutional entrepreneurship “heroic views of individuals” are 
giving a room to actors embedded in social contexts who aim to mobilize other actors to join 
in divergent change process. Even the concept of collective institutional entrepreneurship is 
introduced, which suggests that process may involve several actors instead of one, providing 
the access to varying levels of resources. In case of institutional entrepreneurship change 
cannot be attributed to any single individual or organization and it may even “result from the 
accumulation of countless institutional entrepreneurs’ uncoordinated divergent actions”. 
Institutions may change due to “spatially dispersed, heterogeneous activity by actors with 
various kinds and levels of resources”. (Battilana et al, 2009: 87- 89)  
 
Need of powerful allies to conduct the change is evident, but institutional entrepreneur and its 
allies should be distinguished from collective view or “countless institutional entrepreneurs” 
who cause the change. This refers also to “natural change” where agents rather response 
and adopt to changing wider environment, as entrepreneurs always do, but they are not the 
key agents who initiate the change, which requires significant changes to existing institutional 
structures. In real life, in wider societal transformations, there are institutions that may 
change “naturally” while others may require more determinant efforts from institutional 
entrepreneurs or/and from lobbyist groups. 
 
Thus, in order to provide real institutional changes, institutional entrepreneur has to bring 
together the different domains and levels in the field, or more precisely, the key agents of 
these fields and levels (Fig. 1). For example at micro level key agents may be seen as single 
employers, hospitals or municipalities, in meso level Commission for Local Authority 
Employers and in macro level different ministries, members of parliament and authors taking 
care of regulations steering the processes. The level is related to agents’ power to change 
things, to micro, meso or macro level practices. Significantly, agents who are key allies, have 
to be able significantly impact on the change that supports the new activity and reshapes 
institutions, in different levels and maybe in related institutions.  
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Figure 1. Institutional entrepreneurs (circulated with dashed line) and their allies as mediators 
between the levels and fields in transformation process 
 
In health care sector in Finland, some (thin) support for transnationalizing recruiting patterns 
may be seen in political domain’s institutional changes. Finland and China are negotiating 
about the “minute of mutual understanding” concerning the recruiting of Chinese workers to 
Finland. Minute aims to guarantee the good conditions for the workers and Chinese officials 
are also agreed to remove the agencies that take fees from the employees from their lists, 
according to Head of council of Finnish Ministry of Interior. (Hankonen 2010). Ministry of 
interior also produced a report concerning the “co-operation models with the third countries in 
international recruiting”, where “third” referred countries outside of the EU. Report included 
several recommendations, how the process could be organized according legal and ethical 
constraints. Thus, change is moving on, not just in recruiting practices promoted by adult 
education center and recruiting firm, but also in closely related regulative institutions due to 
government actions. 
 
So it seems, that links with other agents are needed in order to provide institutional changes, 
that work in different fields of society. It should be noticed, that institutional change in 
recruiting patterns in one economic sector, may be virtually unrelated to some other 
economic sectors and their certain sub-fields. For example recruiting patterns of knowledge 
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intensive TNCs, small firms in construction industry and public health care sector, especially 
in case of recruiting nurses and doctors, are creating their own, just occasionally overlapping 
institutional settings for the transnational recruiting.  
 
Similarly, changes in regulative field’s institutions are not necessarily related to changes in 
recruiting practices. For example joining to common Nordic labor markets and to EU 
changed recruiting patterns just in some fields in Finland, when demand on job markets 
grew. However, not all fields acquired transnational or even international forms of recruiting. 
In many cases, mobility was based on the individuals decisions to leave and maybe to follow 
existing social networks. In short, institutional changes in labor markets may take place in 
different domains and different fields, which may or may not be related. In order to 
understand the transnationalization of labor markets, this diversity should be well understood 
in each particular case under the study. 
 
In addition, transnationalization in labor markets does not necessarily mean that workers 
would move back and forth in interactive manner. The transnationalization may take place in 
interaction between Finnish and Philippines and Chinese recruiting agents and create 
transnational spaces between the educational institutions and other related organizations 
and individuals. However, transnationalization of labor markets may include several 
separated partial transnationalizations in the labor markets. 
 
Lastly, the high demands for institutional entrepreneur rules out many potential agents willing 
to shape institutional forms. For example, it may be questioned, are example organizations of 
this article really transnational entrepreneurs or are they just adapting to changing 
environment and potential demands? In order to give a solid answer, more profound study 
would be needed, instead of shallow examples given here. However, it seems that very 
detailed and sophisticated understanding of the existing institutions, good communication 
skill and networks are needed. This rules out many groups and is challenge especially for the 
immigrant groups, without strong attachment to and understanding of the society.  
 
For example in Finland several attempts to support immigrant organizations to create 
services that public sector could buy, have failed due to immigrant groups lack of specific 
competences to provide services and lack of understanding how institutions and society work 
as such. (Raunio, et al. 2009) For example in Helsinki metropolitan region the participation of 
immigrant associations in the integrative issues of municipalities takes place in rather 
passive role, mainly through cooperative projects, which are mostly managed by (native) civil 
servants. Representation of immigrant associations in councils of the cities in the 
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metropolitan region has been fairly weak and takes place mostly at the planning stages if at 
all. (Saksela-Bergholm 2010) This is important, since capability to participate and create 
novel practices will define, who are embedded in emerging institutions and who are not.  
 
 
Conclusions and the next steps 
 
To conclude, one important question is, how to notice the institutional change when you see 
one? Over long periods of time, it is quite easy to define the change, but when the aim is to 
connect the certain individual agent with the institutional change in situ, it is quite fuzzy and 
uncertain process. It is also difficult to say, what are the actual actions that agent should 
take, in order to be counted as institutional entrepreneur? How far they should go in their 
promotion of change? Although these and many more questions need to be answered, the 
institutional entrepreneur offers promising consept for understanding of institutional 
transformation of transnational labor markets. Already several points can be made to show 
the way forward on this pursue.   
 Institutional entrepreneur do not provide novel routines that fit with the existing 
environment and institutions, but aim to change the institutions and environment to 
fit the novel variations that they promote. 
 Institutional entrepreneurs are not necessarily source of change as such, but they 
intercede or transmit the change from one levels to other and from one domain to 
other and thus, are source of transformation, which refers to profound and 
longstanding societal change in all levels and domains of the society, not just 
temporary changes in some limited fields.  
 Qualities of institutional entrepreneur are strong social position, understanding of 
the field, capability to motivate and create allies, field specific capabilities and 
transnational competences. 
 Activities of institutional entrepreneur start from framing the novel routines to 
discourse that is understandable and acceptable for the allies and in the existing 
environment in general and ends with the implementation of the routine in several 
societal fields and levels, that can be interpreted as the institutionalization. 
 To recognize the institutional entrepreneur, robust empirical analysis is required, 
since their activities and qualities offers just potential to be one. 
 In emergence of transnational institutions, the role of weakly integrated migrant 
groups may work as triggering factor for the change, but is not likely to be strong, 
in actual implementation process, which defines the form of the institutions, since 
characteristics of successful institutional entrepreneur includes strong societal 
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position or possibility to mobilize them, which requires social capital, 
understanding of the field and its discourses or even vocabulary and motivational 
factors. These are more likely the qualities of those, who are already embedded to 
institutional environment. 
 Established migrant groups or/and those who have a strong social and 
transnational competences to recognize and mobilize right allies, may, however, 
function as institutional entrepreneurs. In economic field this is more likely, since 
motivating factor is often product or service that can provide profit on the field, but 
in political and socio-cultural domains rewards are less unclear and recognizable 
for the new comers and they are more territorially constructed and embedded with 
existing institutions and thus, motivational factors, rewarding schemes and 
powerful allies are more difficult to recognize and mobilize without understanding 
of the local socio-cultural and political domains. 
 Learning transnational and social competences may open road to the social 
capital and understanding of the formal position of the key agents in different field 
and thus improve the possibilities of the new comer to work as institutional 
entrepreneur. 
 Institutional entrepreneurs may support the creation of more coherent institutional 
structures where practical and cognitive institutions are implemented carefully 
between the macro level demand and regulative institutions. 
 
Still, there are several challenges for this approach to develop as coherent theoretical and 
methodological tool that Battilana et al. (2009) point out. Firstly, embeddedness should 
defined in more detail, as well as degree of fragmentation and degree of institutionalization. 
Secondly, also more studies considering actors’ with embeddedness in multiple fields are 
needed, since it may be significant enabling condition for institutional entrepreneurship. The 
community and individual levels of analysis have received just little interest in research of 
institutional entrepreneurship, although individuals are embedded in organizations that are 
embedded not only in organizational fields but also in local geographic communities. The 
community level analysis of populations, organizations, and markets located in a geographic 
territory that share, as a result of their common location, elements of local culture, norms, 
identity, and laws, would be appropriate.  Local level has not only remained important as 
globalization proceeds, but local particularities and specific features have become more 
visible and salient due to process. “Actors’ simultaneous embeddedness in local geographic 
communities as well as broader global environments might influence the likelihood that they 
will act as institutional entrepreneurs and process of divergent change implementation” 
(Battilana et al 2009, 90.)  Approach focusing on individuals and dual embeddedness offers 
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clearly interesting opportunities also to more profound understanding of the 
transnationalization of the labor market institutions and the role of agency in this process.  
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PART THREE 
TRANSFORMATION OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
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Chapter 7 
Educational ‘Transnationalism’ and the Global Production 
of Educational Regimes 
Kaveri Harriss and Filippo Osella 
 
 
Introduction  
 
In this chapter we discuss ways in which the education sector is changing as a result of 
‘transnationalism’, defined germanely by Aihwa Ong as the “condition of cultural 
connectedness and mobility across space” (1999: 4). To provide empirical detail we return 
frequently to the example of India, tracing the kinds of ‘transnational’ processes that are 
implicated in educational change. The example of India is instructive, as it is one of the 
largest contributors to flows of highly-skilled migrants and students worldwide (Skeldon 
2005). First, we review the existing research on education that has taken place under the 
rubric of ‘transnationalism’, and then argue to bring other important processes into the frame 
for analysis. We consider transformations in Indian education that resulted from ‘precursors 
to modern transnationalism’ (Ong and Nonini 1997) in the colonial and post-colonial period, 
pulling out their ramifying consequences in the present. We then discuss new developments 
linked with the globalization of education, and finally, we consider how they impact on the 
educational aspirations and spatial strategies of parents and students. In so doing, we 
suggest a need for refinements to the transnationalism approach, turning to literatures on 
other kinds of social formations to provide us with a vocabulary to expand, but also 
historicize the spatial and socio-cultural field of global connection. 
 
We begin by reviewing the existing work on education in the context of transnational 
migration. There are two sides to this literature, as it is organised around studies carried out 
in the ‘sending’ countries, mostly within a development studies tradition, and in the ‘receiving’ 
countries within social policy. In both sides of the literature, education is equated with formal 
schooling, and seen to have an intrinsically positive value: it is the key to economic growth, 
favourable and competitive positions of companies, regions and nation states; and not least, 
a substantive freedom and human right (UNDP 1999; Krueger and Mikael 2001). In the 
contemporary knowledge-based ‘network society’ or ‘information age’ (Castells 1999), 
advanced levels of education are required to move economies beyond growth based on 
labour-intensive industrialization towards more capital-intensive activities.  
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Education and transnational migration  
 
On the impact of transnational migration on education in ‘sending’ countries, we see that 
debates are focussed on two main issues: remittances and ‘brain drain’, both concerned with 
the impact of emigration on society and economy. In this field, scholars have broadly 
expressed pessimism and dismay at the failure of migrants to invest their remittances 
productively. The latest studies conclude that remittances have a ‘qualified’ effect on 
increasing educational attainment in migrant-sending households (Kandel and Kao 2001; 
Hansen and Woodruff 2003; van Hear, Pieke et al. 2004; Acosta, Calderon et al. 2008; 
Castles and Delgado Wise 2008; van Naerssen, Spaan et al. 2008). However, alongside the 
qualified ‘direct’ effects of financial remittances we need to consider the ‘indirect’ influence 
the migrants have on their families, through encouragement, setting an example and 
showing that investment in education can be “a means to secure overseas migration and 
enhanced social respect” (Mehta 1990: 157). Furthermore, in the contemporary era of 
intensely regulated managed/circular migration, highly-skilled migration and education itself 
have become extremely important as a channel for young people to head overseas. This has 
had an untold influence on educational priorities in the ‘sending areas’, which is crucial to 
understand. As Khadria says, “there have been few studies on the impact of skilled migration 
on career choices and educational choices_ there have been a lot of choice distortion and 
inter-generation or even inter-community conflict over educational choices that have taken 
place but remained unanalysed if not unnoticed” (2008: 108).  
 
The emigration of highly-educated and skilled workers has generally been seen in a negative 
light from the perspective of ‘sending’ countries, depleting the nation of its most productive, 
economically dynamic citizens. Development experts continue to recommend strategies to 
discourage ‘brain drain’ and promote the retention and return of highly-skilled migrants (Dia 
2004; Kupfer, Hofman et al. 2004). Recently, however, these processes have started to 
appear more complex. Research has questioned whether sending countries are really 
deprived when highly-skilled workers migrate, given that they often migrate precisely 
because they are unable to find highly-skilled employment locally in the first place. Moreover, 
highly-skilled workers tend to migrate internally to metropolitan centres – unwilling and ill-
suited to practice their craft in a rural backwater. Many highly-skilled workers are actually 
produced overseas, as they migrate specifically to pursue education. Opportunities for 
highly-skilled migration may fuel the expansion of educational facilities in the ‘sending’ 
countries, too, as in the case of nurse training in the Indian states of Kerala and Punjab (see 
Skeldon 2005; Walton-Roberts 2011).  
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Increasingly, debates on brain drain have been recast through the lens of ‘brain circulation’, 
whereby highly-skilled migrants “do not transfer completely but retain active links with their 
country of origin by reinvesting, sending remittances and migrating back” (Vincent-Lacrin 
2004: 32) – a ‘win-win situation’ in which highly-skilled people have the opportunity to further 
their careers through migration yet eventually return (Vertovec 2009). This perspective takes 
account of new forms of polarization cutting across and between countries: the downturn in 
the destination economies, the return of highly-skilled migrants, emergence of high-tech 
knowledge economies in the South and outsourcing in the sectors of IT and offshore 
processing. Highly-skilled circular migrants are hoped to play an important role in shifting 
high-tech production to, and opening up markets in their countries of origin, particularly in the 
cases of India and China where foreign direct investment from overseas nationals runs to 
billions of dollars per year (Newland and Patrick 2004). In India, for example, the downturn in 
the US IT industry in the early 2000s led to return migration by thousands of IT workers, 
whilst the emergence of outsourcing and off-shore processing triggered further return 
migration and eventually became a major driver to the Indian economy (Khadria 2008). 
However, it is clear that not all countries will be able to adopt strategies of outsourcing to 
reverse processes of brain drain. Skeldon (2005) suggests that this will be limited to South-
East Asia, coastal China, Brazil and Argentina, parts of India, Mexico, South Africa, North 
Africa, Nigeria and possibly Ghana. Moreover, questions are raised concerning the extent to 
which the return of even a small fraction of highly-skilled migrants can stimulate the 
development of high-tech industries. Can highly-skilled workers’ knowledge really be 
harnessed? How is this affected by the labour relations and practices of professional 
migrants? What happens if they are tied up in company structures? Does their particular 
geographic location matter? Can knowledge be transferred equally across different fields? 
And what about the low grade and lack of creativity of the work that gets outsourced, relative 
to qualifications (Williams 2005; Upadhya and Vasavi 2008)? The unequal terrain on which 
‘brain circulation’ is supposed to take place might lead us back to the idea of ‘brain drain’ –  
or perhaps “the high status accorded to mobility means that new truths are being normalized” 
(Sidhu 2007: 217). 
 
We now turn to consider the second part of the literature concerning education and 
transnational migration, which examines the educational attainment of second-generation 
youth growing up in the ‘receiving’ countries to which their parents or grandparents migrated. 
Migration, Education and Change, a recent collection edited by Luchtenberg (2004), 
exemplifies the problematic ways in which this literature has engaged with ‘transnationalism’. 
Theoretical chapters by Pries and Luchtenberg purport to tackle head-on the challenges to 
scholarship on education posed by new forms of migration and transnationalism, yet end up 
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following a well-trodden path that privileges the education systems of the receiving countries. 
For example, they introduce typologies of migrant incorporation patterns according to their 
relationships to their regions of origin and the timeline along which migration takes place, 
distinguishing between ‘classic immigrants’, ‘return migrants’, ‘diaspora migrants’ and 
‘transmigrants’; and then proceed to test for associations between these various modes of 
‘integration’ or ‘assimilation’ and the educational attainment of ethnic minority groups in 
different European countries. This work assesses the impact of transnationalism within a 
national assimilationist framework. Moreover, when deployed in the ‘receiving’ country, the 
transnationalism approach tends to reinforce a dubious slippage between the terms ‘migrant’ 
and ‘ethnic minority’, which we note is strongly racially-coded – playing into a right-wing 
construction of the children of [non-white] migrants as perennial ‘foreigners’ in the countries 
in which they are born and grow up (Gilroy 2000; Ware and Back 2002; Hesse and Sayyid 
2006).   
 
Debates concerning the relationships between migration and education have therefore been 
dominated by issues concerning the participation, marginalization and exclusion of ethnic 
minority children and youth from mainstream schooling. Surveying studies from receiving 
countries such as the USA, UK, Australia, Germany, France, Greece and Sweden (see 
Jencks and Phillips 1998; and the case studies in Luchtenberg 2004) we are struck by the 
overwhelming deprivationalist tendencies in the literature which largely addresses the 
assumption that migration and ‘incorporation’ undermine children’s education, “resting on two 
key terms – racial discrimination and racial disadvantage – which provide the conceptual 
foundations for almost all current research and policy formulation” (Ballard 1992: 484). The 
often poor attainment of ethnic minority youth in the education systems of ‘receiving’ 
countries is indeed alarming, and educationalists have responded with a specialized 
literature designing and evaluating interventions to redress inequalities, in the context of 
diverse national policies concerning immigration, citizenship and multiculturalism (cf. 
Pitkanen, Kalekin-Fishman et al. 2002). Meanwhile, quantitative studies have documented 
differentiation in the educational trajectories of different ethnic minority groups. For example, 
Connor et al. (2003) note that over half of 18/19 year old Indian-origin youths in the UK are at 
university, more than double than their Pakistani- and Bangladeshi-origin counterparts. It is 
now established that not all ‘culturally different’ children do poorly in mainstream schools, 
requiring increasingly complex and less deterministic models of the relationships between 
discrimination and disadvantage, culture and scholastic achievement. 
 
In accounting for the academic achievements of certain high-achieving ‘model minorities’ in 
the UK and USA, namely Indians and Chinese, commentators have pointed to the 
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importance of parental success in getting their children to internalize high educational 
ambitions, making recourse to a highly essentialised concept of culture. This celebration of 
cultural resources culminates in Modood’s concept of ‘ethnic capital’, supposedly built 
through the triad of “familial relationships, transmission of aspirations and attitudes and norm 
reinforcement” (2004: 100). If close ties to ethnic and parent cultures enable educational 
achievement, transnationalism entails possibilities for educational achievement and mobility 
(Moldenhower 2005). Whilst the concept of ‘ethnic capital’ grasps the compulsion of parental 
ambitions and values, it naturalises and deplorably racializes ethnic differences in 
educational attainment, and normalizes existing stereotypes about patriarchal immigrant 
culture and neglects to see how children and young people’s educational careers are 
influenced not only by ethnic background but by social class, the values of peer groups in 
and out of school, and youth culture outside their own ethnic group, amongst other things. 
The more astute ethnographies critique the bipolar dichotomy between parents and 
transnational communities on the one hand, and white society, showing that young people’s 
use of the dominant trope of being ‘caught between two cultures’ is indeed significantly 
related to the ways in which they are expected to “allow themselves to be re-made at school, 
be produced by the disciplinary practices and normative judgements that regulate life at 
school” (Hall 2002: 122-3; cf. Shankar 2007). The ‘cultural productions’ school of educational 
ethnography (Willis 1977; cf. Levinson, Foley et al. 1996; Eisenhart 2001) engages with the 
wide range of cultural influences that saturate the lives of young people, showing how youth 
culture may articulate with, but equally undermine parental insistence on high educational 
achievement.  
 
 
Ethnographic challenges to transnationalism 
 
These studies point to complex ways in which education is changing as a result of 
‘transnational’ connections, whether we consider the additional sources of educational 
financing that are captured through migrant remittances; how educational ambitions are 
increasingly shaped by the prospect of mobility; the trend towards governance of migration to 
facilitate circular highly-skilled migration or ‘brain circulation’; or the educational experiences 
of migrants themselves, and their children, in the places to which they migrate. They also 
point to multifarious cultural influences influencing educational attainment, and problematize 
the ‘two cultures’ trope.  
 
The diffuseness of these processes might lead us to endorse a vision of ‘transnational 
spaces’. As Walton-Roberts (2004; 2005) shows, entire spaces are reconfigured through 
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transnationalism. Transnational spaces are complex, multi-dimensional and multiply-
inhabited, in which not only migrants or people from ethnically-bounded transnational 
communities are seen to operate, but a multitude of actors with different levels of investment 
and involvement (Jackson, Crang et al. 2004: 3). In the field of education, however, we 
encounter a number of problems in adopting such an approach.  
 
First is the problem of newness. The appropriateness of transnationalism as a frame for 
understanding migrant and diasporic experiences is justified by the defining features of the 
contemporary era, in which new technologies of travel and communication have permitted 
people to maintain “more frequent, less expensive and more intimate connections than 
before” (Levitt 2003: 569). However, massive transcontinental migrations have occurred in 
past centuries: these are “precursors to modern transnationalism, out of which the latter 
arose” (Ong and Nonini1997: 18). The recognition that transcontinental processes are not 
new has provoked much debate among transnationalism scholars, who have strived to 
identify how long-distance connections in the contemporary era differ from their antecedents. 
Some scholars have argued for a kind of technological determinism in which transnational 
migration, if not novel, has at least increased in extent, intensity and speed (e.g. Smith 
2003). Others have linked the salience of transnationalism to changes in global flows of 
capital and trade in the 19th and 20th centuries, recognising that intense economic 
restructuring has produced a range of cross-border connections (Glick Schiller and Levitt 
2006: 9). It is the interdeterminacy with globalization that is supposed to distinguish 
contemporary transnationalism (Vertovec 2009: 14). Provocatively, however, Tsing suggests 
that scholars only find global migration new because large numbers of black people have 
recently turned up in the ‘big white societies’ of Europe and its diaspora, where in the 19th 
century they were refused (cf. Minsk 1998: 123; Chaudhuri 2005). In the field of education, it 
is clear that this preoccupation with distinguishing the contemporary transnationalism “erects 
stereotypes of the past that get in the way of appreciating both the past and the present” 
(Tsing 2000: 333).  
 
Second is the problem of spatial binarism we find in work on transnationalism, which tends to 
focus on dyadic relationships “between migrants, the states where they settle, and their 
homelands” (Glick Schiller and Levitt 2006: 12). Over this spatial binarism are overlaid socio-
cultural ‘dual perspectives’ or ‘bifocality’. Aspects of life ‘here’ and ‘there’ are perceived as 
complementary. Migrants inhabit an inherent ambivalence between the pull of ‘home’, the 
locus of personal and social identity and religiosity; and ‘abroad’, associated with material 
bounty and opportunity. Places are therefore imbued with particular value, and transnational 
space is differentially empowered (Vertovec 2009: 67-8, cf. Rouse 1992; Gardner 1993). 
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However, the privileging of dyadic relationships between ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ countries 
obscures other connections in a complex spatial terrain. It also abstracts a wide range of 
cultural influences into two reified topoi. When deployed in the context of education in the 
‘receiving’ countries, we suggest that the transnationalism approach has a racially-coded 
effect of othering. 
 
Here, we turn to other literatures to provide us with a vocabulary to expand, but also 
historicize the spatial and socio-cultural field of global connection. In her study of capital and 
knowledge flows in Indonesian rainforest environmentalism, Tsing critiques the hubris in 
scholarship of the ‘global era’, with its excited heralding of a future mapped out by 
universalizing trajectories towards liberalization and transnationalization. She argues that 
such discourses are performative, in that they naturalise global projects and have “real 
effects on social life” (2000: 251), yet fail to examine the ways in which global projects are 
“themselves situated, contradictory, effervescent or culturally circumscribed” (ibid. 339). She 
then provides a portfolio of methods to study global connection. She urges attention to the 
process of what she calls ‘channel making’ or ‘friction’. Just as a wheel turns because of its 
encounter with the surface of the road, so is global connection “charged and enacted in the 
sticky materiality of practical encounters” (2005: 1). She argues that global connection should 
always be studied empirically, to tease out “how pre-existing groups link and, through linking, 
enunciate new identities and interests”, and how “the specific features of the link have 
ramifying effects” (ibid. 77, 15) – historical precedents that are variously reinforced or 
reworked in unpredictable ways. As she argues ethnographically, this needs to be explored 
with an eye to political economy and cultural politics.  
 
This open-ended approach is germane for the purposes of this chapter, in which we explore 
other salient dimensions of education, including the antecedent educational connections that 
exist in these ‘transnational spaces’, the “wider political economy of educational provision” 
(Jeffery, Jeffery et al. 2007: 12) and parents and students’ evaluations of the educational 
opportunities that inhere in particular spatial strategies.  
 
 
Histories of transnational education 
 
Characteristically, the transnationalism approach prefigures the degree, intensity and velocity 
of border-crossing connections to distinguish itself from historical precedents. However, we 
find it instructive to consider the ‘precursors to modern transnationalism’ (Ong and Nonini 
1997) that are being variously transformed in the present context. In particular, colonial rule 
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was a strong period for the transcontinental circulation of educational ideas and practices. 
The western education of the colonies was integral to the project creating a self-governing 
population, inculcating into the colonial subjects a particular set of skills, dispositions and 
attitudes, serving a modernist administrative and economic imperative (Tikly 2004). Colonial 
education was a highly differentiated project, unfolding in different and contradictory ways in 
different parts of the world (Crossley and Watson 2003; Hickling-Hudson, Mathews et al. 
2003). In Africa, the French and the British established very divergent education systems, the 
French offering little support for missionary schools and providing an exclusively secular 
education in government schools, whilst the British delivered colonial education hand-in-hand 
with missionaries, arguing that the public interest demanded the inculcation of Christian 
values (White 1996). In India, on the other hand, British policies were contradictory, at times 
supporting and then withdrawing from missionary activities, whilst firmly opposing religious 
education in government schools (Kumar 1991). Given the heterogeneity of colonial 
education projects, the example of India is considered here, to provide more detailed context 
to what has emerged as one of the largest markets for education in the world.  
 
In what might be described as an unevenly-empowered but mutual imbrication between 
colonizer and colonized, the encounter between Britain and India transformed ideas about 
knowledge and knowledge transmission in both places. In 1813 the British Indian 
government decided that it would take responsibility for educating its Indian subjects, 
including the funding of ‘indigenous instruction’ such as that taking place in maktabs, 
madrasas, tols and pyal schools. However, following a debate among colonial officials as to 
whether the colonial government should patronize ‘Oriental’ knowledges, an ‘Anglicist’ 
education policy was firmly in place by the mid 1830s. This was bolstered by demands from 
some sections of Indian society who wanted English education for practical and financial 
considerations. As the 1823 petition by Raja Rammohan Roy to Governor General Lord 
Amhurst made clear, English was viewed as a means of unlocking western sciences that had 
contributed to the advancement of European society (Advani 2009). From 1835 the British 
Indian government became the agency for promoting western knowledge through modern 
institutions and pedagogic processes. ‘Indigenous’ education was condemned as 
‘superstitious’, ‘mythic’, ‘primitive’ and generally ‘untrue’. However, western education was 
not merely ‘transplanted’ into India but also changed in the process, under the dual demands 
of economic and cultural imperatives that created a schizophrenic discourse (Chatterjee 
1993: 126-8). At the same time, the codifying of ‘indigenous instruction’ through madrasa 
textbooks or orientalist colleges transformed Hindu and Muslim education (Zaman 1999; 
Seth 2007). Ideas and practices developed to educate the poor in Britain were trialled and 
experimented upon in colonial India, and the resulting pedagogies used back in Britain on the 
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industrial and rural poor (Starrett 1998). Moreover, if we consider the constitution of modern 
knowledge itself, we see that subjects such as botany, cartography, linguistics and 
engineering were established through these same asymmetric, but reciprocal processes of 
interaction and negotiation between colonial officers and colonized Indians (Raj 2007). 
 
If western education was an essential element of colonial governmentality, the leading 
intellectuals and revolutionaries of national liberation struggles were equally the products of 
colonial education. In the case of India, most of the members and leaders of the latter 19th 
century nationalist organizations were educated not only in English schools in India but also 
in British universities, availing themselves of an earlier form of transcontinental education 
involving movement within empire rather than between nation states. The English-educated 
elite held that western education was one of the most important ‘gifts’ bequeathed to them by 
the British, but they were critical of the standard of education provided in government schools 
and the ‘denationalizing’ effects that it was having. This led to various attempts to use 
modern education to reform indigenous knowledges and produce vernacular alternatives. 
However, “no one seriously proposed what might seem the most obvious answer of all: that 
national education purvey the tradition or indigenous knowledges of India” (Seth 2007: 167). 
Rather, western education was appropriated, such that modernity was sought to be made 
“consistent with the national project” (Chatterjee 1993: 240). At the top end, the embracing of 
western education culminated in exclusive public schools such as Doon in North India, which 
were based on the British boarding school model. Such was the rejection of indigenous 
education that the Doon School was run by English headmasters for whom “previous 
experience in India was not only not necessary but would be a disqualification_ in this way, 
the School could ensure the service of men untainted by the mores of the society that it 
hoped to transform” (Srivastava 1998: 40). Notably, it was in such schools that the 
construction of the ideal modern Indian citizen – rational, secular, metropolitan and 
nationalist – was elaborated. The dominance of modern education is thus “as much the fruit 
of nationalist strivings as it is of colonial imposition” (Seth 2007: 182).  
 
In the early post-colonial era, Jawaharlal Nehru’s vision for an independent India articulated 
a strong modernist take on education’s role in development and nation-building, aspiring for 
a national education system that would impart scientific rationality, improve India’s ‘human 
capital’ and enhance the lives of citizens by promoting equality and expanding access to 
historically excluded sectors of the population. Under a politics of developmental state-ism, 
believing that government intervention was an important channel for modernization, the 
education system under Nehru and his Congress successors saw increasing public sector 
involvement. Despite Nehru’s optimistic ideals, though, state inputs to education have failed 
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to provide education and literacy for all, and the deeply embedded inequalities that produced 
an Indian elite in the colonial milieu have continued throughout the period since 1947. This 
was particularly through the mastery of English-medium education, which changed from 
colonial language to the language of pan-Indianism, requiring complex political mediations as 
Hindi was rejected as national language by the South (Advani 2009). “English remains a 
language of power that it not equally accessible to all”, says Jeffery, “and English-speaking 
elites remain privileged, both internally and internationally” (2005: 19). Latterly, the claim that 
there has been an ‘elite revolt’ (Corbridge and Harriss 2000) against the Nehruvian goals of 
state socialism, egalitarianism and secularism resonates with recent educational reforms in 
India, which have reinstated the elite’s facility of using private education. The valorization of 
the kind of international education currently purveyed transnationally, which we explore 
shortly, and debates about how to appropriate and provide modern education alongside a 
particular national or community-religious context are therefore all rehearsed in this colonial 
and post-colonial history. 
 
Also important to understanding contemporary entanglements with global educational 
provision is historical multipolarity. Alongside, and in contradistinction with European colonial 
legacies are other transcontinental formations. For example, consider the medieval Muslim 
world, in which ulema (clerics), scholars, students, mystics and traders circulated within the 
dar-al-Islam (domain of Islam) using Arabic and Persian as lingua franca, encountering 
familiar social codes and moral ideals wherever they moved (Cooke and Lawrence 2005: 4). 
Or, more recently, the Cold War offers an alternative scenario of distant places mutually 
imbricated through exchanges of educational ideas, materials, scholars and students. During 
the 1950s and 60s, bilateral Cultural Agreements between India and the USSR led to 
countless exchanges of delegations of scientific personnel. The USSR provided assistance 
in the funding of Indian universities; thousands of Indian students were trained on 
scholarships in Soviet and Eastern European universities; scientific and technological texts 
were printed for Indian schools and colleges, and the USSR published low-cost periodicals 
for distribution in India. Soviet scholars studied Indian languages and translated Indian 
literary works into Russian, whilst Russian literature was translated into vernacular Indian 
languages (Roy, Kumera et al. 2007). This historical polycentricity is also played out in 
contemporary global educational regimes. 
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Global production of educational regimes 
 
By using the term ‘educational regimes’, we wish to “locate [educational] values in a broad 
political terrain that encompasses the global, national and local contexts” (Jeffery 2005: 13). 
Globalization has come to hold a strong influence over educational priorities and 
implementation within countries. Ongoing politics of liberalization and privatization 
culminated in the inclusion of education as a tradeable service in the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO’s) General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) from 1994 
onwards. According to GATS, there are four modes in which education can be purveyed 
transnationally: consumption abroad, e.g. movement of students to study overseas; 
commercial presence, e.g. overseas branch campuses, franchises, corporate programs; 
cross-border supply, e.g. distance education, online learning; and movement of people to 
deliver the service (GATS 1999). Whilst the state was still the main provider of education 
until the 1980s, privatization is “now so widespread that it cannot be linked easily with any 
specific class of society” (LaDousa 2007: 139). As Robertson and Dale argue, the 
globalization of education implies shifts from predominantly state-run national education 
systems to “a more fragmented, multi-scalar and multi-sectoral distribution” (2008: 3). 
Robertson and Dale also critique the ‘spatial fetishism’ that inheres in scholarship on 
globalization and education, and urge us to apprehend the actors or subjects of globalization, 
locate them in their national boundaries and scrutinize their politics. In the case of education, 
we see that globalization is driven by a conjunction of specific and nationally-situated 
interests, namely private educational firms seeking to penetrate new markets, particularly 
firms based in the USA; and governments, who increasingly require educational institutions 
to raise their own funds under the directives of supra-national organisations dominated by 
Northern agendas.  
 
The transnational higher education market has been valued at US$100 billion, of which 
international students are the most significant and visible part (UNESCO 2002; The 
Economist 2003). In 2004 there were estimated to be more than 2 million people pursuing 
education abroad and by 2010 this is predicted to rise to 3.3 million, of whom nearly 60% 
would originate from China, India, Malaysia, Hong Kong or Singapore (British Council 2004). 
Evidently, the transnational education system is unevenly empowered, with the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, enjoying competitive 
advantage and attracting some 85% of students, linked with the dominance of English in 
global markets (Larsen et al 2004). Thus, there is an important historical context, “with the 
consolidation of a globalized economy, the new imperial impetus of education and of English 
language learning has only been strengthened” (Advani 2009: 12).  
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Notably, flows of migrant students are also multi-polar. The literature has not paid much 
notice of the overseas ‘branch campuses’ that are mushrooming in places like the Gulf, India 
and China, but these reduce the need for student migration and may reconfigure the field of 
transnational education. Of interest are the growing numbers of schools that have grown out 
of established ‘parent schools’ from the English private school sector such as Dulwich, 
Haileybury, Harrow, Repton and Shrewsbury, and that model themselves on their ‘parent 
school’ to the extent of buildings replicating the original buildings and uniforms copied from 
the style of those worn by their ‘parent school’ peers. However, not all prestigious English 
private schools have followed the lead of their peers in such ‘hyper-capitalist experiments’. 
Indeed, some have actively resisted doing so, concerned at the potential loss of brand name 
security and/or feeling uncomfortable about the aims of raising money through the overseas 
satellite (Waters 2006; Bunnell 2008; Waters 2011). 
 
The facility of foreign firms to set up private educational institutions has been subjected to 
intense public critique, particularly concerning the problem of social inequality. In the field of 
higher education, there are already western universities in India that have already 
established offshore branch campuses: Leeds Metropolitan University in Bhopal and the 
University of the Fraser Valley in Chandigarh are two to our knowledge that have been 
advertised extensively. The Foreign Educational Institution (Regulation of Entry and 
Operation) Bill was delayed for four years before being approved for parliament by the 
cabinet in March 2010, under criticism from the left and the BJP who feared that foreign 
educators would undermine India’s own educational provision and pushed for investment 
without giving foreign educators the entitlement to take profits out of India. It remains to be 
seen whether the dividends to foreign universities – mostly in terms of ensuring a supply of 
fee-paying Indian overseas students – will suffice to tempt them to invest without guarantees 
of profit (The Hindu Businessline, 17th March 2010). In a context where Indians are estimated 
to spend $5.7 billion annually on studying abroad, it is hoped that foreign university branch 
campuses will save valuable foreign exchange as well as enhance the profile of higher 
education in India (Times of India, 21st March 2010). The branch campus model may change 
the nature of educational provision in countries like India. HRD Minister Kapil Sibal said that 
“a revolution larger than the one in the telecom sector awaits the education sector” (Times of 
India, 15th March 2010). 
 
South-South flows have received scant attention in the literature on student migration, but 
the emergence of higher education institutions branded as ‘centres of excellence’ in the 
South will reduce the need to undergo exclusive overseas migration to obtain a highly-
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esteemed prestigious education.  The global terrain of educational provision is changing. 
However, “global competition is not a level playing field where each university has an equal 
opportunity to win” (Marginson and Sawir 2006: 348-9). A revealing comparison of the global 
capacity and strategy of the Australian National University and Universitas Indonesia shows 
that universities in developed nations continue to hold most of the cards, having superior 
public and private resource base, better IT systems and research capacities, and capacity to 
attract and hold students and staff. Their global character is also one of the key factors in 
their attractiveness locally. Institutional strategies premised on the idea of the stand-alone 
institution taking on all-comers in a global marketplace therefore miss the continuing 
importance of place-bound identities in determining global strength and position, as 
university capacity is the product of past government strategies of nation building; 
universities remain central to the policies of governments; and variations in the global 
position of the nation condition the ‘global potential’ of universities.  
 
In turn, national higher education sectors are transforming in response to the 
internationalization agenda. In the UK, the main consequence of transnational education is 
competition for the recruitment of fee-paying international students, to fill the deficits left by 
reduced government funding in recent decades. Opponents have expressed fears that 
globalization will lead to a replication of the worst excesses of the North American ‘diploma 
mills’ or ‘McDonaldized universities’, arguing that trade increases the commoditisation of 
education, weakens areas in the humanities and social sciences which are felt to have no 
value in the culture of marketable knowledge, and inculcates privatized, market-like 
subjectivities in individuals and institutions (see e.g.  DeVita and Case 2003). Transnational 
education is feared to have had major repercussions for the patterns of international 
recruitment and the experience of international students within higher education: “it is often 
the universities with the weakest support structures which charge bargain basement fees, 
attracting academically vulnerable students unable to meet the admission requirements of 
more prestigious institutions” (Harris 1995: 77). Issues of accountability, quality control and 
consumer protection in the education export industry have intensified the need for regulation, 
testing, assessment and international comparison of universities (see Yelland 2000).  
 
International schools have expanded beyond their historical niche catering to the children of 
elite ex-pat diplomats to the aspiring middle-class families of the post-colonial national elite, 
who aspire for their children to benefit from the kudos of private English-medium education 
whilst themselves not globally mobile (Waters 2011). Curricula and pedagogies are also 
influenced by transnational education, as courses are being reformed with more of an 
‘international’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ flavour. In many contexts, the primary aim of curricular reform 
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has been to promote particular skills for living in the neoliberal global market, such as global 
awareness, social skills, problem-solving ability and especially, proficiency in IT and foreign 
languages; IT is expected to enable a shift in pedagogy from costly teacher-dominated 
learning models to a use of diversified resources and interactive learning beyond the 
classroom (Law 2004; cf. Freeman 2008; Urciuoli 2008). Leaving aside the abundant 
critiques that ‘milking the cash cow’ of international students has implied no more than lip-
service to the curricular changes that might be envisaged for a truly ‘cosmopolitan education’ 
(Yelland 2000; DeVita and Case 2003), a more fundamental question in curricular reform 
concerns the particular source of knowledge that is infused.  Some have criticized the 
legitimacy of labelling what is effectively a western construction of knowledge and knowledge 
transmission as ‘international’ content. However, our own ethnographic work in Punjab 
suggests that schools are not trying to transfer international curricula ‘verbatim’ but 
attempting to achieve nuanced local ‘navigations’, ‘amalgamating’ international education 
with Indian values (Harriss and Osella 2011). Thus “modern western knowledge is not seen 
as ‘western’ at all, as a particular mode of knowledge; it is knowledge as such, everywhere 
and for everyone” (Seth 2007: 182). International education is produced in historical contexts 
but deployed by such a vast population of actors that they are not particularly ‘western’ (cf. 
Gupta and Ferguson 1997). 
 
 
Parents’ and students’ spatial strategies 
 
Historical multipolarity and the polycentricity of global capitalism in the field of education 
emerge to be very important we turn to consider the value/utility of transnational education 
from the perspectives of the parents and students who consume it, as it seems that one of 
the most significant aspects of current changes in the field of education is precisely the ways 
in which differentially empowered ‘transnational spaces’ are being reconfigured. The existing 
work on transnational education has emphasised the wide range of factors that are taken into 
consideration in assessing the value/utility of transnational educational credentials in 
migrant-sending areas. Parents and students are “not merely engaged in profit making; they 
are also acquiring a range of symbolic capitals that will facilitate their positioning, economic 
negotiation, and cultural acceptance in different geographical sites”  (Ong 1999: 18-19). In 
transnational education, parental and family strategies are just as significant as in local 
education, articulated through the same, well-established relations of class. Middle-class 
education generally involves more strategy and less contingency, with the pursuit of 
‘distinction’ taking precedence over considerations of family and locality (Ball, Bowe et al. 
1995). 
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In the face of growing competition over both educational opportunities and employment, it 
seems that more and more is being demanded of migrants. In the current knowledge-based 
‘information age’, doing well in school is increasingly important as a mobility-providing tool 
(Suarez-Orozco 2001). ‘Designer emigrants’ are produced in sending areas through the 
consumption of education. For example, in areas of South Asia with a high incidence and 
long history of emigration, parental strategies concerning children’s education are 
increasingly directed towards enhancing chances for international migration, a trend 
supported by the expansion of private English-medium education. There are varied routes 
through which the resulting types of ‘educated persons’ develop the subjective propensities, 
competences and contacts conducive to overseas mobility, which include migration for 
onward studies; skilled employment; or becoming a desirable match for transnational 
spouses. Ethnographic studies have shown how grooming through private English-medium 
schooling is differentiated by the gender, age, birth order, in accordance with the perceived 
abilities and interests of specific children and young people; and may result in unexpected 
patterns of preference and allocation within families (Mand 2003; Chopra 2005; Osella and 
Osella 2008). In aspirant migrant households in Indian Punjab, for example, girls may 
unconventionally be given more prestigious education than their brothers and thus groomed 
for transnational marriage, in the hope that once established overseas, they might be able to 
arrange for the migration of their brothers, thus becoming an ‘agent of marital citizenship’ 
(Mooney 2006).  
 
In the middle-class families that prefigure in the ethnographies, a child or young person’s 
stage in his/her schooling frequently dictates the precise timing of family migration, and the 
concern with education can be seen to completely structure migrants’ household 
organization, creating novel family forms. The significance of maternal agency and sacrifice 
in planning for, nurturing and sustaining families scattered for the purposes of transnational 
education should not be underestimated: arrangements which may variously entrench or 
challenge the gendered division of household labour; put tensions on, but also enhance 
marital relationships (Huang and Yeoh 2005). For middle-class Hong Kong and Chinese 
migrants, the opportunities for economic accumulation remain in East Asia, whilst the 
opportunities for educational strategizing are in Vancouver or Singapore. The phenomenon 
of ‘astronaut families’ and ‘parachute’ or ‘satellite kids’ (Zhou 1998; Orellana, Thorne et al. 
2001; Thorne, Orellana et al. 2001) have therefore emerged, to permit family migration and 
citizenship and reduce overseas student fees.  
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Outside purely economic consideration of how education plays into strategies for the 
accumulation of capital, parents are attentive also to ‘exposure’, namely the specific values 
and competences internalized and embodied through living in a particular place. For 
example, we note that diasporic Indians send their children back to India in order to expose 
them to Indian culture and traditions, while avoiding what are perceived to be the pitfalls of 
Western youth culture, in accordance with what Osella and Osella term a ‘folk model of the 
habitus’ (2008). Similarly, judging the education system to be too westernized and desiring 
more of an Islamic texture in subject matter and daily life, diasporic Muslim parents send 
their children to a niche of schools and colleges in Muslim countries that offer to combine 
Islamic and modern education (Timmerman 2000; Cook 2001). International or 
‘cosmopolitan’ education is thus fetishised, but also comes under criticism.  
 
There is a need for more careful attention to the economic, socio-cultural and political 
contexts within which thinking about the value/utility of transnational education is situated: 
these are rapidly changing. In Hong Kong, economic restructuring and the expansion of the 
financial services industry has driven ‘qualifications inflation’. In the context of intense 
competition over professional jobs, overseas education, particularly from North America, is 
felt to offer something ‘rarer’ and more valuable than the norm. Overseas-educated 
graduates are at an advantage in jobs that involve dealing with people such as marketing, 
insurance, human resources, public relations and law, which points to the value of embodied 
transnational cultural capital in business and professional spheres; indicating fluency in 
English as well as less obvious quality of ‘exposure’, incorporating confidence, sociability, 
cosmopolitanism and possession of valuable social capital (Waters 2005; 2006). However, 
we cannot assume that transnational education will inevitably be preferred. Preference for 
overseas education depends on the modes of education available locally, and varies from 
sector to sector. ‘Exposure’ is not only produced in schools in the west. In India, the powerful 
middle-class discourse of progress, modernity and India’s dynamism and importance in the 
new global economy appears to lessen the value/utility of overseas education as India itself 
has ‘world class institutions’. Studies highlight ambivalence concerning Indian institutions and 
continued interest in transnational education, but also uneven employment returns to the 
supposedly prized capitals of international education and studying overseas (Parry 2005; 
Baas 2006; Nisbett 2006; Baas 2007; Narasimhan 2009; Cross 2010).  
 
Intriguingly, contrary to assumptions concerning the superior value of transnational education 
the ethnographic studies prompt us to consider that opting for foreign education might in 
many cases be less prestigious than we assume. For student migrants the intense 
competition to get into the ‘best’ schools and universities in Hong Kong and India constructs 
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overseas education as an escape route for those who are unable to secure admission or 
success in competitive local institutions. Studies suggest that migration for education is 
frequently triggered by the threat of ‘failure’ in the local education system, indicating the 
emergence of more differentiated terrain for transnational education (Brooks and Waters 
2010). Educational failure threatens middle-class social reproduction and upward mobility; a 
point that echoes Brown’s criticism of Bourdieu for exaggerating the inevitability of middle-
class reproduction, in a context where economic restructuring, unemployment and 
educational change have “made parents more aware of the uncertainties of success and the 
consequences of failure” (1995: 33).  
Supported by wider government policies (e.g. permitting bank loans for overseas studies), 
the market for transnational education is now expanding beyond the upper middle-class elite 
that has long availed it. For example, overseas students from India are now frequently the 
first in their families to migrate abroad (Baas 2006; 2007). Whilst coming from privileged 
backgrounds, they may not perceive themselves as such, and indeed many young middle-
class Indians appear to undertake overseas education in an attempt to gain permanent 
residency overseas, seeing themselves not as local ‘haves’ but as global ‘have-nots’ (cf. 
Hannerz 1992: 228), comparing themselves with to other [western] middle classes whose 
lifestyles they aspire to, with whom they identify all around the world, and with whom they 
find it easier to identify than with lower classes in India. Alongside the expansion of access, 
there is also evidence of fragmentation due to the sheer expense of transnational education 
and the importance of knowledge, information and contacts in guiding applications for 
admission and scholarships. Non-elite migrant students who lack personal contacts overseas 
may be cheated by migration agents working on behalf of cheap, ‘third-rate’ and often 
informal educational establishments in which they receive a poor standard of education. 
Student migration is often a period of intense struggle, with students constituting a reserve of 
underpaid informal workers who are exploited by employers by virtue of racial discrimination, 
undervaluation of their foreign qualifications and their relative paucity of information about the 
labour market and contacts; compounded by state policies which only permit students to 
work limited hours (intended as a safeguard against illegitimate use of student visas as a 
ruse to ‘economic migration’). As immigration regimes change rapidly, it is inevitably the 
students who bear the financial, social and legal brunt, their immigration status “indelibly 
precarious, only ever one risk-of-life away from being withdrawn” (Dembour 2010: 1). There 
is a gap between the expectations and the reality of transnational education, which is, of 
course, ultimately a market, and therefore constrained by what one can afford. Importantly, 
though, we should not always presume that education is a strategy to obtaining eventual 
residency in the country of education/training; whilst job opportunities in Britain or Australia 
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may be felt to be better than in India, students and highly-skilled migrants eventually return to 
India because their earnings can afford a better lifestyle there. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The unfolding project of transnational education has produced new forms of inequality, so we 
conclude with some comments on the implications of transnational education for social 
development. Broadly, the exclusivity of transnational education perpetuates and reinscribes 
social inequalities with reference to knowledge. In the case of India, we have suggested that 
an ‘elite revolt’ has taken place against national education systems, whereby the elite, who 
during the colonial era availed themselves of prestigious English-medium education and 
higher education in western metropolitan cities, were temporarily constrained during the post-
independence period by the political imperative for development and nation building, but 
have now reverted to exclusive transnational education. Transnational education seems to 
be a spatially-extended version of the well-recognised middle-class tendency to reorganize 
family roles and capitals to accommodate educational strategies (cf. Ball, Bowe et al. 1995), 
strengthening the relationship between social and spatial mobility and the reproduction of 
inequalities. The predominantly middle-class character of student migration therefore begs 
the question of the impact of transnational education on non-elite groups. The expansion of 
markets in transnational education has broadened, but also fragmented access to world-
class private education. First-time migrants from non-elite backgrounds may be availing 
themselves of transnational education, but not necessarily from well-regarded institutions. 
There thus emerges a top tier who receive private education that makes them globally 
competitive; a middle tier who receive good but not world class education; and a majority 
who receive local national education (Tikly 2001: 161). The promises of transnational 
education are therefore not always congruent with the realities.  
 
Finally, we return to the transnationalism approach with which we began this chapter. We 
take the idea of ‘transnational spaces’ (Jackson, Crang et al. 2004) as our starting point, 
thinking about how entire spaces are reconfigured in the process of transnational connection. 
However, we encounter a number of problems with this approach. Through our explorations 
of transcontinental educational connections in colonial and post-colonial history, the 
globalization of education, emergence of various forms of transnationally provided education, 
and how these are evaluated by parents and students, we develop three refinements. First, 
transnationalism cannot be reduced to the present. We have outlined historical processes of 
interaction, imposition and appropriation of educational models and values which lay down 
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the tracks for contemporary educational entrepreneurship, and rehearse many of the debates 
over international or ‘cosmopolitan’ education. History provides complex contexts that are 
variously reinforced or reworked, in unpredictable ways that cannot be guessed in advance 
of open-ended ethnographic study.  
 
Second, transnationalism cannot be reduced to dyadic relationships between ‘sending’ and 
‘receiving’ countries, as is common in the literature on migrants. When we consider the 
processes of ‘channel-making’ or ‘friction’ (Tsing 2000; 2005) engaged by the many actors 
operating at different scales in the global education regimes that we have outlined, the field is 
expanded to encompass supra-national organizations, national and sub-national 
governments, private companies as well as families, parents and students. This spatial field 
is polycentric, with multiple nodes of power, and western dominance cannot be assumed. 
Whilst the literature implicitly assumes that transnational education is about movement of 
students from South to North, South-South movement for education has been, remains 
significant and seems likely to increase. The emergence of ‘centres of excellence’ in the 
South may obviate the need to migrate abroad to obtain prestigious, exclusive educational 
credentials. In the contemporary era of globalization, it may be that the model for the future 
would be the expansion of overseas branch campuses – that is, for the institutions, ideas and 
practices to move, rather than students themselves. As much as national education appears 
to be being devalued, there is also evidence of diasporic parents sending their children ‘back 
home’ to expose them to a niche of schools and colleges combining modern international 
education with community-religious specific needs. For some, transnational education may 
be motivated more by failure in competitive, hierarchical local education systems than the 
pursuit of distinction overseas.  
 
Third, undergirding the social spaces of transnationalism with conceptual oppositions 
between the complementary values of ‘home’, the locus of personal and social identity and 
religiosity, and ‘abroad’, associated with material bounty and opportunity, is not helpful. In a 
global educational regime, parents and students possess “more than a ‘double 
consciousness’: they face many directions at once” (Ong and Nonini 1997: 12). The 
approach that would abstract such cultural connectedness into ‘dual perspectives’ or 
‘bifocality’ ignores a range of cultural influences, styles and imaginative possibilities. 
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Chapter 8 
Bringing Teachers Back In: 
Dilemmas of Cosmopolitan Education  
in the Context of Transnationalism 
Devorah Kalekin-Fishman 
 
 
Dated November 1, 2009, a call for papers for Current Issues in Comparative Education (Vol. 
12, Number 1) asks for theoretical and practical submissions related to characteristics that 
define cosmopolitanism in education. The call cites transnationalism as a necessary 
component of cosmopolitanism and states further that '[c]osmopolitanism encourages 
reassessments of cross-border responsibility, illustrating the educational challenges of 
promoting transnational social justice, global citizenship, and human dignity across familiar 
social boundaries and divisions. It thus might provide an opportunity for comparative 
education scholars to reconsider and re-conceptualize the reigning intellectual frameworks, 
ethical positions, and practical categories of their field and methodologies.'  
 
The editors of CICE seem to assume that schools are indeed dealing with the challenges 
they name and that many researchers have encountered educational projects framed in 
terms of cosmopolitanism, have studied these projects and produced reports worthy of 
publication; and can use their findings to revise approaches to the field of comparative 
education. In this paper, I argue that although there are papers on education that refer to 
'cosmopolitanism' and recognize the prevalence of transnationalism, remarkably few 
delineate clear criteria for discovering that one or another program is indeed an example of 
cosmopolitanism in education. Even fewer relate to the realities of schooling into which 
teachers must integrate cosmopolitanism.  
 
This chapter is divided into six sections. First, I will sketch meanings attributed to 
transnationalism and cosmopolitanism, and indicate connections between them. Going on to 
the literature on what is called 'cosmopolitan education', I will point out weaknesses of the 
vision that is propagated and show that the dilemmas of schooling that teachers face are 
ignored. The situation in the Israeli state system of education illustrates the viability of the 
argument. Finally, I suggest an approach to practices which considers teachers' problems 
and can lead to the shaping of a program for furthering cosmopolitan education. I conclude 
that although cosmopolitanism is described as a form of consciousness, cosmopolitanism in 
education is possible only if framed in action. 
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Transnationalism and Cosmopolitanism 
 
Facets of Transnationalism 
 
In a globalizing world, where the flows of goods and ideas are accompanied by flows of 
people, transnationalism is a social reality of well-documented importance as an existential 
position observed among Diasporic groups, minorities, migrants, their kin and neighbors 
(Castells, 1996; Smith, 2002; Vertovec, 1999; Vertovec and Cohen, 2003: 9).  
 
Investigations of transnationalism as a social reality focus on at least six clusters of salient 
themes (Vertovec, 1999). Theoretically, transnationalism refers to 'social formations' that 
'span borders' (p. 3). Its effects include an awareness of multi-local belonging which leads to 
a 'transnational imaginary', a type of collective identification that can replace the imaginary of 
the nation (Vertovec, 1999, pp. 4ff.; also, Anderson, 2006/1983; Anthias, 2002). More widely, 
transnationalism is deliberately promoted in culture often by religious establishments, 
through the packaging of cultural elements and their diffusion across borders for 
transnational consumption (pp. 6-7); in the economy, through the transnational flow of capital 
via trans-national corporations in the macro- and in the meso-context the flow of capital 
within the circles of dispersed kinship groups (pp. 7 ff.; also, Robertson and Scholte, 2007; 
Sassen, 1991); and in the polity where politically engaged Diasporas and social movements 
position themselves in transnational sites (pp. 9 ff.). Apparently unavoidable is the 
transnationalism which is signaled by 'the force and form of electronic mediation, between 
spatial and virtual neighbourhoods' and is evident in the constantly widening disjuncture 
between territory, subjectivity and collective social movement' which (p. 13).  
 
The intertwining threads of the themes identified as transnationalism (Vertovec, 1999; 2006) 
ultimately have the effect of shaping  transnationality, which Ong (1999, p. 4) defines as 
'cultural interconnectedness and mobility across space, a condition that calls attention to the 
horizontal and vertical economic, social, and cultural practices that span space, the power 
hierarchies and citizenship regimes in which they are embedded and the ways in which these 
practices are enabled and regulated by the changing relationship between states and 
capitalism'.  This blueprint lies at the base of arguments for cosmopolitanism in the social 
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sciences (Hollinger, 1995, p. 86); recognized as a configuration of opportunities for lived 
experiences, it is grasped as well as a basis for deep revision of method.40  
 
 
New-Old Cosmopolitanism 
 
Explanations of the 'new cosmopolitanism' do not, however, take transnationalism as their 
point of departure. First of all, Beck (2009: xii) theorizes 'cosmopolitanism' as a logical step in 
the evolution of the term 'globalization' in the social sciences. With growing awareness of 'the 
erosion of clear borders separating markets, states, civilizations, cultures, and the life-worlds 
of common people, which implies the involuntary confrontation with the alien other all over 
the globe', Beck (2009: xii) claims that globalization implies a cosmopolitanization of the 
world, and therefore a 'cosmopolitan turn' is required for re-conceptualizing the social 
sciences (Beck and Sznaider, 2006: 1) on the one hand, and for revising the moral 
underpinning of daily experience (Hollinger, 2003), on the other.  
 
Emphasizing the shift required in the social sciences, Beck and Sznaider (2006) exhort 
researchers to look beyond the national-international distinction that is inherent in theories of 
modernity (Parsons, Eisenstadt) and post-modernity (Lyotard), of polity (Meyer), and of world 
systems (whether Wallerstein or Luhmann) (cited in Beck and Sznaider, 2006, p. 16; see 
also Berman, 1982; Natoli and Hutcheon, 1993). Far from being a set of phenomena 
happening 'out there', cosmopolitan processes are to be researched as 'globalization from 
within', the experience of interdependence (Beck and Sznaider, 2006, pp. 9, 12). The point is 
that research adapted to the cosmopolitan moment will be 'multi-perspectival' taking into 
consideration the life experiences of the subaltern as well as those of the hegemon, the lives 
of all groups associated with the post-colonial condition, with full respect for the knowledge 
and opinions of the natives of all continents. To accomplish this, moreover, the social 
scientist takes upon herself the duty of re-examining 'the fundamental concepts of "modern 
society" [such as ] household, family, class, social inequality, democracy, power, state, 
commerce, public, community, justice, law, history, memory, and politics [which] must be 
                                               
40 For a historical overview of the development of cosmopolitanism as an idea and as a principle, see Steven 
Vertovec (2006) 'Fostering Cosmopolitanisms: A Conceptual Survey and A Media Experiment in Berlin', WPTC-
2K-06 Working Paper of the Institute of Social and Cultural anthropology, University of Oxford 
[http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/cosmopolitanisms.PDF, accessed July 30, 2009] 
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released from the fetters of methodological nationalism, re-conceptualized and empirically 
established within the framework of a new cosmopolitan social and political science' (Beck 
and Sznaider, 2006: 6, italics in the original). Ultimately they foresee a quasi-revolution in the 
social sciences for carrying out this revision is a transdisciplinary task which can only be 
done by finding new combinations of geography, anthropology, ethnology, international 
relations, international law, political philosophy and political theory as well as sociology and 
social theory (Beck and Sznaider, 2006: 1).  
 
The 'new cosmopolitanism' builds on a history of debate that goes back at least to ancient 
Greece where the Sophists challenged the political posture of Plato and Aristotle who did not 
question dedication to one's city (Athens). For centuries thereafter, the debate continued in 
Europe as political authorities defended the need for loyalty to one's homeland (village, city 
or state) against religious authorities of the eternal Church who were interested in spreading 
their truths without respect for borders. In the eighteenth century, Kant argued for world-wide 
peace that could be attained by a 'league of nations' which would not have an army so as not 
to challenge state sovereignty, but would have a legal code to defend human rights. 
Proposals for free trade promulgated by Adam Smith similarly envisioned international 
understanding and mutual support. In the nineteenth century, Marx's (1978) account of the 
mechanisms of capitalism emphasized the inevitable cosmopolitanism of class and the 
implications of such cosmopolitanism for collaboration across borders. His vision of the 
'withering away' of the state in the face of such alliances was, however, isolated from the 
argument of other pioneering sociologists such as Durkheim and Weber, Comte and Spencer 
all of whom situated their sociological theories in an acceptance of the world divided into 
nation-states (among others, cf. Cheah, 1998).  
 
Developments in twentieth century international politics have created new transnational 
realities on macro, meso, and micro levels; and these are the basis for new 
conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism. After World War I, practical efforts at setting up 
mechanisms of international governance through the League of Nations still relied on state 
sovereignty as a criterion for organization. By contrast, the United Nations (set up after World 
War II) and its subdivisions have assumed the right to intervene deliberately in the affairs of 
states. As a regional organization, the European Union has extended its authority over many 
areas of everyday life across the borders of the twenty-five member states. Although they are 
likely to be somewhat dependent on states for maximizing profits, transnational corporations 
are no longer clearly affiliated with one or another state, nor are the banking arrangements 
for financing industries (Sassen, 1991). Moreover, the steady advance of efficient means of 
travel, significantly air transportation, as of communication in the form of telephony and 
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electronic communication, and the advance of 'automobility' are constantly blurring the 
meanings of borders for individuals. A growing population worldwide enjoys new types of 
movement and, it has been said, cannot avoid developing a cosmopolitan consciousness 
(Szerszynski and Urry, 2006, p.  113). Thus the new cosmopolitanism can be understood as 
a decisive shift in explaining the epistemological changes which constitute the increasingly 
unavoidable 'globalization from within' (Beck and Sznaider, 2006: 9). 
 
 
Comparing Transnationalism and Cosmopolitanism 
 
From the analytic point of view, both transnationalism and cosmopolitanism are outgrowths 
of globalization; better, both theoretical approaches are specifications of the effects and the 
meanings of globalization. Like transnationalism, the 'new' (twenty-first century) 
cosmopolitanism refers to 'spanned borders' and cultural, financial and political relations 
across state boundaries. In the large, cosmopolitanism, like transnationalism, has 
geographical, political, and economic dimensions. But while the concept of transnationalism 
necessarily remains associated with the overweening importance of nationalism, Beck and 
Sznaider (2006) read cosmopolitanism as a new social condition which calls for a radical 
epistemological departure from traditional concerns with the dualistic axes distinguishing 
'national from international' and  'we from them' on dimensions of race, culture, religion, or 
class. Thus, while transnationalism is an existential position to be explored empirically in 
diverse ways, cosmopolitanism is heralded as not only a socio-cultural condition, but also as 
a complex scientific and political project with moral implications (see also Vertovec and 
Cohen, 2003: 9).41    
 
Emphasizing the moral aspects of cosmopolitanism, many researchers identify it as a 
realization of the visions of the Enlightenment, seeing in it an ideology or a philosophy of life 
which has finally been made possible because of the phenomena of globalization. Among its 
effects, then, the cosmopolitan awareness can be seen as the motor for establishing 
transnational institutions (Archibugi, 1998) and as impelling the political project of advancing 
the rights of multiple subjects (Hollinger, 1995).  The cosmopolitan turn relates to the very 
organization of the globe, but also to the fate of individuals because on the personal level, 
                                               
41 To date the literature on cosmopolitanism has not related to the problems of women in a cosmopolitanizing 
world and in the framework of this paper, I will not be able to extend my discussion of these issues. 
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cosmopolitanism is an attitude, a state of mind, and a set of competencies (Hannerz, 1990).  
The encounter of the moral basis for cosmopolitanism with the reading of cosmopolitanism 
as a frame of mind and as sets of capacities highlights the inevitable alliance between 
cosmopolitanism and education.  
  
 
Cosmopolitan Education 
 
Given that cosmopolitanization is an on-going process, there is clearly a need to ensure that 
people growing up in a globalizing world should be equipped with the competencies that will 
enable them to take advantage of new political and economic opportunity structures as well 
as to contribute to fostering a cosmopolitan consciousness. Allied with this is the concern 
with the ethical values historically associated with cosmopolitanism. Thus, there are rich 
discussions about cosmopolitan  education among philosophers, sociologists, and 
researchers in the field of education.  
 
 
Ethical Aspects of Cosmopolitanism in Education 
 
Viewing cosmopolitan education as a means to correct the failings of contemporary society, 
Nussbaum (1997, 2000) argues that through a cosmopolitan orientation liberal education can 
be reformed and directed towards a heightened appreciation of the nature of justice and of 
readiness to grant 'material aid' on a broad scale. Papastephanou (2005) insists that a 
cosmopolitan education can lead to a humanity imbued with a more viable ethic in a world 
full of global challenges. Responding to those who insist that there are unavoidable 
competitive elements in human nature, she points out that the de-essentializing trends on 
which post-modernism and globalism converge underline the fact that human nature is not 
fixed. The goals of a cosmopolitan education, she admits, are not easily achieved and 
competitiveness may triumph 'because people often become what they are taught that they 
are' but not because competitiveness is an inevitable part of human nature (Papastephanou, 
2005: 548). Scott (2008, p. 9) interprets the goal as responsibility for a 'shared humanity', 
and draws on the ideas of Levinas to underscore the perception that 'respect, dignity and 
freedom [develop] in relation to the disturbing and provocative event of being confronted by 
another person'. Thus, it is in what she calls 'provocation' that Scott sees 'the promise of 
education itself.'  To specify some of the content of this promise, Hansen (2007) describes a 
cosmopolitan education as '(1) an expression of values, (2) a moral compass, and (3) an 
abiding engine of ideas about teaching, curriculum, [and] learning'. In his view, through a 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 170 
cosmopolitan education, students acquire respect for the unknown and hence the ability to 
accept new people and new ideas.  
 
Arguments about whether or not cosmopolitanism is compatible with patriotism are also 
tackled if not resolved, by philosophers concerned with education (see Appiah, 1998). On the 
basis of the description of cosmopolitan education as an education for democratic values 
(Held, 1995), Ben-Porath (2007) insists that there is no contradiction between a 
cosmopolitan education and national patriotism. Taking being-at-war as the exemplar, she 
reasons that when a state is engaged in warfare, members of the nation must collaborate 
and care for one another. Schools should convey this understanding; not as jingoism, but as 
the kind of achievement for which a democratic cosmopolitan education strives.  Similarly, 
Osler and Starkey (2003, pp.  243, 252) argue that to fulfill goals of cosmopolitan citizenship, 
education 'needs to address peace, human rights, democracy and development'. This 
requires a broadening of sympathies, but the recognition of common humanity does not 
mean asking people to 'reject their national citizenship or to accord it a lower status' [sic!]. 
There are, however, other voices. Gunesch (2004: 268), on the other hand, asserts that the 
core of education for cosmopolitanism should be derived from a clear image of the type of 
individual that is to be educated, and the state cannot be given special favor. Leaving the 
position of the state open, he proposes a model in which the goal is for students to acquire 
'world citizenship in terms of individual engagement with cultural diversity'.  
 
 
Strategies for Cosmopolitanism in Education 
 
While the literature mentioned above relates to education mostly on the level of ideas and 
aspirations, there are writings that purportedly deal with educational strategies. In a paper 
presented at the 102nd annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Casey 
(2007) describes 'The Cosmopolitan University' as 'The Medium toward Global Citizenship 
and Justice'.  Explicitly embracing a cosmopolitan goal, the paper points out that American 
universities must be encouraged to foster international solidarity (the core of 
cosmopolitanism) by smoothing the way for foreign students to integrate into courses of 
study and by setting up branches in foreign countries where the meeting of intellectuals of 
different origins will contribute to mutual understanding and collaboration.  Ironically, then, 
Casey makes a declaration in favor of cosmopolitanism by showing how to promote the 
cultural imperialism of the US.   
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Other papers on cosmopolitanism in education relate to the individual student. Torres (2007, 
p. 156) cites Freire's ideas that students have to be educated in the democratic process via 
'normative grounding, ethical behavior, knowledge of the democratic process, and technical 
performance', as well as being guided to understand themselves better.  To these ends, he 
notes that it is important to 'redeem' Freire's concept of 'conscientização' as self-reflection 
oriented to one's history and traditions.  Here, too, the idea is somehow to attain a 
cosmopolitan viewpoint through a close examination of national traits. A somewhat more 
specific guide to finding connections between learning and cosmopolitanism is proposed by 
Emdin (2008). Impressed with the difference in attention and energy that students 
demonstrate when they listen to the performance of a favorite song and the apathy and 
indifference they show when listening to a chemistry lesson, Emdin (2008: 773-4) suggests '3 
C's' for harnessing youthful energy to the study of science in school: cosmopolitanism, co-
generative dialogue and co-teaching. While, however, he is able to provide instructions for 
'doing' co-generative dialogue and co-teaching, in regard to cosmopolitanism he is satisfied 
with encouraging teachers to subscribe 'to a cosmopolitan outlook' in class. This, he claims 
will make taking part in what is going on attractive to all the students. 
 
In a very detailed article, Fernando Reimers (2006) talks to the goals of 'Schools in an Age of 
Globalization'. Although he does not discuss cosmopolitanism explicitly, his concern with 
cultural differences and 'human rights in a framework of global values that includes 
compassion and caring, concern for others, respect and reciprocity' (Reimers, 2006, p. 276) 
echoes the qualities attributed to 'education for cosmopolitanism' as worldwide citizenship. In 
his view, citizenship education converges with human rights education and both are molded 
by common values. This, of course, leads to an examination of the curriculum, and here 
Reimers touches on the importance of learning facts that broaden one's cosmopolitan 
understandings. To his mind, the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is 
material that is highly pertinent to developing a global perspective. Quoting Dewey to the 
effect that 'how we teach is what we teach', he does, however, highlight the importance of 
school practices outside the classroom as well as inside it, for shaping citizens with a shared 
democratic consciousness.  
 
The literature is extensive and I have been able to cite only a few examples in order to show 
the types of discussions underway. All praise education based on mutuality, a core concern 
of cosmopolitanism, and recommend that students learn to respect others of diverse types; 
that they learn democratic values; and that they learn what it means to be citizens of the 
world. Researchers imply that if requisite norms and values 'are taught', and if textbooks 
describe and explain them, then students will learn the messages and 'have' the values. 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 172 
Most of the writing on cosmopolitanism in education overlooks the role of the teacher and 
evades the complexities of what learning entails.  
The assumption is that what adults understand as cosmopolitanism can be transferred to 
children as a kind of multi-faceted knowledge. 
 
All told, the proposals show an ignorance of the fact that education is an important part of 
governance and not a site where a decision to further cosmopolitan education can be 
imposed as a technical curriculum directive. Any search for a way to develop 
cosmopolitanism in education must consider that enabling such an education requires a 
sophisticated and flexible interpretation of what goes on in schools. To this end, advocates 
must examine the teaching-learning process, the political foundation of education, and the 
dilemmas that face teachers in schools. Analysis must include an understanding of how 
teachers are prepared for their profession and the kinds of obstacles to cosmopolitanism the 
professional education may raise in teachers' consciousness. Only on such broad grounds 
will it be possible to propose a program of action that is likely to be effective in developing 
cosmopolitanism.  
 
Yet, the literature that supports cosmopolitan education barely mentions professional issues 
or teaching practices. Dilemmas that face teachers in their work as teachers – dilemmas that 
may make it nigh impossible for them to 'decide' to engage in doing cosmopolitan education 
are shaped by the conceptualized spaces of teaching as well as by teachers' own 
socialization / education.  In order to show how this is likely to work, I will first relate to critical 
analyses of education and illustrate my interpretation by examples from the state education 
system in Israel (Kalekin-Fishman, 2004). 
 
 
Obstacles to Effecting Cosmopolitanism in Education 
 
The Teaching-Learning Complex 
 
Learning is a complex process and it is not a linear outcome of 'teaching'. In psychological 
studies of learning, researchers examine students' cognitive skills such as knowledge 
(memory of specifics), understanding, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation 
(Bloom, 1956). It has been shown that in order to gain a command of ranges of skills, 
learners also have to acquire meta-cognitive skills such as 'planning, organising, monitoring, 
and doing self-assessments of one's competencies' (Hartley, 2007: 46).  The constructivist 
turn in education, moreover, has riveted attention to how learning is related to students' 
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assessments of what is required in any learning context. Examining outcomes of lecture-
based learning versus student –activating lessons, for example, Struyven et al. (2006) found 
that when students are activated they engage in 'deep' learning, and are likely to make 
concerted efforts to plumb the meanings of the texts and the ideas presented to them. By 
contrast, lectures encourage 'surface' learning; students do not exert themselves beyond 
acquiring the obvious details that are laid before them in the classroom situation. They may 
even take a 'strategic' approach, not centered on what is to be learned but on how the 
lecturer is likely to assess learning. Beyond the cognitive skills and the degrees of activation, 
elements of affect such as motivation, intention, student history of failure or success, among 
others, undoubtedly also have effects on current learning (Struyven et al., 2006, p. 14). Still 
another aspect of how learning gets done is the factor of grouping. It has been found that 
learning in groups is more effective than learning by oneself, and many studies show that 
sharing learning experiences affects learning outcomes positively (Lazonder, 2005; Stanton 
et al., 2004).  
 
Some learning escapes classification among the categories noted above. Because it is clear 
that students do not learn exclusively from what is presented as 'the material of the lesson', it 
has proved fruitful to study distinctions between learning in formal frameworks and learning 
in informal frameworks. There is purchase in examining relative salience of what is learned: 
core knowledge and peripheral knowledge; explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge; what 
students have learnt about practices and to what degree students have learnt to be (i.e., to 
perform as) participants in a community of practice. Moreover, at the source, it has been 
shown that people endowed with different types of intelligence and different sensibilities (cf. 
Eisner, 1994; Gardner, 2006; Sternberg and Grigorenko, 2002) learn in different ways and 
acquire different kinds of knowledge. 
 
In the descriptions of learning and its theorizations as culled from the literature, teachers 
have a crucial role. Even passing mention of the types of learning that may be required in 
different subjects and for different purposes demonstrates how varied the types of 
functioning required of a teacher. The complexities of learning and hence, the complexity of 
deciding what types of learning are possible and how those types of learning can be fostered 
in teaching-learning events are the challenges that teachers face daily in their work. Given 
choices of texts and tasks, the teacher is responsible for helping students develop 
appropriate cognitive skills. Beyond these, in arranging the classroom, choosing materials, 
designing the lesson, distributing tasks, positioning students, monitoring events, overseeing 
long-term learning processes, the teacher creates a climate which may or may not facilitate 
learning because of the wide variety of learning styles that different students adopt.  
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Teachers can control what knowledge they intend to convey formally but have no way of 
controlling the informal learning conveyed by modes of speech, by the appearance of the 
classroom, by contacts with peers 'in the meantime,' and by the performance of equipment. 
Teachers find ways to convey explicit knowledge, but the tacit knowledge about what can be 
done with it has to be acquired through acting on the basis of that knowledge. In connection 
with the learning that is considered necessary, the general orientations of students to the 
classroom situation may be decisive in whether the teacher will be involved in a supply – 
push or in a demand- pull mode of teaching, i.e., a proactive or reactive approach to what 
they consider learning (Brown, 2006). 
 
More subtle problems are part of the minimal structure of the teaching-learning situation. 
Over time, teachers have to face the limitations of the space of the school and the space of 
the classroom. In schools, teachers are enclosed in a relatively rigid space with clusters of 
student life trajectories (Massey, 2005). Constrained to experience students' temporal 
evolution together with their own, this is a constant source of tension that cannot be avoided.  
 
 
Political Problems that Attend Teaching 
 
In a newspaper article published in the 1860s, Marx condemned a German law that was to 
require children to go to school. His fear was that compulsory schooling would be a way of 
regulating social and political life, of homogenizing personalities, and of preserving the 
political and the economic status quo.  One hundred and fifty years later, education – at least 
primary education for all -- is presented as a basic need, an unquestioned good, and is no 
longer styled a privilege. The progress of states toward ensuring a decent standard of living 
for their populations and toward developing reasonably comfortable life conditions is 
measured at least in part by the availability of schooling. Throughout the world, education is 
an uncontested value, imbued everywhere with clusters of unchallenged norms that underlie 
networks of statuses, role relations and legitimate ways of knowing.  Schools everywhere 
have been shown to children's ways of thinking and their ways of understanding the 
environment (Scribner and Cole, 1981).  Accomplishments of schooling are offered as sets of 
unalloyed good, even though the smooth statement hides some uncomfortable facts that 
confirm, if obliquely, some of Marx's fears.  
 
In practice, the organization of state education is a site of struggle in a double sense. From 
outside the state territory, there are assaults on sovereignty by supra-state institutions; 
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internally, groups with diverse interests struggle to impose an institutionalization of their 
agendas in schools. With the growing number of regional, international, and global 
organizations, all with social and cultural agendas, state systems of education are called 
upon to defend and sustain a shared national imaginary, legitimating the state as a national 
state. Through education conceptions of the state as a unique national territory are 
reproduced and disseminated. Defined as the consensus, state sovereignty is asserted in the 
language of instruction, the disciplines that make up the curriculum and the modes of 
organization. The consensus is institutionalized in time allocations, bureaucratic structures 
and hierarchies. It is also expressed in terms of a historical narrative that intertwines the 
history of the 'nation' with the history of national education. Within the state, moreover, the 
'consensus' embodied in a particular configuration of schooling is the outcome of on-going 
intra-national struggle. There are clashes about how to allocate students to different types of 
organizations, and criteria for shaping careers in schools for students and for those in charge 
of carrying out the tasks defined as education. There are struggles over focal elements of 
curriculum content.  Agitation for different kinds of education, overt in democracies and 
covert in autocratic states, is an integral part of political campaigns. The outcomes are never 
fixed once and for all. Moreover, following Foucault (1980), it is possible to see that how 
schools are run is minimally an expression of governmentality --- among the practices and 
rationalities of rule that perhaps do not originate in the state, but are nonetheless an 
expression of the way governance is conceived in a given collective even if this is not the 
overt intention.  
Although I surmise that these foundations of state schooling are quite general, I will here 
quote examples from the state system of education in Israel which I believe can provide a 
trenchant illustration.  
 
 
State Education as an Obstacle to Cosmopolitanism in Education: The Case of Israeli 
Education  
 
Education and the Founding of the State 
 
When Israel was founded in 1948, all the pre-state systems of education were maintained 
apart from the government schools of the mandatory/ colonial power, the UK. For the schools 
in which Hebrew was the language of instruction there were four distinct systems, each the 
arm of a political party. They were: the centrist General Zionist system, the left-wing Socialist 
Workers' system, the Religious Zionist system, and the right-wing system of ultra-orthodox 
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anti-Zionist schools. Education for speakers of Arabic was sparse and generally conducted 
under the aegis of religious bodies.  
 
The early years of the state were years of mass Jewish immigration which more than 
doubled the number of children eligible for schooling and in attempts to maximize funds that 
they could claim from the state, the systems engaged in zealous, even fanatical competition. 
Passed in 1953, the Law for Compulsory Education ostensibly instituted a system of state 
education to counter the fragmentation and calm the conflicts. The law asserted that the 
state would replace the political parties, and would take responsibility for compulsory free 
primary education (kindergarten to 8th grade) for all the children in the country. However, to 
resolve disputes which, it was feared, might undermine the very existence of the new state, 
the law defined 'state education' ab initio as a bifurcated system with separate apparatuses 
for the religious state sub-system (Hebrew-speaking) and the secular state sub-system (the 
latter divided again for speakers of Hebrew and Arabic). Further, the law recognized ultra-
orthodox Jewish schools as private schools supported by the state although no government 
supervision was imposed. To form the state secular system, the Socialist Workers' system 
was assimilated to the General Zionist system and in effect eliminated from the educational 
map.42 But the goals of each of the Jewish parties were enunciated as an integral part of the 
educational project. Those mentioned included the goal of learning the scriptures (a principle 
of the religious Zionists), the goal of fostering a scientific orientation and of developing 
craftsmanship (General Zionists), and the goal of training for agricultural expertise (Socialist 
Workers even though their curriculum and mode of organization were not represented in the 
new system).  Overtly, interests of all the parties were preserved even though the parties as 
such no longer had complete control of either the curricula or the staffing. The legislation 
ignored the obvious: it was patently impossible to build programs to achieve all the 
contradictory objectives. At the same time, however, the state asserted its right to control 
education by underlining the over-arching goal of education as to develop a Zionist 
consciousness (Lamm, 1973).  
 
This assertion was, of course, anathema to the large minority of Arab citizens in Israel. True, 
a significant achievement of the 1953 law was the institution of compulsory state education 
for children whose mother tongue is Arabic. Less than ten percent of the male children had 
had any formal schooling until then. In the narrative of the system, however, goals that 
                                               
42  The party had a majority in the government and so could be cajoled into accepting the decision. 
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related to Arabic as a mother tongue or to Arabic culture, or to Muslim, Druse and Christian 
religious values were formulated for the first time over forty years later, in the mid-1990s. 
Only then, with the pressure of the Arab Committee for Education (a voluntary organization 
set up by heads of Arab local councils in Israel) together with Arab Members of Parliament 
and activist members of the Jewish lay public, did the Ministry of Education revise the 
formulation of the goals of education to include full recognition of the cultural rights of the 
Arab minority, 'loosening' but not removing the demand for identification with the Zionist 
project (see Kalekin-Fishman, 2004).  
 
 
The Student Career 
 
In the Israeli state school system, the reality of schooling is presented to students as 
inevitable. Students are inducted into a framework in which the curriculum is fixed, their 
positioning in classes is organized without their participation in the decision-making process, 
and their daily agendas are arranged for months in advance. As the 'subalterns' of the 
school, students tend to take the most rational course, namely, to evade restrictions insofar 
as possible. Restrictions include rules that govern comportment, on the one hand, and the 
irksome mental load of 'learning', on the other.  
 
The state system of education fosters a carefully graduated awareness of what constitutes 
knowledge throughout the student's career. A student's first experience of schooling is her 
encounter with a teacher who is overwhelming. In primary school one teacher is responsible 
for each class with only occasional entrance, interference, if you will, of teachers for sports or 
music. From the consistent presence of the class teacher, children learn what patterns of 
behavior are acceptable in public often by contrast with the patterns of behavior practiced in 
the home. From the way teachers' hours are distributed in the time-table children are also 
taught that fields of knowledge are organized in a hierarchy; some studies are important and 
some are of negligible importance. The 'extra' teachers are presenting less important areas 
of knowledge and with luck, are providing peeks at what is meant in schools by 'fun' – 
something that may or may not be congruent with children's intuition of what is enjoyable.  
The picture is nuanced somewhat in secondary schools. There is differentiation in the subject 
matter and recognition that additional teaching staff may be experts in important if relatively 
esoteric disciplinary areas. Meetings with certain teachers convey an acquaintance with 
more valued divisions of knowledge (teachers of physics or chemistry) and with divisions 
disadvantaged by social selection (fine arts, poetry).  
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The generality of practices is wrapped in a world view which is conveyed as the 'way things 
are'. Schools attempt to preserve the normative patterns of behavior, although, as noted, 
these are often contested. At the same time, signs of what constitutes the national character 
are a constant presence.  Marking the annual cycle by means of religious holidays adapted 
(in the state secular system) to national symbolization is a powerful mode of education. The 
institutionalization of time during the school year illustrates this. School rituals, which mark 
the highlights of the school year, are among the fixed elements of the universe. Through the 
rituals, the school calendar expresses the distinction between the sacred and the profane, 
part of the 'way we live'. The times are, of course, connected to designated places within the 
state territory – Memorial Day to the military cemeteries; agricultural feasts integrated in the 
Jewish religion are connected with the plants and odors of the fields, national holidays are 
exhaustively celebrated at fixed times and in varieties of places that endear the territory and 
emphasize the association of the state with nationhood. Each highlighted date is also 
associated with appropriate songs and sounds (Kalekin-Fishman, 2010).  
 
The ideology which legitimizes the existence of the state, and makes its mark on the 
consciousness of each student is established as a set of understandings that cannot be 
countermanded; they are the basis of pertinent knowledge as well as the indicators of 
national morality. Teachers who convey what is known as knowledge, and sanction the 
patterns of the profane, also conduct the sacred activities; willy-nilly they have an important 
role in establishing the incontrovertible truth of the existence of a nation (Kalekin-Fishman, 
2004).  
 
The directedness of the nationalistic agenda in Israel has to be understood in light of the fact 
that the existence of Israel as a nation-state could not be taken for granted when it was 
recognized as a sovereign member of the UN on November 29, 1947. In the territory 
allocated to the state then there was a population of about 600,000 Jews. The leaders 
reasoned that to make the state a viable entity they would have to attract a large number of 
immigrants. Although the success of this project was not a foregone conclusion,43 resources 
have steadily been invested in order to maintain a steady stream of Jewish immigrants. In 
Israel today, there is a population of more than seven million people, about 76% of whom are 
                                               
43 In 1948, survivors of the Holocaust and persons displaced after WWII were, of course, eager at long last to find 
a country that would take them in. But for those Jews, who viewed Judaism as a religion, the idea of migrating to 
a Jewish state was not necessarily appealing.    
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Jews from over one hundred different countries. But in terms of assuring a shared national 
imaginary, this success raises problems. Even though 90% of the students in the schools 
today were born in Israel, the countries of origin of their parents and grandparents are 
diverse.44 Because of the policy that the state adopted in order to ensure its viability, schools 
are inevitably locales of trans-national consciousness, loyalties, and practices. Students 
bring into the schools the memories that are rehearsed in the homes, the practices that were 
brought from each particular Diaspora, and often the networks of connections with other 
countries that are fostered in the family.   
 
The effects of transnationality are not necessarily benign. Educators have to contend with a 
rising tide of violence in schools among peers and on the part of parents (Arieli, 1995; Elbaz-
Luwisch, 2005). Among the bones of contention are crude attempts to lean on teachers for 
marks that signal success, and to evade investing in learning by 'achieving' classification as 
a person with innate learning difficulties (see Wilf and Wilf, 2008).  Yet the job of teachers 
and the expectation of inspectors, parents and the students themselves is that learning does 
get done in schools. The best strategy is considered sticking to the plan embedded in the 
structures of the educational system. How are teachers prepared for this task? 
 
 
Educating Teachers 
 
Further obstacles to cosmopolitanism in education arise from the framework for professional 
education that prepares candidates for teaching. In Israel, the formation of the teacher is the 
responsibility of specialist professional schools or of professionally-oriented departments at 
the university. In their professional education, teachers acquire discipline-grounded pointers 
about how to get along with students in schools, along with repertoires of skills for imparting 
'pieces of knowledge' of different kinds. The teacher is led to see herself as an autonomous 
professional but she is taught how to limit her interventions to what is interpreted as needed 
by students – and what is needed to preserve community / state solidarity. In the 
professional preparation, the emphasis is on how to do teaching. Since teaching is purported 
                                               
44 By September 2009, the total population of Israel was 7,515,400 [75.5% Jews, 20.3% Arabs; 4.2% 'others' – 
non-Jewish family members of Jewish immigrants, non-Arab Christians or Muslims, and people whose religious 
affiliation is not listed in the Ministry of the Interior]. Among the entire population, 70% were born in Israel. In the 
schools, as noted, the number of native-born is higher. 
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to be a way of channeling knowledge and consensual values, i.e., the values that are taken 
for granted in textbooks and acted out in the organization of schools; knowledge is assumed 
to be unambiguous and students in classes are assumed to be associated with universally 
agreed upon types.  
 
Internalization of the framework for the nationalizing program of the state is facilitated by 
reference to easily assimilated slogans abstracted from canonical texts such as the Bible, 
from the orthodox Jewish Prayerbook, or from the Israeli Declaration of Independence. 
Slogans such as 'all Jews are responsible for one another',  one is obliged to 'bend one's will 
to the will of God,' the obvious need for 'the ingathering of the exiles,' are among the self-
evident values that teachers are expected to internalize and disseminate. Defined as central 
values of the state, the slogans also serve to legitimate the state's practices of assigning 
rights and duties, recognizing or not recognizing claims made by residents or citizens. What 
is conveyed both formally and informally is the assumption that what exists as schooling is 
exactly what ought to be. The hierarchy that is embedded in government ministries, 
including, of course, the Ministry of Education is replicated in each school from the 
headmaster 'down' and adapted to taken for granted hierarchies in parents' organization, but 
also in classrooms. Thus, the relations of hierarchy are taught – and learned – as the 
structure of a framework without which it would be impossible to conduct a learning 
environment. Student teachers practice skills as they acquire them in schools. Teachers are 
the products of the school system that awaits their professional services and they have been 
socialized to the current hegemonic narrative of the nation-state. Preparation for the vocation 
of teaching underlines the explicit message of the system. Forms of teacher education and 
the conditions of teachers' employment are coordinated with how schooling is framed and 
with how 'normal' teachers act.  
 
But there is a catch. Teachers who have gone through the system as students are indeed 
prepared for the ideological context of teacher education as well. But concomitantly with their 
preparation for teaching, or before they enter upon professional training, they are exposed to 
study in the university. Speaking in terms of the educational organization, the university is the 
place where the student must come face to face with knowledge as it is practiced in the real 
world. To some extent, one can say that the mere requirement to access reading materials 
which were prepared in different countries with different axiomatic truths is enough to tear 
apart the veils which are so carefully woven throughout primary and secondary schooling. 
Here students are exposed to the kinds of differences of opinion that characterize the 
academic and the scientific world. They are introduced to the uncertainties, the doubts, the 
questions, and the arguments that can never have a permanent resolution because they are 
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at the heart of inquiry (Weber, 1964). The exposure to academe opens a window to 
skepticism and perplexity. The national worldview is implicitly but, even then, not explicitly 
put in question. 
 
Yet, in the face of the implacable structures of schooling, the ideal stance for teachers that is 
promoted is that of 'neutrality'. In their professional education it is impressed on teachers that 
in order to safeguard the well-being of students, schools have to radiate neutrality in regard 
to political struggles within the state. Knowing that politics must not be allowed in to the 
school, they are encouraged, to introduce changes that may be needed from a pedagogical 
point of view. In the large, however, teachers' task is to demonstrate neutrality and support 
the status quo. The neutrality extends to the approach to knowledge. Subject matter as it 
appears in the curriculum is absorbed by teachers as the neutral, unambiguous core of 
whatever discipline they may be teaching. They know that the curriculum has been planned 
to cover as much of the world of knowledge as possible. The mission is defined as conveying 
knowledge assumed to enjoy the stamp of approval of the scientific communities. Having 
undergone vocational preparation, teachers are presumed to be able to set aside the doubts 
and the confusion that the university, in promoting scientific endeavors, must have provoked.  
 
The upshot of their professional education is that teachers are supposed to emerge as 
agents [not in the philosophical sense of autonomous actors, but in the insurance sense -– 
representatives of organizational goals]. They are, moreover, in the conceptualizations 
(metaknowledge) they hold, in their repertoires of patterns of behavior and in their intentions 
(habitus), the representatives of the state ideology, the message (albeit evolving) that the 
state fosters as the 'good life', for its perpetuation as organization and institution. 
 
 
Is the Structuring of Education in Israel Unique?  
 
Although the particularities of the Israeli condition are not necessarily generalizable, research 
discloses that the challenge presented in the Israeli classroom is not necessarily unique. The 
literature of the last twenty years makes it clear that transnational communities have formed 
throughout Europe and Asia (Castles, 1998; Kastoryano, 1998). Mobilities of experts, 
students, industrial workers, domestic workers – even when originally intended to be 
temporary have given rise to groups with families settled into the receiving country (Raijman, 
2008/2009). Ties with communities that span borders are reinforced by the media and the 
sheer awareness of 'people movement' – the possibilities of relatively cheap tourism, the 
possibility of finding work across borders. In accordance with the Universal Declaration of 
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Human Rights, the children of temporary residents of all types are admitted into the school 
system. Immigrant children are equipped with the slogans, the times, the spaces, the 
practices of 'there' while attempting to fathom the meanings of the slogans, the times, the 
spaces and the practices that are taken for granted 'here'. Children bring their own and their 
parents' life trajectories into the classroom; these include transnational affiliations, loyalties, 
communal identifications, rhythms of everyday living. Thus, students of all ages bring into the 
schooling situation sets of tools for thinking and sets of practices that diverge from what 
teachers know to be the norm. In the classroom spaces, teachers find they have to deal with 
what is likely to be a confusing array of trajectories meaning 'time so far' and pointing ahead 
in different ways. In practice, professional education grooms teachers to stem the tide.45 
Appointed as agents to limit developments of certain aspects of the trajectories, teachers are 
challenged daily to adapt their materials and their behaviors to steadily diversifying groups of 
students. The fact that with growing tides of transnationals the state is changing, as the 
governance of the world is changing, is not a realistic argument against the hold of 
internalized ideology.  
 
 
Can Cosmopolitanism Be Integrated into Education? 
 
In the framework of a state education which is oriented to underlining state sovereignty, 
cosmopolitanism cannot easily be absorbed into educational programs. There are, however, 
pressures which challenge the exclusivity of a nationalist orientation, if only because internal 
and external pressures impact the consciousness of teachers and students alike. With 
diverse types of population movements across the globe, transnationality is appearing in 
schools in ever more impressive proportions. Secondly, there is 'internationalist' pressure 
from supra-state forms of governance. No state is immune to the influences of decisions 
taken in the various sub-groups of the United Nations, of the consultations and conventions 
of regional groups such as the European Union, or of the international non-governmental 
                                               
45 As part of a recent reform in Israel, teachers are obliged to spend more time in schools, to attend to individual 
needs of students. As 'autonomous professionals', they are instructed to compile a 'vision' for the functioning of 
their school, and they do this with a view to adopting the consensual values, the official ideology, to what they see 
as the essence of schooling. Experience shows that the presence of students with different backgrounds in class 
is taken to be a problem that has to be overcome by pressure for homogeneity (Ministry official: personal 
communication). 
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organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Médecins Sans Frontières (Ku, 2002: 542; cf. 
among others, www.sociology.emory.edu/globalization/ingo.html).  
 
In a word, transnationality appears in classrooms not as an ideal but as an inevitable reality. 
There is a possibility of integrating cosmopolitan projects into education, however, only if it is 
possible to find elements of what is taught as professionalism that can be coordinated with 
cosmopolitan principles and practices.  A practical orientation is called for in order to 
encompass the dense differences within classrooms as well as in order to grasp the 
unfolding meanings of globalization. To ensure such an orientation in the schools, it is 
important to find 'hooks' onto which a program of cosmopolitanism can be hung without 
threatening the educational establishment. These hooks can be found in the images of the 
psychology of good teaching and in the basic idea of community that infuses every 
nationalizing project. Community can, moreover, be an immediate experience for students. 
Like all good pedagogy community has to be conveyed not by preaching but by doing; by 
leading to action that builds on the knowledge and the skills that teachers have acquired at 
the university and in their professional education. A key structure that is of immediate use 
can be found in Israeli schools. As a rule, children are assigned to classes which study 
together throughout the six years of primary school. Integrating the concept of the class as a 
community into teaching can serve as a basis for collective activity, thus fostering 
experiences that further cosmopolitanism in education. 
 
 
Building a Program for Cosmopolitan Education 
 
To recapitulate, a practical program for cosmopolitan education can only be formulated if 
teachers and their dilemmas are taken into consideration. Implementation will, furthermore, 
be possible only if elements in teachers' professional education are taken as the basis for 
furthering cosmopolitanism as a realistic educational goal. An important conceptual link is to 
legitimate a vision of participatory citizenship in civil society as integral to the educational 
mission (cf. Etzioni, 1993; Lister, 1997; Walzer, 1990). 
 
Because of the varied learning styles that are recognized in educational psychology, 
teachers are encouraged throughout their professional education to find varieties of ways to 
attract students to learning.  This basic tenet has manifold implications for constructivist 
approaches to the teaching-learning situation, among them the conviction that in order to 
achieve maximal learning, students have to be involved and insofar as possible, active 
(Brown and Adler, 2008). Moreover, doing things in groups has been shown, as noted, to be 
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a most effective learning tool.  Teachers are taught that developing collaboration in groups 
(Lazonder, 2005; Stanton et al., 2004) and fostering solidarity in the classroom is useful for 
learning (Papastephanou, 2005). Standards of good teaching, then, are identified in terms of 
the teacher's skills in enabling students' activities. 
 
Developing social skills via projects is also pre-defined as an integral part of running a class, 
a school. Students in classes are groups that have the potential for forming and belonging to 
civil society and the idea that they are actually shaping a civil society through their own 
participation can be realized. Some of the definitions of civil society deal with specific political 
regimes; some belabor distinctions between civil society and the state. While definitions of 
civil society are varied (Ku, 2002; see Bernhard and Karakoc, 2007 for a useful survey), civil 
society in all its permutations is strongly associated with community and community values. 
Seeing schooling as a service to civil society along with the incontrovertible goals of 
acquiring knowledge and skills for getting through the student career with aplomb, will enable 
teachers to guide students in the very acts of creating a community. This value can arouse 
no opposition whether the 'community' is that of a state or a village. Any program that guides 
students toward becoming part of the community and  toward being active members of a 
community can fit in with the goals of teaching in general and can further a program of 
cosmopolitan education.  This view of what cosmopolitanism in education entails can make it 
possible to recruit teachers to initiate concrete steps to further 'globalization from within.' 
 
As the basis for an educational project, the framework for researching 'Global Civil Society' 
developed at Johns Hopkins University (Salamon, Sokolowski and List, 2003) provides a 
scaffolding that can be used by teachers. Their definition of civil society which has served 
researchers in forty different countries is: 'a broad array of organizations that are essentially 
private, i.e., outside the institutional structures of government; that are not primarily 
commercial and do not exist primarily to distribute profits to their directors or "owners"; that 
are self-governing; and that people are free to join or support voluntarily' (Salamon and 
Sokolwski, 2003). It is from their list of the types of organizations that are likely to be found in 
civil society around the globe that we can find ideas for concrete projects furthering 
cosmopolitanism in education. According to them, in civil society there are, along with other 
types, organizations that deal with:  
 Culture and recreation 
 Education and research 
 Health 
 Social services 
 Environment 
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 Development and housing 
 Advocacy 
 Philanthropic intermediaries 
 International movements 
 Religious congregations 
 Business and professional organizations, unions. 
 
Each of these types of initiatives refers to a wide array of attempts to deal with problems that 
are relevant to life in schools. The kinds of problem-solving that can be undertaken in 
schools is analogous to the kinds of problem-solving that citizens in neighborhoods, villages, 
cities, and regions are likely to be called upon to do. 
 
Groups of children can be sensitized to community issues throughout all the years of 
schooling. An interesting outcome of such awareness will be that students will be learning to 
cope with the very social issues, terms for which Beck and Sznaider consider to be in need 
of revision in the social sciences. They will be discovering the practical and dynamic 
meanings of key terms which, according to theory, require re-clarification.46  
 
Speaking practically, the point of departure for introducing cosmopolitanism in education will 
be problems that trouble the class as a community. In defining the problems that can be 
solved, students will consider what kinds of activities the class can undertake, what kinds of 
activities can contribute to a solution of the problem, and so on. In the early years of 
schooling, of course, the students will deal with issues that arise in their immediate milieu. As 
they mature, they will develop sensitivity to issues of wider scope. In guiding the groups, 
teachers will find it necessary to foster significant intellectual capacities: observation, 
definition, clarification, translation into action, implementation, drawing conclusions about 
what has been accomplished and what remains to be done. The original definition of the 
class-as-community, as an acting collective will expand to encompass community as a 
broader social construct.  Students will be observing different types of community actions 
while reflecting on themselves and their place in relation to each of them. It will be important 
to call their attention to the environmental, economic, and even the political context. And, in 
order to reach decisions on action in the community (however community is defined in any 
                                               
46 As noted above, these includ: household, family, class, social inequality, democracy, power, state, commerce, 
public, community, justice, law, history, memory, and politics. 
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given year of study), they will have to adopt modes of abstraction.  The power of 
emphasizing these keys to cognition lies in their professional acceptability, their indication of 
what kinds of learning can be attractive to different students – a task that every teacher can 
legitimately undertake. According to Dillon (2008, p. 258), these pedagogical indicators lead 
to breaks with disciplinary norms, and thus broaden perceptions about the nature of 
knowledge.47 
 
Despite the relative single-mindedness of teacher education, the broad infrastructure of 
teaching allows teachers to find their way to further such a project. Working in the classroom 
as a community or as sub-groups, settling on problems that concern the community as it is 
understood by students at different stages of their development, and using varied keys to 
cognition as pedagogical indicators lays the groundwork for the kind of openness that can 
lead to a solution to some aspects of teachers' dilemmas. Certainly this kind of performance 
can guide students to kinds of awareness that advance the moral aspects of citizenship and 
further a mind set that accords with the cosmopolitanization of the world.   
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Cross-border relationships are apparently inevitable in a globalizing world. They include 
elements of feeling such as multi-local belonging, a 'trans-national imaginary', connections 
with 'neighbors' who are physically at a distance, as well as transfers of cultural elements. 
Such relationships also include concrete contacts through the flow of capital and coordinated 
political engagement. Such interconnectedness encompassing 'horizontal and vertical 
economic, social, and cultural practices that span space' (Ong, 1999, p. 4) evolves into 
transnationality with implications that go beyond the limitations of nationhood. It is key to the 
transition from narrow conceptions of nationalism to a perception of the nation as part of the 
globe; and hence, of the need for promoting 'globalization from within', a cosmopolitan 
consciousness. In a word, there is a need to recognize the place of moral practice as a mode 
of dealing with the changes that people are undergoing.   
 
                                               
47 Note that the cosmopolitan project as conceived by Beck (Beck and Sznaider, 2006) is understood to require a 
radical change in definitions of knowledge with new combinations across disciplines. 
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Indeed, the new cosmopolitanism is defined as a project which embraces ethical principles 
as well as a social theory and changes in the epistemological basis of methodology; this is a 
project of which education is an integral component. Aspirations, however, are inadequate to 
bring about the kind of practice that is implied. Above all, cosmopolitanism can be brought 
into education by taking into account the practicalities of schooling and the dilemmas facing 
teachers. These include the complexities of the teaching-learning nexus, the significance of 
educational projects for governmentality, and the expectations of teachers' professionalism.  
 
State schooling is an apparatus for imparting knowledge in ways that are appropriate to the 
national imaginary. In the systems, the structuring of both children's education and teachers' 
professionalism is guided by regulations designed to ensure the maintenance of whatever 
compromise among conflicting interests is currently accepted as the mode of education that 
best serves collective as well as individual needs. Yet, classroom poopulations are not all 
attuned to the consensual mode. Groups put together for the purpose of learning are 
increasingly transnational, made up of students whose backgrounds are highly diverse. And 
the diversity is often the root of the most basic of teachers' problems: pedagogical dilemmas 
about how to induce effective learning. 
 
For teachers, adopting a program of cosmopolitan education may be a way of solving the 
problems they confront in facing a class where transnationalism is 'rampant'. This can be 
accomplished by thinking through the idea that even in the schools, students and teachers 
are part of a civil society, namely a society that is maintained by active voluntary participation 
of its members. It has been proposed here that it is possible to activate children as a civil 
community of participating citizens who are guided to turn their attention successively to 
problems that they as a group can help to unravel. Working through the steps of activation as 
participants in a social nexus, students have opportunities to act in civil society as 
cosmopolitans, acquiring the competencies that support an interactive transnational reality 
while becoming imbued with a global ethic. From the literature on the teaching-learning 
nexus, we can see that in this type of undertaking teachers are enabled to use the very 
professional resources which are known to advance in-depth learning. 
 
 Time is embedded in school spaces – and it is clearly impossible for schools to be 
disembedded from history. The inexorable advance of globalization is a wave which can be 
ridden with the help of tools that were invented for tangential purposes. The milieu in which 
teachers are called upon to exercise their profession is rife with contradictions. Thus, it is 
possible for teachers to apply their professionalism so as to further both consensual national 
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goals and as the means toward furthering a program of cosmopolitanism in and through 
education. 
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Chapter 9 
Transformative Impact of Social Remittances 
in Transnational Settings 
Pauliina Järvinen-Alenius, Pirkko Pitkänen, and Anna Virkama 
 
 
There is much research literature focusing on the quantity and impact of migrants’ cash 
transfers to their families and communities back home. Among other issues, researchers 
have focused on the circumstances under which financial remittances can be channeled into 
productive investments in sending societies. Some of the researchers have also underlined 
that financial and material remittances have profound social impacts in migrants’ homelands, 
communities and households. Peggy Levitt, in particular, has highlighted that migration-
related changes do not result from monetary transfers only, but social catalysts are also at 
work. Parallel with financial remittances Levitt has termed those factors as social remittances 
(1998; 2001:54). She has initially defined social remittances as “the ideas, behaviours, 
identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities” (Levitt, 
1998: 926)48. Later on Levitt (2008: 6) has acknowledged that migrants can also bring new 
ideas and practices to the receiving countries, but still the previous research has mainly 
concentrated on exploring how migrants’ social transfers, named as social remittances, 
modify the lives of those who “remain behind” (see Córdova & Hiskey, 2008; Gakunzi, 2006; 
Jiménez, 2008; Moran-Taylor, 2008; Parella & Cavalcanti, 2006; Taylor et al., 2006).   
 
In this chapter, we hypothesize that new concepts and practices are not transferred just 
between host countries and countries of origin, but rather they are flowing in transnational 
spaces which encompass both migrants and non-migrants and are characterised by an 
intensified movement of diverse transfers across national borders. Further, the present 
research on social remittances has not explored how border-crossing transfer of new 
conceptions is linked to institutional transformations in transnational settings, including the 
host societies where migrants’ transformative impact is often reduced to “increased 
multiculturalism”.  By looking at ongoing transmission processes and by identifying different 
                                               
48
 Although the term was introduced by Levitt, she is not the first one who has discovered that migrants convey 
new ideas, values and practices to their previous homelands. Already in the 1950s and the 1960s, researchers 
claimed that return migrants could transmit, for example, skills, knowledge and normative ideas from the receiving 
countries to their countries of origin (de Haas, 2007: 3).   
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types of transnational transfers suggested in the previous research we will outline a picture of 
emerging transnational institutions and figure whether – and to what extent – transfer of 
social remittances in transnational settings may transform existing institutions.  For this 
purpose, we draw empirical examples, in particular, concerning family, work and politics from 
research concerning both migrants and non-migrants in different fields.  
 
 
The Flow of ideas and practices in transnational social spaces 
 
Studies on migrant transnationalism have often stressed the bipolar transnational ties 
between the migrants’ countries of origin and new countries of settlement. For our purposes, 
the concept of ‘transnational social space’ seems to provide a useful approach to explore the 
transnational transmission processes of social remittances. As explained by Faist (2000: 
309), transnational social spaces are composed of “relatively permanent flows of people, 
goods, ideas, symbols, and services across international borders that tie stayers and movers 
and corresponding networks and non-state organisations”. One of the essential features of 
transnational social spaces is the cross-border transfer of conceptions and practices. 
Examples of transnational social spaces include, for example, communities of scientists, 
transnational families, trans-state religious organisations, and ethnic communities (Faist 
2007: 4). Such spaces can include individuals –both migrants and non-migrants- living in 
several nation states. Furthermore, transnational social spaces can differ significantly in the 
sphere and scope of their activities. 
 
The transmission of social remittances has mainly been described as a one-way process 
where migrants adopt new ideas and models of behaviour in the immigration country and 
convey them back home to non-migrants living in the country of origin.49 In the case of 
financial remittances, these are predominantly one-way flows from host societies to migrants’ 
home countries. Subsequently, social remittances are typically examined from the same 
perspective. Besides, the fieldwork on social remittances has mainly been conducted in the 
migrants’ countries of origin and empirical evidence of their impact in the countries of 
destination is thus limited. Both in the case of financial and social remittances, migrants are 
                                               
49
 In her most recent article with Lamba-Nieves, “Social Remittances Revisited” (under review; published on-line 
2009) Levitt argues that social remittances circulate between receiving countries and the migrants’ homelands. 
Yet, the emphasis is still on the transfers from migrants to non-migrants back home. 
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seen as the key agents of transmission. However, the transmission processes of these two 
types of remittances are not quite similar. While money is usually sent detached from 
individuals, the ideas and practices are embedded in individuals. Coe and Bunnell (2003: 
438) have noticed - concerning knowledge transfers in general – how embodied know-how is 
shared and transferred through social networks by processes of social interaction. Therefore, 
regarding social remittances, social interaction is a prerequisite for such transfers to take 
place. Furthermore, transnational networks play a key role in the transmission processes.  
 
Thus, in this article, we understand social remittances as conceptions and practices 
transferred through interaction between individuals or within transnational networks, 
communities or organisations in transnational social spaces. Our conception is that the 
binary constellation of ‘receiving country’ and ‘sending country’ in explaining border-crossing 
transmission of social remittances is problematic and should be supplemented by a 
transnational approach, taking into account the role of mediating factors such as individual 
migrants, transnational networks and improved communication technology. It is true that not 
all migrants have transnational orientation, and that migrants’ transnational activities can 
differ significantly depending, for example, on their migration background, political status, life-
cycle stage and resources. Still, an increasing number of people is constantly moving 
between two or more countries, or is living in several countries, and even continents, during 
their lives. Furthermore, migrants’ transnational contacts and networks are not limited only to 
their countries of origin. For example, members of transnational families can reside in various 
countries. In addition, migrants’ friends, colleagues or fellow students can live or have “roots” 
in different nation-states.  
 
Levitt (1999; 2001) has explained the ways how social remittances have been transmitted to 
sending communities. Migrants communicate with their relatives or friends living in their 
country of origin, for example, by phone, e-mails, or videos, and simultaneously convey new 
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours. They also pass on new ideas and practices during their 
visits to the countries of origin, and social remittances can be exchanged when non-migrants 
visit their relatives or friends in the country of immigration. Migrant associations, 
organisations, informally-organised groups and social networks have also been identified as 
possible transmission channels. (Gakunzi, 2006; Levitt 2001; 2009.) The ideas presented by 
Levitt are of interest but there is a need for critical amendments, particularly as systems of 
practice, normative structures, identities and social capital are seen as the main types of 
social transfers (Levitt, 2001; 2009). For instance, concerning gender identities, there can be 
many different identities depending on ethnicity, age, social class, sexual orientation, and so 
on. Hence, stating that migrants adopt and transfer gender identities of receiving societies 
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would be difficult to prove empirically, since it would require a deep analysis of ideas and 
beliefs behind certain type of gendered practices and a reliable way to prove that migrant has 
really internalised these ideas. Therefore, we find it more accurate to argue that migrants 
observe and adapt from their visible and observable fragments, such as clothing, consuming, 
and spare time activities, ideas regarding gender roles and positions.  
 
It has been suggested that there are several factors that can hinder or support the adoption 
and transmission of social remittances (see Levitt 2001: 65-69). For example, the level of 
differences in value structures between the host and home countries can have an impact on 
how easily new norms will be adopted. In addition, the extent and amount of social 
remittances conveyed simultaneously influences their impact. Furthermore, both “senders” 
and “receivers” of social remittances expand, select and modify ideas and practices which 
they adopt (Levitt, 2001: 56-59; Suksomboon, 2008: 478). When people living abroad have 
contacts with colleagues, neighbors and classmates in their new home country, they observe 
behaviors that differ from what they are used to. Yet the immediate social contacts of 
migrants are not necessarily restricted just to natives/members of cultural majority in the 
receiving country: they can come to contact even more often with other immigrant or ethnic 
minority groups, and adopt their practices. Therefore, it can be said that migrants rather 
represent and transmit fragments of hybrid identities in transnational settings. 
 
According to Levitt (2001: 66, 131) migrants can take advantage of their powerful economic 
position (due to financial transfers) in order to influence decision-making of non-migrants in 
the societies of origin. This conception is rather questionable. Although people working 
abroad may have a higher economical status compared to those who have been “left 
behind”, it does not automatically mean that they are admired and imitated in the sending 
communities. Rather, the migrants’ status may be ambivalent and their perceived success 
can be seen as 'corrupted success' by those who stayed (Lacroix, 2004: 90). The different 
ways of living that the migrants display through their behaviour, clothing and consumption 
can attract some but put off some others. This is the case, in particular, what comes to 
deeper value and norm structures. Furthermore, Flores (2005: 21-23) has underlined how 
one should not ignore the role of national and international power structures in transmission 
processes: the remittances conveyed by elite sectors of Diaspora usually reinforce traditional 
hierarchies while the remittances of the poor and working-class sectors can challenge or 
upset existing power relations.  
 
Research on social remittances has so far overlooked the impact of improved communication 
technology to the cross-border transfer of ideas and practices. Many migrants are nowadays 
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taking advantage of various technological innovations to share experiences and views with 
their relatives and friends. Internet is an increasingly important arena in transmitting images 
'from here and there'. Virtual social platforms, such as Facebook, offer a public forum to 
distribute visual material, and, in You Tube, all kinds of video clips are available for 
circulation within one click, but still the selection and distribution is always done by 
individuals. It is worth noticing that, in transnational contexts, even innocent looking posting 
of a video may have political impact since the virtual rights are perceived differently in the 
contexts of different nation-states.  For instance, You Tube is forbidden in many authoritarian 
states. This implies that migrants living in countries where such restrictions do not exist have 
an access to video material that their friends and relatives back home cannot see, but they 
can share this information with them. In this way, migrants become gatekeepers to 
transnational ‘mediascape’ (Appadurai, 1999). 
 
There is evidence that many migrants prefer online communication for staying in touch with 
their friends and relatives who are in geographically distant places. For example, among 
those Estonian and Moroccan migrants we have examined50, Internet (e-mails, chats, 
Messenger, Skype-calls, Facebook, YouTube, and so on) is the most popular means for 
transnational communication. The use of Internet has made keeping frequent contacts with 
friends and relatives cheaper, easier and faster than before. Using information technology 
has become a normal part of many migrants’ and non-migrants’ everyday life. As Miller and 
Slater (2000) have shown, computer-mediated relationships of migrants are no longer 
separate from their other social relationships. Furthermore, internet groups can bring 
together both migrants and non-migrants from different countries and allow members of such 
groups to cross geographic and national borders easily. Brinkerhoff (2009) has, for example, 
looked at how members of virtual diaspora groups –living in different nation states- have 
been sharing experiences, discussing and negotiating political views, and, eventually, 
fostering also their social capital through online interaction. Consequently, new 
communication technologies provide inexpensive and fast channels to maintain daily contact 
to persons living around the globe and, consequently, transmit social remittances more 
rapidly and more extensively than before. 
                                               
50
 Within the TRANS-NET-project (see the Introduction of this book) 2008-2011, both in Finland and in France, 80 
semi-structured interviews of migrants were carried out as well as 20 life-course interviews of the selected 
persons mainly from the same groups. 
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Searching for the transformative character of social remittances 
 
To find representative cases of transformation processes we draw empirical examples from 
previous research on the field.  Empirical evidence suggests that there are, in particular, 
three spheres of life where social remittances play an important role: family, work and 
politics. In this chapter, we focus on these three cases and ask how – and to what extent – 
the circulation of ideas and practices in transnational social spaces can transform the 
institutions concerned. As research focusing on social remittances has mainly examined 
them as one-way flows and has looked at their impact mostly in the countries of origin, we 
also refer to studies which are not explicitly focusing on social remittances but the authors 
are discussing transnational transfer of ideas and/or practices on a more general level.  
 
 
Case 1: Family order 
 
In the previous research, there is evidence that transnational migration and new conceptions 
conveyed by migrants can – at least in some ways – transform the existing family order. 
Frank and Wildsmith (2005) have noticed that, in Mexico, persons residing in communities 
with medium level of migration experience have a greater risk of union dissolution as 
compared to residents of communities with low levels of migration. It was concluded that the 
norms regarding divorce and marital unions could have been transferred to Mexican 
communities through return migration and migrants residing in the United States. 
Nevertheless, there are limits regarding the adoption of new ideas once migration has 
become a standard feature in a community. (Frank and Wildsmith, 2005) Concerning family 
planning, it has been noted that transnational and other kinds of social networks can transmit 
information about the positive effects of fertility control as well as methods available, and 
consequently enhance the use of modern contraceptives (Lindstrom and Muñoz-Franco, 
2005). More effective family-planning methods can eventually change both family sizes as 
well as the lives of men and women. The ability to control births can also have an effect on 
social structures of the societies. This implies that ideas and behaviours brought by both 
migrants living abroad and returnees may gradually transform family orders.  
 
Most evidently, transnational migration has challenged existing conceptions on marital 
unions in migrants’ home communities. In Thailand, cross-cultural marriages between Thai 
women and foreign men have changed marriage choices: marrying a foreign partner is now 
perceived as an opportunity for upward mobility as well as financially beneficial. Furthermore, 
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migrant women are also themselves reinforcing views of international marriage migration as 
a success story, making it a desired option for girls. (Suksomboon, 2008) In Morocco, the 
number of previously inhibited marriages between Muslim women and foreign non-Muslim 
men has increased, and such unions have become socially more tolerated in recent years 
(Harrami and Mahdi, 2008). One reason why the “mixed” marriages have become socially 
acceptable in migrants’ home communities is that marriage has been seen as a migration 
strategy and economically beneficial for family members. 
 
It has been pointed out how both male and female migrants have adopted new behaviours 
and conceptions regarding family order, such as more equal division of household chores, 
ideas how to hinder domestic violence as well as new approaches in family management: 
giving special attention to children and consulting more their partners. (Levitt, 2001; Moran-
Taylor, 2008; Taylor et al., 2006; Tiemoko, 2003)  Furthermore, they have been conveying 
new ideas also to the non-migrants in the communities of origin which have influenced, in 
particular, women’s attitudes. (Levitt, 2001; Moran-Taylor, 2008; Taylor et al., 2006) 
However, it has been noticed how the changes in male returnees’ behaviour and views have 
often been temporary: men have reverted to previous patriarchal ways. (Taylor et al., 2006: 
56) In addition, female migrants’ emancipated behaviour is not always welcomed by the 
communities of origin (Moran-Taylor, 2008: 116). Consequently, migration-related changes 
to gender order within families, influenced by social remittances, can be gradual or even 
ambivalent due to the social structures which resist transformations.  
 
Regarding the impacts of social remittances to the receiving countries’ family orders, 
Suksomboon (2008) points out how the ideas and practices concerning family are also 
transmitted from the home country to the host country. For example, as Thai-Dutch couples 
have different understanding of the family unit as well as of the responsibilities of adult 
children towards their parents, this requires management and renegotiation between migrant 
women and their spouses. Suksomboon (2008:461) argues that “these social remittances 
expose non-migrants to global cultural diffusion and cause to a degree a transformation of 
their social values and their life styles” Although cross-cultural marriages are becoming more 
common within host societies, one cannot yet show that family institutions in the host 
countries have been rapidly changing due to the new practices. 
 
Although there is evidence that migrants have transmitted new ideas and practices 
concerning family orders which have affected non-migrants’ and communities’ behaviour and 
views particularly in migrants’ countries of origin, one can also notice that permanent 
changes in norm systems are often slow. The changes can be uneven and gradual 
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depending on the social structures and ideologies in the countries concerned.51 Therefore, 
one cannot yet claim that family institutions have been profoundly transformed due to the 
transnational flows of ideas and practices. However, migrants can have a special position - 
because of their transnational orientation and cross-cultural know-how - to promote new 
ideas on family order as well as to introduce different kinds of marital practices.  
 
 
Case 2: Work conditions 
 
Transnational migrants may also transfer new ideas, knowledge and practices through their 
work. An increasing number of people exercise their occupation in two or more countries. Not 
just low-income workers migrate to rich countries, but also highly skilled professionals are 
increasingly going international, due to higher income and life opportunities elsewhere, or 
because of lack of opportunity at home. These movements are occurring between high-, 
middle- and low-income countries, “developed” and “developing” worlds, but also among 
highly-industrialised and ”developing” countries, with different but linked impacts and 
challenges in each case. Yet previous research on social remittances has not scrutinised 
transfer of conceptions or practices in transnational occupational contexts.52 The majority of 
migrants studied in relation to social remittances have been working in manual/ 
manufacturing work in the destination countries. In these cases, their interaction with the host 
population is probably limited, in particular, in work contexts. However, there are also a 
number of highly skilled migrants who are actively participating in different kinds of 
transnational professional networks and activities.  
 
In our study (2011) focusing on the Finnish/Estonian transnational social space, new ideas 
and practices were often shared at occupational contexts. Migrants had conveyed 
manual/professional skills, ways of organising work, knowledge about project work, 
organisational know-how and ideas on promoting gender equality at the workplace and in 
recruitment processes in transnational settings. They had also adopted new professional 
                                               
51
 See also Harrami (in this volume) focusing on how transnational migration affects cultural transmission within 
migrant families. 
52 The studies to which we are referring in this chapter have not mentioned ‘social remittances’ as such (except 
Gakunzi, 2006) although most of them are discussing international/transnational transfer of ideas, knowledge 
and/or competences.  
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skills and practices from different countries where they had been working. The respondents 
reported that the members of different kinds of transnational occupational 
communities/networks had shared new ideas and practices, and they had mutually profited 
from these exchanges. It should still be taken into account that several factors can hinder 
conveying new knowledge and practices in work environments. For instance, host country 
nationals may not value or accept the immigrants’ competences. Forsander (2002) who has 
examined the role of social capital and cultural competences of immigrants for their 
incorporation to the labour market in Finland, has noticed that, due to different forms of 
discrimination, immigrant workers lose possibilities for transferring their knowledge, ideas 
and skills obtained in the country of origin. Rather than transmission of professional skills the 
concept of “brain death” was used by Gakunzi's (2006) African informants to summarise their 
situation in Europe: highly skilled immigrants had ended up in low skilled occupations in the 
immigration country and, therefore, progressively came to lose their professional skills 
acquired in the source country.  
 
Despite discrimination and prejudices, in work environments, there are also arenas where 
migrants and non-migrants meet and are able to exchange their views, beliefs and practices. 
The adoption and implementation of diversity management practices represents an example 
how companies and their HRM practices have changed as a consequence of transnational 
mobility of labour. Many managers have started to value the diversity and the various skills of 
both recent and old ethnic minorities. The most successful examples have also shown that 
adopting a new diversity plan is not enough but more long-term institutional changes will be 
needed, including reforms in HRM strategies. (Marquis, 2007: 1-6; Wrench, 2007: 3-7) In the 
2000’s, diversity management practices have become a relatively common business 
practices, particularly in large Western companies. An important factor which has influenced 
the policy changes includes the development of heterogeneous workforce due to the 
increasing transnational mobility of labour as well as the increasing internationalisation of 
business. In transnational occupational spaces, significant culturally based differences can 
exist in the relationships between managers and employees, and also among majority and 
minority employees. This means that ignoring diversity is no longer an option. It is evident 
that a human resource strategy wherein the mainstream staff are seeing as a norm fails to 
provide the representatives of minority cultures with equal opportunity and, thus, to prevent 
their exclusion. In a culturally diverse environment it is not enough that all people are to be 
treated the same, rather the management of diversity needs to become a main issue of 
concern.  
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It has been shown how a part of professional expatriates maintain extensive and frequent 
contacts with colleagues and institutions in their former home countries (Mahroum et. al., 
2006; Saxenian, 2006). Such transnational ties have been transforming to ‘diaspora 
knowledge networks’ which provide arenas where “brain drain” can be converted to “brain 
circulation” through the transnational transfer of skills and knowledge. Although it has been 
claimed that such networks may not be stable and their impact has not been measured in 
detail (Lowell and Gerova, 2004), there is evidence that the number and activities of diaspora 
knowledge networks has been increasing in recent years (Kuznetsov, 2006; Meyer and 
Wattiaux, 2006). Although globally their number is still limited, their diverse activities, such as 
exchange of scientific, technical and administrative information, “scientific diplomacy”, joint 
projects, enterprise creation, training and ad hoc consultations can support the scientific, 
technological and economic development of migrants’ former home country in different ways. 
Furthermore, there also exist networks which unite professionals originating from the same 
region or continent, not only from one nation state. (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006: 7-8, 16) In 
such networks, scientists can exchange and circulate information not only between the host 
and home country but also within and across several countries. Furthermore, it is not always 
necessary that migrants physically move in order to transfer ideas across national borders. 
Through virtual networks highly skilled expatriates can transfer information and know-how 
without moving themselves.  
 
Coe and Bunnell (2003) have identified transnational innovation networks among which one 
domain include networks composed of “knowledgeable” international migrants, bridging 
associations and transnational enterprises. Concerning innovation processes, they underline 
the importance of ‘mobile knowledgeable subjects’ who are “plugged into networks facilitating 
the ‘external’ renewal and reworking of practices that define innovation” (Coe and Bunnell, 
2003: 452).  In other words, transnational, highly skilled migrants can play a key role in 
transferring and sharing new practices which can promote innovation. Transnational scientific 
networks, for example, can be a space for the transmission and adoption of new ideas. 
Furthermore, such networks – which include both migrants and non-migrants- can develop 
into “transnational technical communities characterized by mutually beneficial connections 
and the circulation of people, capital, technologies and ideas”53 (Coe and Bunnell, 2003: 
438). An example of such communities could be the transnational technical and business 
communities created by the ‘new Argonauts’ –mobile migrant entrepreneurs from Silicon 
                                               
53
 Emphasis in the original text. 
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Valley- in cooperation with local partners from their homelands, including China, Taiwan, 
Israel and India (Saxenian, 2006). 
 
Transnational technical/scientific communities and networks are examples of new forms of 
transnational social spaces which have been rapidly expanding. The development of 
information technology has facilitated the transnational activities of such communities and 
networks. Mutually beneficial circulation of know-how and knowledge is the core idea of such 
spaces. Transnationally-oriented migrants which possess transnational competence (see 
Koehn, 2006) and belong to diverse, heterogeneous networks can ideally link 
scientific/technical communities in different countries. Through exchange of ideas and 
practices, members of such communities are taking advantage of the social capital54 
embedded in their networks, developing bridging social capital and enhancing their human 
capital. 
 
 
Case 3: Political sphere  
 
In the increasingly interconnected world, one question of actual importance is the flow of 
political conceptions in transnational settings. Cross-border migrants and migrant 
organisations have been represented both as potential advocates of democracy as well 
potential supporters of terrorism. For instance, international organisations have been 
portraying emigrant organisations and migrant communities as possible promoters of 
democracy, human rights and good governance (Faist, 2007: 2, 6). Yet some authorities and 
politicians have also expressed fear how migrant organisations can through their 
transnational activities agitate for violence and disorder.  
 
It has been suggested that increasing democratisation of states as such has enhanced 
migrants’ opportunities for transnational political engagement. Koslowski (2005a: 5) 
underlines that “democratisation in host countries provides more conducive environments for 
emigrant political activity while democratisation of home countries increases the chance that 
emigrants are able to influence their homelands’ politics”. Yet the links between migrant 
political activities and democratisation processes can be very complex. When examining the 
                                               
54
 See the definitions of social capital by Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1993), and Faist 2000 
(on the role of social capital in migration movements).  
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case studies on the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, one can notice migrant 
organisations were part of political opposition movements opposing the authoritarian regimes 
and taking part in the political processes which led to democratisation. Although migrants 
have been enforcing democratic decision-making in these countries, their contribution to the 
deepening of participatory democracy has been limited. (Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008.) 
Therefore, migrants can have in transition periods special interest to support democratisation 
processes but when the political regime has been reformed their political activities may 
diminish or they may opt for maintaining the privileges of certain groups. 
 
There are also indications that migrants can enhance tolerant attitudes and political 
participation of non-migrants in the countries of origin to a certain extent. For example, in 
Mexico, people living in communities with high migrant population were more eager to take 
part in political activities. Non-migrants who had transnational contacts, were more likely to 
work for political parties, to attend political rallies, to vote, and also to tolerate their 
opponents, including their political rights.  (Jiménez, 2008) Similarly, a study concerning six 
Latin American countries by Córdova and Hiskey (2008) showed how individuals with strong 
connections to migrant networks expressed higher levels of political tolerance if compared to 
those with limited or no connections to migrants. In addition, those having more exposure to 
transnational networks were also more active in community-related activities. However, it is 
also possible that authoritarian regimes interpret the attempts of exile organisations to 
promote the development of democracy at the home country as “outside interference” and 
use it as an excuse to repress opposition forces, as happened in China (Freedman, 2005: 
145).  
 
Internet has become an important medium for migrants’ political advocacy. Again, online 
migrant groups can both promote secessionist movements and civil war as well as search for 
peaceful solutions for the internal conflicts in their countries of origin. There is evidence that 
cyberorganisations of migrants can prevent conflicts by providing platforms for discussions 
on homeland, negotiating hybrid identities inclusive of liberal values, showing alternative 
paths to address conflictive topics, and discouraging calls for violence. Moreover, interaction 
within the communities can also foster bonding and bridging social capital of their members.  
(Brinkerhoff, 2009: 146-147; 201) Bonding social capital allows them to unite and share 
experiences with those with similar backgrounds while bridging social capital assists them in 
crossing national and ethnic boundaries by linking migrant groups in various host countries. 
 
When discussing the transfer of political ideas and practices in transnational settings, one 
should take into account that political ideas and practices are not just transmitted from host 
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society to home country but instead flowing in transnational social spaces, and that migrants 
can already possess ideas, for example, on advancing democracy and human rights when 
they emigrate.55 In case of exiles, which have fled authoritarian regimes, emigration has often 
opened opportunities to promote their political ideas, and simultaneously influence political 
change in the country of origin. In these cases, migrants can “send back” conceptions 
already arisen in the home country, as well as elaborate these ideas based on their 
experiences in the host country.  
 
Political activities of migrants can be supported by the political opportunity structures 
provided by the host countries. Political mobilisation of migrant groups, including the transfer 
of political ideas and practices, can have implications not only for the country of origin but 
also for the host country. For example, in case of Kurdish diaspora, Kurds have been able to 
express their ethnic identity and mobilise political activities more effectively outside their 
homelands. In case of Germany, the civil rights provided ground for developing community 
ties of Kurds, for aggregation of resources and for organising various protest activities. The 
political activities of Kurds eventually affected also the domestic politics of Germany. (Lyon 
and Ucarer, 2005: 77.)   
 
Koslowski (2005b: 1) suggests that “increasing international migration, the information 
revolution and democratisation have propelled a globalisation of the domestic politics of 
many states that is similar to the globalization of national economies”. From our view, 
migrants’ political activities - which include the flows of ideas and practices over national 
borders – have, in some cases, extended the realm of domestic politics from national to 
transnational level. However, one has to note that not all emigrant groups are politically 
active or influential. Some powerful migrant communities have been transforming domestic 
politics in the way that it also includes a transnational dimension. The political freedoms have 
advanced the possibilities of the migrants to express their views and promote their agenda 
both in the new country of settlement and in the country of origin. 
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 See also Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2009) on how migrants’ experiences prior emigration can influence both 
their activities in the host societies and what they remit back to their countries of origin. 
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Conclusion 
 
In previous research, there has been some discussion to what extent migration and migrant 
transnationalism can transform societies in general. Portes (2008: 19-24) has argued that 
transformational potential of migration is limited in host societies. He provides examples of 
some 20th century migratory movements to the United States concluding that immigration has 
not changed the fundamental pillars of the American society, such as normative complex, 
legal system or power structures.56 According to Vertovec (2009: 23-24), migrant 
transnationalism and its social effects may not bring substantial societal transformations 
alone but can contribute to broadening or intensifying on-going transformation processes. 
Consequently, he suggests that migrants’ transnational practices – at both individual and 
collective level – can in the cumulative way alter value systems and social practices of 
people across regions. Likewise, Stephen Castles has mainly focused on social 
transformation in the context of increasing transnational connectedness. He has highlighted 
that there is a need to study social transformation processes caused by cross-border flows 
and transnational networks in a wider global context (e.g. Castles, 2001; 2007). 
 
The focus of this article lies in institutional transformations caused by transnational flows and 
networks. We sought to figure whether the transnational transfer of social remittances can 
transform existing institutions. On the basis of the empirical evidence presented it can be 
concluded that social remittances may change conventional thinking in the spheres of family, 
religion and politics as well as transform competence requirements, qualifications and 
professional identity maintenance. It was noted that although the flow of new ideas and 
practices may affect both migrants’ and non-migrants’ and their communities’ actual 
behaviours, the changes are particularly slow in the sphere of attitudinal and normative 
structures. If compared to the influence of global media flows, the power of social 
remittances lies in the personalised nature of transmission: one of the key features of social 
remittance transmission is that these are often communicated between persons who know 
each other well, or are united by mutual social ties (Levitt, 2001: 64). Furthermore, migrants 
can pass information and practices which are seldom conveyed in media, such as 
transnational know-how and occupational expertise. Such information can be particularly 
useful for those planning to migrate and for those who are engaging in transnational 
                                               
56
 If Portes had looked the issue few centuries earlier, he might have noticed that earlier migration movements 
did, indeed, profoundly alter the society in the North America. 
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business or working in transnational contexts. Transnational migrants have a special position 
to attain multiple human capital as they live in several nation-states and have become 
familiar with life styles, modes of behaviour and political systems of these countries. Through 
novel perspectives, they can compare social and cultural differences and similarities in 
different societies and share their ideas with those who have not moved. Transnational 
networks, communities, and organisations provide arenas for negotiating and adopting new 
conceptions and practices.  
 
Although it is difficult to identify clear institutional changes caused by transnational 
transmission of social remittances, the emergence of transnational occupational spaces and 
new forms of HRM strategies may provide present-day examples of institutional 
transformations. Still, the most evident examples of institutional transformations can be found 
in virtual environments. Transnational virtual communities represent examples of emerging 
transnational communities which unite people with different or similar cultural, ethnic and/or 
linguistic backgrounds. In these communities, people can transcend national borders without 
moving themselves. On-line communities provide opportunities both for fostering ethnic 
community ties and for creating multicultural, transstate communities sharing same passions.  
 
There are also other types of transnational “communities of practice” (Lave and Wenger, 
1991; Wenger, 1998) where people share same interests and engage in common practice. In 
such communities, people can exchange ideas, conceptions and practices as well as foster 
their social capital across cultural, linguistic and/or national boundaries. Different kinds of 
transnational social spaces can, therefore, be examined as communities of learning where 
participants engage in a process of collective, informal learning: sharing, exchanging and 
adopting new ideas and practices. Many interesting questions are arising here. It can be 
asked in what kind of transnational communities and social spaces ideas, information, and 
practices are transmitted and exchanged smoothly? In addition, one could ask, which 
aspects may hinder interaction processes in transnational settings? In general, exploring 
social remittances can assist both in attaining deeper understanding of the nature, function 
and development of different kinds of transnational social spaces as well as understanding 
socio-cultural transformations linked to migration. 
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Chapter 10 
Transnational Care and National Social Policies 
Minna Zechner 
 
 
Transnational care 
 
Family responsibilities, like care, do not fade away when family members live dispersed in 
various countries (Alicea, 1997; Bryceson & Vuorela, 2002; Zechner, 2008). Instead new 
ways to provide emotional, practical and economic care and guidance emerge in these 
transnational families (see Huttunen in this book). One of these new ways is transnational 
care, which refers to caring activities that are performed across the borders of nation-states 
(Baldassar et al. 2007: 3; Zechner, 2008: 33). Care and more specifically social care is here 
understood as activities and relations involved in meeting the physical and emotional needs 
of children and elders who are not able to do it themselves (Daly & Lewis, 2000: 285). Care 
is a gendered activity, performed to great extend by women. Care is also often a pivotal 
issue in migration. For example the moves and migrations and especially their timing 
amongst migrant groups from Bangladesh to United Kingdom is very much influenced by 
care. More specifically the decisive factor is when female labour is needed for care reasons. 
Husbands leave wives behind so that they care for children and parents-in-law. In addition 
wives are called for to join the husbands in United Kingdom when the husbands become frail 
and ill (Gardner, 2002: 122, 124). 
 
Child and elder care are both individual and societal activities. It means that giving care 
produces welfare both at an individual as well as at a societal level.  Care activities are 
framed, defined, controlled and supported by various kinds of social policies. The care of 
family members is generally understood as a family responsibility, but processes such as 
ageing of the population, low birth rates and the rising numbers of women in the labour 
market have paved the way for social care to be collectivised to some extend. Still, averaging 
across the fifteen EU countries and Norway, informal care of older people in 2000 was five 
times more prevalent than formal care which comes through services of various kinds (Daly 
and Rake, 2003: 54). In some countries such as mainland China, Israel, Spain, Taiwan and 
over half of the US states there is a legislation defining the role of family members in 
providing care for elders (Izuhara, 2010a: 155). 
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Since social care has become a societal issue, a vast number of policy responses have been 
designed to provide and support care activities especially in developed welfare states. 
Despite the increasing impact of transnational organisations, such as European Union (EU) 
or Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), on national social 
policies, care policies have generally stayed predominantly national even though there is 
certain degree of convergence in welfare policies either offering cash benefits or services 
(Starke & Obinger, 2009: 123; see also Kalev et al. in this book). Also during the past 
decades states have increasingly pursued a social investment approach in social policies 
hence linking employment and social provision more closely together than before (Lewis, 
2006: 2). 
 
Care policies are under change but their national character has remained even though 
transnational caring has become a common practise. In this chapter I aim to tackle following 
questions by looking at different types of mainly European care policies through the lens of 
transnational child and elder care activities. The questions include: What happens when the 
transnational care activities meet the care policies that are mainly national? What kinds of 
care policy responses support transnational care and which ones may even hider such 
activities? And finally, are there differences in child and elder care policies in this relation?  
 
Policies are scrutinized mainly from the migrant’s point of view, where a migrant is giving 
care across transnational social space. Migrants and their close ones are seen as actors who 
may make use of various national care policies in an innovative way. Even though care 
policies are designed to support care provision within the nation-state, they may additionally 
include elements that can be of assistance when giving care also transnationally at the same 
time. This means that when migrants or their close ones living in a developed welfare state 
are targets to child or elder care policies, they may at the same time make use of these 
policies while giving or receiving care across nation-state borders. Transnational caring is an 
activity which has been documented in various studies and my data consists of these 
studies. 
 
This chapter is in a way testing different types of care policies in relation to transnational 
care. I will demonstrate how transnational care stretches the boundaries of national welfare 
policies and that individuals sometimes use the care policies in ways that are different from 
what the policies are originally designed for. As a result national policies may be changed. 
What has to be kept in mind is that migrants in developed welfare states do not form a 
homogenous group. Instead they vary from refugees and asylum seekers to high rank 
expatriate workers and other professionals. Based on their different statues officially defined 
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as illegal and legal immigrants with varying types of residence and working permits, some of 
them have full access to publicly provided social welfare whereas others have very limited on 
no access at all. In addition there is always a need to pay attention to the possible barriers 
for international move such as requirements for visas, passports as well as political 
instabilities, wars and natural disasters. Some families are also dispersed to more than two 
locations but for simplicity I am referring to two localities: migrant’s country of residence and 
the country of departure only. Finally, care of children and older people has traditionally and 
predominantly been a female activity, thus care policies shape especially the transnational 
activities of women. Next I shall put forward some issues related to social care policies and 
their changes in recent years. 
 
 
Care policies 
 
Before going to national care policies, it must be reminded that since the majority of 
European welfare states are members of the European Union, the role of EU must somehow 
be taken into account. European Union has some degree of power to shape national policy 
responses. Free movement of labour, capital, goods and services amongst the member 
states, is one of the main motives for the European Union. The right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
is also granted to their family members, irrespective of nationality (Directive 2004/38/EC). 
These issues have an essential impact on transnational care activities. 
 
Regarding child care, member states committed 2002 in Barcelona meeting to step up 
provision of child care so that by 2010 it would be available to 90 per cent of children 
between three and six years of age and 33 per cent of children under three years of age 
(Commission,  2006: 10). This goal has not in many countries been achieved but already a 
creation of such an explicit goal gives states a strong incentive to shape their child care 
policies towards offering services. 
 
The impact of EU on elder care policies is less direct than on child care policies.  Anyhow at 
least two main EU impact areas are worth mentioning. Firstly there has been a gradual move 
towards applying internal market and competition law in the field of social protection (Saari & 
Kvist, 2007: 2). Hence EU sets guidelines on how public entities are supposed to do their 
procurement and set out tenders for certain services that are open for outsourcing. Secondly 
a common European Union policy on legal and illegal immigration is under way (Council of 
the European Union, 2008). This means that the international movement of essential actors 
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in care, namely family members and care workers is to become standardized across the 
European Union member states. Generally within EU there is a freedom of movement and 
residence. For retired people freedom of residence is applicable when they have pension, 
health insurance and sufficient resources to prevent them from becoming dependent on the 
host country (King et al. 2000: 175). Freedom of movement is also determined by the 
definition of family members, which usually refers to spouses and minor children (Kofman, 
2004). In Spain and Denmark instead older generations may be included in family 
reunification measures if they are dependent, in Germany for humanitarian reasons and in 
Netherlands if they are in serious difficulties (Kofman 2008: 75). 
 
Social care encompasses various stages as well as spheres of life. For example matters like 
housing, public transport and barriers in the nearby environment essentially shape the 
possibilities of people to give and receive care and to live an active and fulfilling life. From 
that point of view majority of social policies have a role in shaping people’s activities in social 
care. However in this chapter only policies that are directly aimed at shaping child or elder 
care are considered. Also it is assumed that children are generally healthy, not with 
disabilities or long-term illnesses. 
 
Social policies supporting care activities basically meet three needs, the ones of time, 
services and finances (Daly, 2002: 255). Meeting these needs can be translated to four 
different types of policy responses: 
1. monetary and in-kind social security and taxation benefits, 
2. employment-related provisions, 
3. services and 
4. incentives towards employment creation (ibid. 255). 
 
Monetary and in-kind social security and taxation benefits take often the form of cash for care 
where people are given money for not using services and/or for doing the care work 
themselves usually at home. Benefits may be paid for the carer of for the person in need of 
care (if an adult) and the amount and type of control related to the use of a benefit vary 
substantially. Reimbursement may also be other than cash, for example assisting devices, 
diapers or house renovations. Monetary benefits related to taxation are often given to 
families with young children in a form of a family taxation. Lower levels of income tax are 
paid if the taxpayer has so called dependent family members.  
 
Employment-related provisions are only available for those who are active in the formal 
labour market. A common version of such a provision is care leave, which allows parents and 
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those giving care to an elderly person to take time from employment for caring. Other forms 
of provision may be career breaks, flexible working times and reduction of working hours. 
Each of these policy responses frees individuals temporarily from employment 
responsibilities in order to give care. 
 
Services are generally divided into institutional or community-based ones. Institutional care 
services offer to elders 24-hour care when care needs are extensive. For children 
institutional services in the form of day care are usually offered for the time their parents are 
busy with work or study. Community-based services are mainly supporting elders with 
everyday activities such as eating and bathing and giving them a space for socialising. For 
children community-based services are at times to be consumed with parents or other adult 
who has the main responsibility for the child during the service use. An example of such a 
service is a meeting point for parents with young children or an afternoon club for primary 
school children. 
 
Incentives towards employment creation include policies such as tax rebates for buying 
services from the market. Also vouchers that may be used for buying market-based services 
can be understood as and incentive towards employment creation. Mainly these incentives 
aim to encourage people to consume services at home and to buy them directly from the 
market. This way service sector employment is also boosted. Policies predominantly aim to 
assist caregiving within the national borders, not for somebody residing abroad. This is taken 
as given here since the transferability of welfare benefits is generally very limited, especially 
related to social care.  
 
Policies on care have during recent years been under change. Public responsibility of child 
care has been increasing in European countries (Anttonen & Sointu, 2006: 118). Parental 
leave schemes have spread across countries even though entitlements still vary significantly. 
United States and Australia are one of the few welfare states that do not have any form of 
paid parental leave (Himmelweit, 2008: 257). Nordic countries have transferred many child 
care tasks to social services. Most Continental European and English-speaking countries 
instead support family income through transfer payments or tax benefits (Starke & Obinger, 
2009: 133). Child care is increasingly understood as a shared responsibility where women, 
men and the state are involved, even though the main responsibility is still held by parents 
(Anttonen & Sointu, 2006: 119).  
 
Public responsibility on care for older persons has also been increasing in European 
countries (Anttonen & Sointu, 2006: 121). Policies aim to recognise and sustain familial care 
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by combining the transfer of money to families with the provision of services. At the same 
time new social care markets have been started up, based on the distinction among 
financing, purchasing and management of services.  Social care markets include competitive 
procedures and market mechanisms and aims to empower the users allowing them freedom 
of choice through more purchasing power (Pavolini & Ranzi, 2008: 18). 
 
Welfare states have put different emphasis on children and elders. Looking at the direct 
public expenditure it is possible to divide welfare states into ones that are either oriented 
towards youth or towards elderly. In this terms consistently elderly-oriented countries are 
Austria, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain and United States. The most youth-oriented welfare 
states are the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries and the English-speaking countries other 
than United States (Lynch, 2006: 16). Social expenditure does not of course reveal it all 
since intergenerational transfers, spending in the market and other groups of people 
benefiting from policies not targeted to them takes place as this chapter will point out. 
 
Now having described the variation of social care related policy responses as well as some 
broad policy changes, I shall evaluate them by paying attention to how care policies support 
or hinder transnational caring activities within and from developed welfare states to other 
countries. I start by looking at care services, then move on to incentives towards employment 
creation after which employment-related provision and finally monetary benefits are 
considered. 
 
 
Care services 
 
The underlying idea of welfare policies is to secure the citizens or inhabitants of a nation-
state territory from certain social risks. It has been claimed that the construction of the 
national welfare has been an integral part of nation-building as well. Social policies, including 
care policies have indeed explicit and implicit goals such as socialising people into desired 
patterns of action as well as sorting out and regulating so called problem populations (Clarke, 
2004: 1).  
 
The main function of publicly provided or organised care services is to either support or 
replace informal care given by the close ones, mainly family members. In transnational 
families those who give and those who receive care are living in a territory of another nation-
state. Since public care services are mainly offered within the territory of a given welfare 
state, they do not give much support for transnational caring activities, unless those in need 
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of care migrate. In such case it ceases being transnational care. In many countries it is very 
difficult for older persons with care needs to enter the country where for example members of 
younger generations reside. For example entry to Britain to join families is feasible only if the 
potential entrée can demonstrate that the stay would not entail recourse to public funds 
(Mand, 2008: 189). 
 
However, there are some exceptional cases where a welfare state has taken measures to 
produce or support the local production of care services in another nation state. Certain 
Norwegian municipalities have set up nursing and care institutions in Spain providing elder 
care. These institutions serve mainly Norwegian pensioners who have migrated to Spain as 
retired migrants either on permanent or seasonal basis (Migration and health, 2009: 81). The 
problem with these institutions is that they only provide for those who originate from 
Norwegian municipalities that have contributed to the provision of these services. A group of 
Norwegians have started to lobby and campaign for a coherent and fair treatment of 
Norwegians living in Spain and in need of care (ibid. 86).  
 
Similar trends are visible in schooling, for example German state has a long history of 
supporting German schools (Deutsche Auslandsschulen) all over the globe. Schooling is in 
this article understood as education and not as care therefore it is not discussed further. I just 
wish to make a point that public bodies providing services for own nationals and other target 
groups abroad is not that uncommon. 
 
Public services are anyhow predominantly offered within the territory of a given welfare state. 
If a child or elderly person in need of care resides in a country where care services are not 
available, they offer very little support to those who give or organise care across the 
transnational social space. Transnational social spaces refer to “_a densified and 
institutionalized framework of social practices, symbol systems and artefacts that span pluri-
locally over different national societies” (Herrera Lima, 2001: 77). On the other hand, when 
children or elders in need of care reside in a country where services are available, family 
members and close ones from abroad may find these services useful when making an effort 
towards transnational caring. For example Albanian migrants in Greece, United Kingdom and 
Italy are involved in transnational care of older family members since it is the duty of the son 
to look after the parents. In addition the Albanian welfare system is weak; pensions are not 
high enough to secure livelihood and social services are a rare phenomenon, especially in 
the countryside (King & Vullnetari, 2009: 29, 31). 
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New Zealand and Australia are societies that are structured by large-scale migration flows 
both into and out of the country. The adult children of many middle-aged and third age 
parents live and work overseas and, consequently, many people in these countries end up 
lacking close family support in their old age. In this situation social service staff may have to 
communicate with relatives outside national borders in order to keep them informed and 
involved (Baldassar et al. 2007: 180; Lunt, 2009: 240). A study from Australia on 
transnational elder care shows that the most successful encounters between migrants and 
professionals where the older person in need of care resides seem to be when the migrant 
has training in medicine or nursing. Availability and lack of care services may also influence 
the frequency and length of visits to the country where older person in need of care resides 
(Baldassar et. al. 2007: 180–181). At times older generations choose to return to the country 
of departure at the time of retirement. When returned parents start to need care, this may 
evoke the unwilling or willing return of younger generations in order to support and give care 
as has happened with some Pakistani families living in United Kingdom (Harris & Shaw, 
2006: 269–270). 
 
Public services offer little help in transnational caring, depending on the direction of caring: 
between the developed countries or between less and more developed countries (in terms of 
welfare state and social services). Transnational caring from a state that offers a wide variety 
of social services into a country where care policies and services are scarcely available, 
demonstrates the differences between countries in a very concrete and often negative way 
(Zechner, 2008). Since the direction of international migrants is often from less developed 
countries towards the more developed ones, this kind of a setting is not unusual. Migrant 
families who are aware that there are only few services available for those in need of care in 
the country of departure, provide economical and practical support across national borders 
as to compensate the lack of services (Baldassar et al. 2007; Zechner, 2007; 2008). The 
strength of filial piety has a role to play here as well and for example Chinese and Indian 
migrants living in United States at times choose to bring their older parents to live at least 
part of the year in US (see Lamb, 2002; Lan, 2002).  
 
A comprehensive service provision in the migrant’s country of residence may be of 
importance as well in transnational caring. When the care of children and elders residing in 
the same country with the migrant is arranged in a satisfactory way, the migrant is able to put 
more effort in transnational caregiving. Also individuals may gain insights from both countries 
regarding care provision and arrangements. For example in Finland and Norway children are 
all equally entitled to daycare services whether the parents are active on the labour market or 
not (Rantalaiho, 2010: page). This means that migrants outside the labour market can place 
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their children in public day care and dedicate their time for transnational care, if they wish. A 
study of Ukrainian immigrants in Germany on the other hand demonstrates how the German 
day care system, which often does not accept children younger than three years of age, may 
limit transnational caring possibilities of the parents. Working immigrant mothers have very 
few possibilities in fiding day care solutions for children under the age of three years 
(Amelina, 2009: 20, 25).  Having a well-functioning child care and schooling provision in the 
country of residence lessens the need for child-shifting. Child-shifting is a practice of shifting 
the responsibilities of childrearing between parents and other relatives, close friends, or 
neighbours. The shift may be permanent or temporary and it may last from few days to 
several years. With Caribbean families it usually occurs when parents are unable to take 
care of their children (Russell-Brown et al. 1996).  Children are left for example to 
grandmother when the mother migrates (Toro-Morn, 1995). Affordable and available day 
care services and schooling lessen the need for international moves motivated by child care 
(see Zontini, 2006).  
 
If parents are not content with the quality of the services or with the fact that children become 
socialized to the local mainstream culture, they may want to send their children abroad to be 
cared for or for schooling (see Toro-Morn, 1995; Orellana et al. 2001). Indian migrants in 
Australia also send children to India for extended holidays in order to learn about their 
ancestral culture (Voigt-Graf, 2005: 380). At times children are specifically sent abroad after 
high standard school services (see Harriss and Osella in this book). For example a number 
of Korean and Chinese parents have been sending their children to United States to attain 
local schools for the purpose of gaining later entrance to an American university. Children 
may reside either with a paid caretaker, in boarding homes or with locally residing relatives 
and friends (Zhou, 1998, Orellana et al. 2001). These children are often referred as 
parachute kids. Also Bangladeshi children are at times joined with their families and relatives 
residing in United Kingdom at early age so that they, especially boys, can benefit from the 
educational system. If biological mother of these children are unwilling or unable to move to 
Britain, children may be brought by co-wives of their mothers or other female relatives 
(Gardner, 2002: 126). As a reversed practise, certain group of Indian migrants in Australia 
have a habit of sending their children to be raised by the grandparents in South India (Voigt-
Graf, 2005: 373). 
 
Also older people may migrate after care services, so far mainly medical services are sought 
after in foreign countries. This activity evokes mainly temporary international mobility in the 
form of medical tourism, which typically refers to patients travelling abroad for surgical 
operations. Popular destinations for medical tourism include countries like Thailand, 
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Singapore, India and South Africa. The direction of movement in care migration and medical 
tourism is from more to less affluent countries (Connell, 2006; Kröger & Zechner, 2009). 
These examples that go beyond public policies show that child and elder care services, 
public or market-based, are influential in international moves and in transnational activities. 
 
 
Employment creation 
 
The rationale behind incentives towards care employment creation is that when individuals 
employ somebody to do care work or buy care services from the market, the demand for 
public services diminishes. In addition any state is eager to increase the number of people in 
employment. It may also be so that supporting employment creation is cheaper for the public 
purse than offering public care services which often are heavily subsidised by the public 
monies or they are free of charge. For example in 2007 in public Finnish elder care customer 
fees covered about 16 per cent of nursing home expenses and 14 per cent of the home care 
expenses (Sjöholm, 2009). 
 
One obvious reason for employment creation is that labour market activity brings tax 
revenues usually only if the work is performed within the national borders. The policy means 
to create employment in the care work sector are mainly cash benefits, tax deductions and 
vouchers. Tax deductions often allow lower social charges for employing somebody to do the 
work. Vouchers on the other hand cover either completely or partially the costs of buying 
services. Also cash benefits may be used to cover the costs of employing somebody but I will 
cover the issue of cash benefits later under the heading of monetary benefits. 
 
In France subsidised childminders, allowances and tax deductions are widely used tools of 
family policies. An allowance is paid to families with children under six years of age and who 
are cared for at the home of a registered childminder. Another allowance is paid to families 
employing nannies to look after their children in the family home. In addition, parents may 
deduct half of the costs incurred from their income tax and as a result up to 70 per cent of the 
total cost of child care may be covered with these benefits and deductions. Families, who 
employ someone to look after their children after school or on Wednesdays when there is no 
school, may claim tax deductions with a pre-financed voucher to simplify formalities when 
employing home help services (Pailhé et al. 2008: 153–154). 
 
Since taxation is predominantly national, vouchers usable in the domestic markets and 
support employing a childminder or a nanny is mainly for hiring them in the country of 
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residence, policy responses that aim at employment creation in the care work sector give 
little help in transnational caregiving. They may be useful in arranging care in the country of 
residence and hence give space for transnational care activities indirectly. 
 
 
Time for care 
 
The main forms of employment-related provision for care consist of leaves and adjusted 
working hours. Choosing part-time work for care reasons (done mainly by women) can be 
considered as an individual choice, even if restrained by policy responses such as 
unavailability of full-time day care for children. Still, for example in Sweden and Norway 
parents have the possibility to take part-time parental leaves. In Austria parents may after 
fulfilling certain requirements, work part-time and have flexible working hours until the child 
turns seven (Kreimer, 2006: 144). Care policies thus may have a profound effect on the 
working time of the parents. In Sweden parents may use parental leaves until the child turns 
eight whereas in Norway leaves are to be used by the time the child turns three (Rantalaiho, 
2010: page). 
 
The majority of European countries offer care leaves for parents with young children (Bettio 
& Plantega, 2004: 91). European Union has been driving this development from early on and 
in 1996 a directive on parental leave gained legal force (Hall, 1998). The incentive for elder 
care leaves has been much less vigorous and generally only short term breaks from 
employment are offered for elder care purposes. Sweden with 60 days and Denmark with 
three months offer longest periods of leaves at times of an adult relative facing a severe 
illness (Bettio & Plantega, 2004: 96). In United Kingdom as well as in Finland there is no 
specific provision for leave for carers of adults, only unpaid leave for temporary emergencies 
(Himmelweit, 2008: 357; Zechner, 2010: page).  It means that contrary to child care, time for 
long-term elder care is not generally being offered for employed individuals. 
 
Time for care would be a valuable asset in transnational care since in many cases the 
distances between the carers and those in need of care are long. Anyhow this is not always 
the case since many persistent patterns of international migration take place between 
neighbouring countries such as from Mexico to USA and from Poland to Germany.  
 
Notwithstanding the lengths of distances, time is an essential resource in care since giving 
care means doing something for somebody who can not do it for him of herself. Especially 
personal care, such as helping with dressing up, bathing, eating, moving and personal 
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hygiene is not possible from a distance. Personal care thus demands that people are in a 
same place at the same time. Other types of care and assistance are possible from afield. 
For example sending money or goods, giving emotional support, organising services or other 
kind of help is possible from afar. There is still one kind of care-related activity that may not 
be done from a distance, but does do not require that the care receiver and the care giver 
are present at the same time. For example cleaning, shopping, cooking and going to the 
bank or library are these kinds of activities. Here child and elder care differ greatly since 
young children usually require constant attendance while elders often are able to stay alone 
for longer periods of time, depending on the care needs they have. On the other hand young 
children are many times easier to take along when running errands than older people who 
may have difficulties with their mobility. 
 
All of the above mentioned activities that can be part of care require time. Care leaves, 
especially if they come with an allowance, allow people to use time for organising and giving 
care transnationally. If leaves come with monetary benefits, they can also help to cover the 
costs of care. The money can be used for buying services, either from the formal or 
undeclared market. Also friends, neighbours and relatives can be reimbursed for their care 
activities. Person using the leave can use the benefit to visit the care receivers abroad, 
providing that travel is not prohibited due to passport or visa requirements or due to political 
or other instabilities of the countries. Depending on the citizenship of the traveller, people 
have different possibilities to enter countries. Generally citizens of Western countries have 
better access to majority of countries than citizens from countries in Africa, Asia or Middle-
East. In addition return to the country of residence may be a risk for refugees and especially 
for immigrants without required permits (Baldassar et al. 2007: 181–183). 
 
Full-time care leaves give more flexibility for transnational caregivers than shortened working 
hours or part-time work. Shorter hours may also be used for similar purposes, for making 
extended weekend visits if the distance between the care receiver and the care giver are not 
too long. Nordic countries offer longer periods of child care leaves and higher levels of 
compensation than most of the other European welfare states (Himmelweit, 2008) giving 
implicitly stronger support to transnational caring as well. 
 
Like many other benefits, care leaves may not be very easily transferred to abroad. When 
the right for leave has been gained, restrictions for travelling abroad are not very common. 
For example Norwegian mothers who are on maternity or on parental leave and who have 
parents or parent-in-laws residing in the Sun Belt of Southern Europe have spent longer 
periods of time with the grandparents abroad. The arrangement is temporary and may be of 
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mutual benefit so that mothers receive help with child care and grandparents are assisted by 
the mother of children. 
 
 
Monetary benefits 
 
Cash benefits have become increasingly common in Europe as a policy response especially 
in elder care. For example Austria, Germany, England and the Netherlands have introduced 
direct payments and/or individual budgets. These are to some extent replacing directly 
provided public services for children and older people needing care. Money is a flexible 
benefit since it can be used in a variety of ways. The negative effect is that it also contributes 
to feminisation of care work as well as creation of low paid care work occupations often at 
the undeclared labour market. In addition care work tends to become less professionalized. 
 
Many cash benefits include restrictions on the use of it. For example there are differences 
between these schemes in relation to whether or not they allow the payment of migrant care 
workers and co-resident relatives (Ungerson, 2004:190). Cash benefits to child care are paid 
to parents, but for elder care they may be paid either to the person in need of care or to the 
one who is giving care. Child benefits are not specifically paid for care purposes, but they are 
an example of a universal and non means-tested monetary benefit paid in many European 
countries such as Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Netherlands and United Kingdom 
(Björnberg, 2006: 93–94). Cash benefits for child care are paid for example in Finland and in 
Norway. In both countries the main requirement besides being covered by the social 
insurance system and having a child under three is the non-use of public day care facilities. 
The benefit is accompanied with an optional leave and the money may be used freely 
(Rantalaiho, 2010: page). The Norwegian cash benefit for child care may be exported. The 
requirement is that one of the parents lives and works in Norway, pays taxes and social 
insurance fees. The other parent and the child under three may be living outside Norway but 
within the European Economic Area. The child ought not to be in a publicly provided child 
care facility and be under three. The number of beneficiaries is small, but increasing. In 2008 
there were 700 beneficiaries of this exported benefit outside Norway. Majority of them reside 
in the new European Union countries, mainly in Poland (Bjørnstad & Ellingsen, 2008: 24–26).  
 
This is one of the very rare benefits that explicitly support transnational care of immigrant 
family members. The residence and employment of an immigrant in a developed welfare 
state gives eligibility to a benefit that may be used for child care in the country of departure. 
In Finland the cash benefit for child home care is understood as a reward for not using 
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publicly organised day care services to which parents with children under school age have a 
subjective right. Still, the European Court of Justice has decided in 2002 that Finland is 
obliged under certain conditions to pay the benefit for family members abroad (Ministry for 
Health and Social Services, 2002). For example when a Finnish company sends employees 
abroad or when an employee comes to Finland to work from another EU or EEA country. 
The court case demonstrates that at times transnational families shape care policies and 
their application through official means. 
 
In United Kingdom a Working Tax Credit may provide up to 80 per cent of childcare costs to 
low- and middle-income lone parents in employment and dual-earner couples (Himmelweit, 
2008, 362). It is possible to apply Working Tax Credit also when the child lives outside UK. 
The prerequisite is that the parents come from a country in the European Economic Area 
(EEA) and are working, or are actively looking for work, in the United Kingdom (HM Revenue 
and Customs). 
 
For elder care purposes Italian care allowances are paid to the elderly in need of care 
according to the invalidity of the person. In Austria the level of benefit is tied to the number of 
hours for which help is needed (Kreimer, 2006: 147). It is not very likely that a person with 
high level of invalidity can give care transnationally or use the money for arranging 
transnational care. To receive the benefit the level of invalidity must be high but there is no 
means-testing (Österle & Hammer, 2007: 16–17; Gori, 2000: 262–263). Elders receiving the 
benefit can of course give economic support to caregiving children residing abroad. In 
Austria, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and USA cash allowances for people with 
disabilities to spend on employing carers directly come with little regulation (Glendinning, 
2006: 131; Himmelweit, 2008: 363). They tend to boost grey economy mainly consisting of 
immigrant care workers. For example in United Kingdom there is minimal regulation on the 
employment of personal carers (Himmelweit, 2008: 363). In Holland instead the personal 
budget holders have to make formal contracts with their employees and adhere to 
regulations concerning wage levels, social security charges and taxation (Glendinning, 2006: 
131). A common problem with these cash benefits is that their levels tend to be fairly low. If 
paid to the person in need of care, the levels are not equivalent to the costs of institutional 
care or home care services. When the benefits are paid to the carers, they often fail to 
secure adequate standard of living and they do not compensate the effort that caregivers put 
to care work (Glendinning, 2006:133–134). 
 
The direction of intergenerational transfers is usually from older generations to younger 
generations. It seems that when older parents live in different country, at least in France, the 
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flow is almost as common the other way around: migrant children paying remittances to their 
parents, especially if parents live in a developing country. The reason to send remittances to 
parents is generally parents’ lack of economic resources (Attias-Donfut & Wolff, 2008: 267). 
For example in Cape Verde, older women whose children have migrated abroad and who do 
not have an income, take it for granted that their children send them money (Åkesson, 2007: 
102). It is thus possible that Cape Verdean women with young children in developed welfare 
state may use cash benefits that are destined for child care, also for supporting their parents 
in the country of departure. 
 
Money can be used for travelling as well as for buying services and assistance. Often 
monetary benefits are received only after a strict needs or means testing. Also the use of 
these benefits may be restricted or controlled in various ways. Finnish carer’s allowance for 
example requires a written contract between the carer and the municipality paying the 
benefit. Care performed by the carer is described in the contract in detail. In contrast, the 
Finnish as well as the Norwegian child care allowance is free to be used as the beneficiary 
wishes (Zechner, 2010; Rantalaiho, 2010). In addition recipients are entitled to a leave that 
may be extended until the child turns three. Together the fairly long period of leave and the 
cash that may be used freely give parents of young children resources that are possible to be 
used for transnational caregiving even though this is not necessarily the original aim of the 
benefit. 
 
In developed welfare states old age pension systems have secured the economic situation of 
elders and they have changed the circulation of private economic support from parents to 
children (Attias-Donfut & Wolff, 2008: 282). The direction of private transfers flows in the 
opposite direction of public transfers of the welfare states (Kohli, 1999). In Sweden on the 
other hand, immigrants from Africa, Asia and Latin America give more often economic 
support to members of older generations than Swedish-born residents in Sweden (Björnberg 
& Ekbrand, 2008: 254). 
 
In Germany, the middle generation of migrants give their parents more often economical 
support than non-migrants of the same generation. Non-migrants in the same position give 
much more practical help than economical help to their parents. The reason for migrants 
giving so much economical support is distance. When elders live in another country, 
migrants are not able to give much practical help. Money substitutes practical help and it may 
be also given to siblings living near the elders and actually caring for the parents. Also 
migrants in Germany are mostly from less well-off countries and parents living in these 
countries need remittances (Baykara-Krumme, 2008: 298–299). Some Indian parents whose 
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adult children are residing in US feel that they have invested in their children and by moving 
to or close to them from India, the elders are able to reap the rewards of their investment. 
Children also are given a possibility to reciprocate towards their parents (Lamb, 2002: 307). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Care policies offer people time, services and money for child and elder care. Care policies 
are national but a vast body of research has documented that people use the benefits 
policies allow also for transnational caring activities. This does not necessarily mean that 
they are being used for purposes not intended. Instead getting support with care activities in 
the migrant’s country of residence may also be helpful in giving care transnationally to close 
ones in the country of departure. Similarly comprehensive care policies in the country of 
departure also support care given transnationally. 
 
On the whole, monetary benefits seem most useful in transnational care. Cash may be used 
for visiting the care recipients, paying for the travels of those in need of care, buying services 
or help and other care-related goods such as assisting devices. Time in addition to money is 
a valuable asset in care, since care work is very time consuming. In transnational care time 
is not only needed for actual care work, but also for travels covering the distance between 
the carer and the care receiver.  
 
Caring across national borders may face obstacles due to travel restrictions. Visa and 
resident permit requirements are the most common ones. In addition political instability and 
natural disasters may make transnational caring more complex. Transnational caring 
includes short or temporary visits but not permanently intended relocations. Being a 
beneficiary to social insurance benefits such as unemployment or sickness benefits may also 
restrict the possibilities to international travel (Baldassar et al. 2007: 187; Zechner, 2008: 39). 
These kinds of benefits are generally not easily transferable, even within the EU. 
 
People who have stayed behind often interpret the support that migrants give or fail to give 
as a sign of whether they care or not about those who have stayed behind (Åkesson, 2007: 
107). Many of those who do not migrate, especially in the least developed countries, are 
dependent on the people, money, know-how and other resources that are far away from 
them (Åkesson, 2007: 93). The relations between migrants and those who have stayed in the 
country of departure are often asymmetric. Although social change has been detected for 
example amongst Chinese migrants in Tokyo who have older relatives in Shanghai. Older 
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parents have become more independent in terms of residency and retirement resources and 
generations are growing away from the previously intensive and exclusive self-help 
approaches (Izuhara, 2010b: 92, see also Huttunen in this book). Still, from the point of view 
of those who have stayed in the country of origin, the initiative for caring activities lies often in 
the hands of the migrants. When they can call, visit, send money and organise help (Åkeson, 
2007: 111). Migrants on the other hand may feel that they have been forced to 
transnationalism. They have to keep contact and maintain relations to the members of kin the 
country of departure (Al-Ali et al. 2001).  
 
Transnational caring activities of individuals have so far shaped national care policies only 
minimally. A distinct example is the establishment of Norwegian nursing homes in the 
Spanish coastal region. Since the scope of transnational caring will be likely to increase in 
the future, it is likely that new pressure groups that aim to change care policies so that they 
support transnational caring as well will emerge. The European Union court case concerning 
the payment of Finnish cash benefit for child home care shows that transnational actors 
actively shape the national policies that seldom take transnational practices into account. 
Also Norwegian elders in the Spanish coastal area have actively been working to shape the 
policies to better fit with transnational patterns of life. 
 
In certain countries there are fairly generous cash benefits for care with minimal or no 
regulation of how the recipients use them. These kinds of benefits allow most room for 
transnational caring since the money is freely usable. The Finnish and Norwegian cash 
benefits for child care where parents are entitled to a leave are prime examples of care 
benefits that give support for transnational caring allowing time and cash for parents to be 
used for arranging care transnationally either for children or elders living elsewhere. These 
benefits are also to some extend transferable within EU countries at least. 
 
Austrian and Italian cash benefits for older persons with disabilities may also be used for 
transnational caring. Although the beneficiaries themselves are not very likely to be able to 
do such activity. Therefore they support transnational care only if the money is circulated to 
those with abilities to give and arrange transnational care, such as migrated adult children of 
beneficiaries. The increasing emphasis on choice that has been given on care policy 
changes, when driven by means of cash benefits, is a trend that gives space for 
transnational caring activities. It has been estimated that since 1990’s in both child and elder 
care cash benefits have been increasingly used in care policies (Yeandle & Ungerson, 2007: 
2). If this continues to be the trend in the future as well, it means more possibilities for those 
involved in transnational care, even though the levels of benefits are not likely to increase. It 
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is possible that since majority of cash benefits are not intended for transnational caring, there 
will be more monitoring on how they are used in order to prevent them being used for 
transnational caring. Also from the welfare state point of view the proliferation of cash 
benefits is not positive since it may hamper the development of care services. Cash benefits 
also tend to pull women from the labour market, or to create a pool of low-paid female care 
workers in working precarious circumstances. Since a majority of the beneficiaries of cash 
benefits are women the responsibility of ensuring appropriate care arrangements rest 
proportionally on women as elders in need of care, as daughters of these elders and as 
mothers in the case of children. 
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Chapter 11 
Emplacement through Family Life: 
Transformations of Intimate Relations 
Laura Huttunen 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Each transnational social field or formation has its own particular history of emergence. 
There are those which grow from refugee exoduses, others that grow from labour migration 
or business enterprises (Cohen 1997; Van Hear 1998). Each history includes its own 
particular dynamics of interrelated institutions and their interactions; e.g. those who move as 
refugees encounter a different set of institutions than those who migrate as skilled 
professionals. In order to understand changing patterns of social life in transnational fields, 
we should look at the dynamic interplay between relevant institutional forms in each 
particular transnational context. There is one institution, however, that touches all migrants, 
irrespective of their reasons for migrating: practically everybody is connected, in one way or 
another, to the institution of family.57 
 
In this article I consider the ways in which transnational migrants seek to emplace their lives, 
and how various institutions shape the process of emplacement. My focus is on family as an 
institution for shaping every-day life emplacement (see also Vertovec 2009: 61-64; Rubel & 
Rosman 2009). There are other relationships, such as collegial and neighbourhood relations 
as well as friendship relations that may be important for processes of emplacement, but 
those relations are not institutionalised to the extent that families are; neither are they 
recognised by state institutions (or others) in similar ways. As Faist and Reisenauer point out 
in the introduction, institutions “denote regular social interactions between individual or 
collective actors” and are “are guided by reciprocal expectations concerning specific rules 
based on values and norms” (xx), moreover they are “relatively permanent social constructs 
that influence social behaviour” (xx); in this sense family is clearly the most institutionalized 
form of social relations on the every-day life level.  
                                               
57
 Those without any actual family members –such as orphaned children - are defined, in many contexts, through 
this very lack of family connections, which foregrounds the social and cultural significance of the family institution. 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 237 
 
Family life is embedded in social and political structures shaped by other institutions such as 
states and international migration management. Within the scope of this article I will refer 
only briefly to the frames provided by such institutions, and the ways in which they interact 
with the institution of family. 
 
To make the discussion of families more concrete, I will give empirical examples of my own 
ethnographic research among Bosnians living between Finland and Bosnia- Herzegovina 
(hereafter Bosnia)58. Unlike in neighbouring Sweden, there were no labour migrants from 
former Yugoslavia in Finland; practically all Bosnians in Finland came there as refugees 
during or soon after the war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. Most of them are of Bosnian 
Muslim/ Bosniak background, or or with mixed background. They constitute a rather small 
community in Finland, about 2900 people, dispersed to different localities in Finland. As the 
community was formed as a consequence of forceful expulsion from their country of origin, 
ideas of return there have been rather strong among the community members. But recovery 
from the devastation of the war, both politically and economically, has been rather slow, and 
consequently many refugees have decided to stay in their new countries of settlement while 
recreating connections with the post-war Bosnian society. 
 
This is, of course, only one particular case, and I do not mean it as a case representative of 
all families within transnational fields. In order to enrich the discussion, I will refer to other 
cases found in research literature. My point is to argue, through these examples, that families 
are flexible institutions that both shape processes of emplacement, and are simultaneously 
shaped by them. Each example needs to be understood in its specific social and historical 
context. 
 
I will first briefly discuss my choice of conceptual framework, especially my understanding of 
‘integration’ and ‘emplacement’ in relation to transnational movement. Then I will discuss 
‘family’ as a concept in relation to such movement. After that I will look more closely at 
various aspects of family life and family transformations through empirical examples. I will 
                                               
58
 Between 2001 and 2006, I have conducted periodic ethnographic research among Bosnian diaspora, 
especially on transnational relations between Finland and Bosnia-Herzegovina. My actual fieldsites are located 
both in Finland and in Bosnia. For more information, see Huttunen 2005; 2007; 2009a & b; 2010. 
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close the article by discussing some implications of my arguments for current debates about 
multiculturalism.  
 
 
Conceptual frames: From integration to emplacement 
 
Migration, for whatever reason, necessarily complicates migrants’ relationship to space and 
place. Michel de Certeau suggests that the best way to understand space is to think it 
through spacilaized practices; relevant space is practiced space (de Certeau 1986).  The 
lived or practiced space for migrants is created through practical engagements that may 
straddle long geographic distances. In most cases these are between two localities (cf. 
Guarnizo & Smith 1998), but they also may encompass more complex webs of localities. 
Such practical engagements to various places are often mediated through family structures. 
 
Both policy makers and researchers within various disciplines have tried to capture the social 
processes related to migration flows through different conceptual frameworks. Transborder 
migrants’ relationship to countries of origin and new countries of settlement figure importantly 
in these formulations. ‘Integration’ is a concept widely used both by researchers (e.g. Delle 
Donne 1995; Carmon 1996; Valtonen 1998) and policy makers. It is often understood as a 
structural relationship between immigrant individual and the larger host society. An integrated 
individual becomes incorporated into the new society, ideally as an equal member (see e.g  
Vasta, 2007: 717-719).  
 
‘Integration’ is mostly used in describing migrants’ relationship to the new country of 
settlement, and as such points to several important issues.  Equality and inequality, entry into 
the labour market and education, racism and discrimination, processes of incorporation as 
well as migrants’ own resources for relating to new environments are often addressed within 
the frame of integration. There is also a substantial body of literature addressing problems of 
integration as well as the processes of migrant inclusion and exclusion (e.g. Stolcke 1995; 
Vasta 2007; Pardo 2009; Wise & Velayutham 2009) 
 
From the transnational point of view, however, some questions arise: where is one integrated 
to? Are there inherent tensions between ‘integration’ to new host societies and sustained 
relationships to countries of origin and/or larger diasporas (cf. Vertovec, 2009: 77-84). When 
using ‘transnational optic’ (Faist & Reisenauer, this volume) one may argue that ‘integration’ 
as a concept often produces rather localized understanding of important relationships. The 
focus is on relationships within the new country of settlement, while other relations and 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 239 
practices, those that cut across nation state borders and connect with the country of origin 
(and other places) are often left out. Many empirical studies suggest that some form of 
integration to the new countries of settlement and sustained transnational relations do not 
exclude each other; these should rather be seen as intertwined mutual processes (e.g. Levitt 
2003; Smith 2006; Vertovec 2009) 
 
‘Belonging’, another rather popular concept in migration literature, emphasises migrants own 
point of view, and refers to the ways in which migrants identify with places and social milieus. 
It is often framed as ‘a sense of belonging’ (e.g. Vuorela 2009). Such a formulation directs 
our attention to the multiple ways in which belonging is socially negotiated, and not 
understood just as a ‘feeling’. We may also have a sense of belonging to several places 
simultaneously, which is helpful when studying life within transnational fields. 
 
‘Emplacement’ resembles belonging as a concept in many ways. Feld & Basso define 
emplacement as  “the way in which people  encounter places, and invest them with meaning” 
(ref. Jansen & Löfving, 2009: 12). But, as Jansen and Löfving point out, emplacement should 
not be understood simply as the capacity of the individual. 
I understand emplacement, together with Jansen & Löfving (2009) as “the point where 
subjects’ capacities to put themselves and others into place articulate with the power 
relations that unequally distribute this capacity” (p. 13). Emplacement as a concept allows us 
to look at migrants’ relations to several places within transnational social fields 
simultaneously. Jansen and Löfving’s formulation points also to the importance of looking at 
power relations that organize processes of emplacement; emplacement is understood here 
as a process where migrants’ own agency intertwines with structuring elements and 
organizing power relations, i.e. institutional formations. If ‘integration’ is understood as a 
policy concept promoting certain forms of relating with the new country of settlement, 
‘emplacement’ as a concept enables us to analyze, without normative expectations, the 
processes of making (and remaking) social space in both the country of origin and the new 
country of settlement, through various institutional formations.  
 
In this article I take the concept of ‘emplacement’ as the most fruitful one to capture 
dynamics and nuances of relationships to place on the everyday life level. It is important to 
recognize the interdependence of emplacement to various locations within the transnational 
space: one’s relationship to a new place of residence is necessarily interdependent with the 
relationship to the place of origin. There is a dialectical tension between these two: difficulties 
to forge a meaningful social position in the country of settlement may produce stronger 
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orientation towards the country of origin, while unfavourable developments in the country of 
origin may encourage stronger engagement in the country of settlement.  
 
Moreover, emplacement should be understood as a dynamic process: migrants’ relationships 
to places change over time, in response changing social, political and cultural contexts in all 
locations that are significant in their personal lives. In the following I will look at the ways in 
which families figure in processes of emplacement. 
 
 
Families  in transnational social fields 
 
Deborah Bryceson and Ulla Vuorela (2002: 3) define ‘transntaional families’ as “families that 
live some or most of the time separated from each other, yet hold together and create 
something that can be seen as a feeling of collective welfare and unity, namely ‘familyhood’, 
even across national borders.” In this understanding, families become transnational through 
spatial separation. This very separation may be understood in some cases as a strategy for 
emplacement in new environments and for pooling family resources, while in other cases the 
separation is a result of coercive politics and inadequate living conditions in original locality. 
Often it is the combination of these all. 
 
Family as such is a culturally defined and polymorphous concept. Some forms of family life, 
such as same-sex couples, are not necessarily recognized by the state authorities, and in 
such cases even more creative practices of family life emerge. The boundary between family 
and larger kin group is flexible and negotiated in changing contexts. If ‘family’ is understood 
as the nuclear family, there are also migrant families that are not transnational in Bryceson 
and Vuorela’s sense: they migrate together and continue to live as a unit in one locality. But 
they do engage in cross-border social networks that shape their processes of emplacement 
to a significant extent. Both ‘transnational families’ and families engaged in transnational 
practices are fruitful conceptions for analysing emplacement within transnational social fields 
(cf. Rubel & Rosman 2009). 
 
The Bosnian families that I encountered during my research project fitted both categories: 
there were nuclear families that had migrated as a family to Finland, but who maintained 
rather close ties with relatives in Bosnia and elsewhere in diaspora, and there were families 
that were dispersed by the exile, but which still maintaided family ties across nation state 
border. To some extent, this is a question of definition: migrants’ own understanding of their 
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‘immediate families’ did not necessarily coincide with official definitions af family, a point to 
which I will return below.  
 
A big part of transnational family practices may be characterized as ‘forced transnationalism’ 
(Al-Ali & Koser 2002);  when people are not able to conduct more localized family life, often 
due to restrictive state policies, they are forced to keep up their family ties across nation state 
borders. Some other cases of dispersed families result from strategic considerations of 
seeking better opportunities and pooling family resources (e.g. Ong 1999; Eastmond  2006a 
& b). The former was often the case with my Bosnian informants: when they were not able to 
bring to Finland all their family members, due to restrictive family unification policies, they 
were forced to create forms of relating across nation state borders. In such processes, the 
institution of family is necessarily set in flux. Simultaneously, such forms of relating forge 
intimate relationships to several geographic locations, i.e. to all those localities where family 
members live. In the Bosnian case this meant, most often, recreating or strengthening ties 
with the country of origin while living in Finland, but sometimes it meant also relating to other 
places is diaspora where family members had settled59. 
 
In the world characterized by what Aihwa Ong calls ‘flexible accumulation’ in late global 
capitalism (1999) with concomitant insecurities and upheavals, families and kinship networks 
provide the ultimate safety network for many people. Migratory groups, often with uncertain 
and limited access to state provided welfare systems both in their countries of origin and in 
their new countries of settlement, rely often heavily on their families for both economic and 
emotional safety. These realities explain partly the enduring importance of family institutions. 
In such circumstances, people often devote their efforts to ‘family welfare projects’ rather 
than larger political schemes, be they refugee families with lived experiences of loss and 
ultimate insecurity (Eastmond 1998, 2006 a & b) or enterprising business class seeking 
possibilities for accumulation (Ong1999). 
 
                                               
59
 My Bosnian informants had family members scattered to many Western European countries, such as Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Austria, as well as to the United States and Australia. Some 
these places could rather easily be visited from Finland, especially Sweden, while others are more difficult to 
reach. In those cases, family members were most often met while visiting Bosnia.  
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Family is also the institution that regulates effectively individual’s emotional life (Chamberlain 
2009). This is at the heart of families’ ability emplace. Social and economic articulate with the 
intimate and emotional in family life, producing powerful configurations. 
 
Families are the sites where relations to new countries of settlement are negotiated at the 
most immediate level, in everyday life practices. Simultaneously relationships to countries of 
origin are often negotiated in/ through family life, (as well as relations to other significant 
locations). But families as institutions structure the flow of every-day life: there are often 
gendered and generational expectations concerning family members. Such expectations, 
however, are often set in flux when families migrate. There is always a tension between 
family as a structuring institution and family as a process evolving in time. 
 
 
Families as structuring institutions 
 
Anthropological research attests to the fact that there are different ways to understand and 
live family and kinship (e.g. Carsten 2000 & 2004; Stone 2001). Families as institutions, 
however, always entail normative expectations concerning relationships between family 
members and modes of conduct towards each other. One could argue that the culturally 
shaped family formations are significant vehicles for transferring cultural patterns from 
countries of origin to new countries of settlement. Ways of structuring family relations 
embody cultural understandings which are carried across transnational space, but they often 
get transformed along the way. (e.g. Werbner 1990; Ong 1999). 
 
Expectations to take care of family members, especially of children, of the elderly and those 
in special need are, in most cases, at the heart of family formations. Such normative 
expectations effectively keep family ties alive across geographical distances in migratory 
situations. The ways in which the expectations are met, or not met, vary from case to case. 
In most cases, however, welfare state policies in receiving countries do not recognize 
obligations to family members living in countries of origin (or elsewhere outside the state in 
question). 
 
Labour migration has, for a long time, created dispersed families held together by 
expectations of care-giving across distances. As a consequence, there are different modes 
of ‘long-distance parenting’ (see e.g. Hochschild 2003; Vertovec 2009: 61-64), as well as 
modes of taking care of the elderly left behind in countries of origin (Izuhara & Shibata 2002; 
Zechner  2008). Sending remittances to countries of origin, a practice that has grown to have 
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significant societal importance in many post-conflict and refugee-sending countries, is fuelled 
in most cases by normative expectations to support family members. 
 
Among the Bosnian diaspora, meeting such expectations meant, in its simplest form, that 
family members living in Western European countries send money and goods regularly to 
their relatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina – a country that in the post-1995 period is lacking state 
provided welfare systems (see e.g. Jansen 2007). Especially elderly people are dependent 
on their children living outside of Bosnia for basic maintenance; similarly unemployment as 
well as sickness may produce situations of dependency. Such practices recreate and 
maintain familial bonds, while they simultaneously transform them. Regular remittances from 
Western Europe to relatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina create modes of dependency and new 
hierarchies of power among family members, as well as tensions and grievances. While 
those within Bosnia, depending on money sent by their relatives may resent their 
dependency, those obliged by normative expectations to keep on sending money, may 
resent the continuous financial burden (Huttunen 2010). 
 
Such complex patterns of mutual dependence highlight the limitations of the concept of 
integration. While many of my Bosnian informants in Finland were rather well integrated in 
the conventional sense, as they speak good Finnish and are employed in rather well paying 
industrial jobs, their life is complicated by their relationships with Bosnia. Their original strong 
will to return to Bosnia as soon as the conflict there would calm down was suppressed, first 
by the slowness of the recovery from the war in Bosnia; later the continuous dependency of 
relatives in Bosnia on their remittances made such considerations difficult for many. While 
their personal histories and kin relations, as well as inherited property in some cases (see 
below), ties them back to Bosnia, actual means for making a decent living for themselves, 
their children as well as for larger family and kin circle, keeps them in Finland. At the same 
time, many relatives in Bosnia would be willing to leave for Western Europe to improve their 
situation, but current restrictive immigration policies towards non-EU citizens makes it difficult 
for them even to get a tourist visa, let alone work permit (see e.g. Jansen 2009). Thus, family 
members who ended up on different sides of the EU border during the Bosnian war 
encounter powerful institutional structures that radically shape their life trajectories. Intimate 
relations are negotiated over such dividing lines. 
 
Families and kinship as organized cultural systems emplace men and women differently. 
Empirical research describes certain cultural systems that produce mobile men and 
sedentary women: in some cases men move in transnational space while women and 
children lead more localized lives either in the country of origin or in the country of settlement 
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(e.g. Ong 1999; Juntunen 2002) But there are other social systems that produce 
transnationally mobile female subjects while men tend to stay behind, such as the Philippines 
(e.g. Margold 2004) and contemporary Russia (e.g. Tiaynen 2008). Careful contextual 
analysis of the gendered cultural logics embodied in kinship and family practices in each 
case may shed light on the dynamic emergence of particular transnational fields: such 
analysis may help us understand why there are more migrant men than women form some 
places and vice versa from others. 
 
Cultural understandings of ‘proper families’ or ‘proper family life’ are partly encoded in 
practices of inheritance. Such practices are very concrete ways of forging relationships to 
place. Inheriting a house or land in the country of origin works as an anchorage when 
migrating (Fog Olwig 1997; Huttunen 2009a). In many cases, patterns of inheritance are 
gendered. My own research among Bosnian diaspora between Finland and Bosnia-
Herzegovina has shown how such gendered patterns of inheritance influence considerations 
over return to Bosnia, and how they create tensions within families. In rural Bosnia, as in 
many others places, sons traditionally inherit the family houses from their fathers, and they 
bring their wives to these houses and households (Bringa 1995). As a consequence, men 
seem to be much more eager, at least in principle, to return to Bosnia than women. Men’s 
ownership of houses ties them more concretely back to their countries of origin and local 
communities there, while women seek emplacement in new countries of settlement through 
employment and bringing up children (Huttunen 2009a; on gender in Bosnian diaspora, see 
also Al-Ali 2002a; Jansen 2008).  
 
The example above suggests, however, the flexible and negotiated nature of gender 
relations within families. Migration sets gender relations necessarily into flux: men and 
women have to renegotiate their relationships in new circumstances, when such crucial 
practical matters as employment and child care may be organized in totally different way 
from the country of origin (see also Vertovec 2009: 64-66).  
 
Generation is another common structuring element within families. Parental authority over 
their children is an almost universally recognised phenomenon, even if the nature and extent 
of the authority, as well as the forms of showing respect to elders and parents, varies 
culturally and contextually. 
 
Research literature widely attest to the fact that in families that migrate parents’ authority is 
often contested (e.g. Merolla 2002; Timera 2002; Levitt and Waters 2002). The simple fact 
that children growing up in new countries of settlement learn the local languages as well as 
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the nuanced norms of conduct much quicker than their parents often undermines parental 
authority. Such embodied knowledge also ‘emplaces’ children differently from their parents in 
relation to the new country of settlement. Inter-generational tensions within migrant families 
are sometimes discussed as a problem of integration. In a transnational framing these may 
be understood also as generationally differentiated modes of emplacement within families. 
Simultaneously they implicate ongoing transformations within migrant families. 
 
This leads to a new set of questions: how does the ‘second generation’ build relationships to 
their parents’ countries of origin? (Fisher 1986) The ‘second generation’ is an emerging field 
of inquiry within transnational studies (Levitt and Waters 2002, also Cole & Durham 2007). 
 
 
“Relativizing”: Kinship and family as processes and strategies 
 
As the discussion above already suggests, families as structuring institutions should not be 
understood as static unchanging forms. Anthropological literature on kinship since 1990’s 
has emphasized that kinship should be understood as a process rather than simply as a 
structure: people actively live and make kinship within culturally regulated domains (e.g. 
Carsten 2000 & 2004). When discussing families in transnational context Deborah Bryceson  
and Ulla Vuorela coin the term relativizing  to describe “the variety of ways individuals 
establish, maintain and curtail relational ties with specific family members” (Bryceson & 
Vuorela 2002, 14), thus referring to such dynamic understanding of kinship. 
 
This definition points to the fact that family and kinship relations are not something simply 
given, but something that people actively mould and negotiate: some relationships are more 
important than others. It is worth noticing that relationships may also be curtailed or 
altogether cut off or disconnected. Geographical distance puts pressure on relationships: 
maintaining them across nation state borders and long distances requires effort. 
Simultaneously cutting off some relationships may become easier than when leading more 
localized lives. Distance opens up new needs for investing in active relation building and 
maintenance on the one hand, and possibilities for manoeuvring and manipulating 
relationships on the other. 
 
To marry someone from the new country of settlement means forging a kinship or family 
relationship to that location. In some cases, such a marriage may be seen as a strategy for 
connecting oneself and one’s family to the location, as in most countries the state recognises 
marriage as a legitimate ground for residence. Practices of marital connecting are, however, 
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much more complex. Marriage is not only a legal, but also a social, cultural and emotional 
institution. 
 
Marriage with somebody from the new country of settlement connects one, in most cases, to 
local social networks in effective ways. Marriages with locals are often powerful vehicles for 
emplacing people to their new countries of settlement, as they open both legal, social, 
emotional and cultural worlds in new ways. Children born in these marriages affect the 
process of emplacement further. Marriages with locals open up the possibility for relativizing 
for the larger family group as well, forging new relations and opening up possibilities to 
tapping into new languages of belonging to the place. 
 
Many marriages, however, are contracted across nation state borders, within the 
transnational space. There are established practices for bringing brides from the countries of 
origin or arranging marriages across nation state borders among many migrant communities 
(e.g. Werbner 1990; Vuorela 2002; Rubel & Rosman 2009). Internet era has opened up new 
possibilities for finding partners within transnational social spaces (Schmidt 2004). Such 
practices keep the transnational space alive. Simultaneously, they create or recreate social 
relationships in the countries of origin. In some extreme cases, such as the Palestinian 
occupied territories, marrying someone from the country of origin may even work as a 
strategy for regaining (lost) rights of access to one’s country of origin (Isotalo 2005). Frontiers 
of ‘relativizing’ are multiple in the globalizing world of migration. 
 
Marriages across nation state borders are, however, heavily controlled by state functionaries. 
Even if marriage with a citizen is almost universally recognized as a warrant for residence, 
different nation states have various rules and regulations concerning cross-border marriages. 
There are also various practices that aim at testing the truthfulness or veraciousness of 
cross-border marriages: spouses are often subjected various techniques of interrogation, 
concerning intimate and personal matters. Moreover, various legal and financial documents 
are required, which creates inequalities between couples with varying class backgrounds. 
State functionaries retain power to decide over life trajectories of cross-border families to 
significant extents, and simultaneously state institution intrudes into the private sphere of 
conjugal relationships. 
 
Within the Bosnian community in Finland, during the period of my fieldwork, some marriages 
were contracted with local Finns, while the majority of marriages were contracted among 
Bosnians – either with Bosnians resident in Finland or with Bosnians from Bosnia. Especially 
young Bosnian men travelling to Bosnia for summer holidays formed relationships with young 
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local women and later brought them to Finland as wives. While marriages with local Finns 
opened up kinship networks in Finland, marriages with Bosnians from Bosnia forged new 
affinal relations in the country of origin, and often simultaneously created new familial 
obligations there. Obligations towards the Finnish kin seemed to be less demanding on 
financial terms, as the Finnish kin were rather affluent or at least taken care  of by local state 
provided welfare systems, while kin living in the ailing Bosnian economy were often in need 
of financial support.  
 
Marriages are not, of course, the only kinship relations that actively mould processes of 
emplacement. Also other family and kinship relations in transnational space are selectively 
enacted. There are relatives brought in to take care of children in new countries of settlement 
or to work in family businesses. There are elderly parents in countires of origin that are taken 
care of, or not taken care of  (Izuhara & Shibata 2002; Zechner 2008). There are siblings, 
cousins, nieces and nephews, aunts and uncles that may or may not be actively included in 
regular cross-border networks. The possibilities of such inclusions are regulated by state 
policies allowing certain practices and prohibiting or at least impeding others. All these 
relations mould the processes of emplacement, in relation to countries of origin, new 
countries of settlement as well as to possible other locations within each transnational social 
field. 
 
Kinship is not, however, the only idiom of making relations: friendship and collegial relations 
are other easily recognized sets of relationships that are important in processes of 
emplacement, both in local and transnational settings. E.g. youth groups in urban 
environments may be important for processes of emplacement in new countries of settlement 
for young people (Mayer 2009). On the other hand, retaining old friendships in countries of 
origin may be important forms of relating to that place. Friendships are not, however, 
institutionalized in the same way as kinship, and friendship relations are not recognized by 
state policies like kinship relations. Friendship opens up informal spaces for emplacement, 
rather than legal-official statuses to claim rights. The meaning of different forms of friendship 
is a rather understudied realm within migration and transnational studies. 
 
 
Policies of managing emplacement 
  
Family as an institution is always shaped by other institutions, the state being the most 
obvious. But transnational families are also shaped by international migration management. 
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Here, I will make some brief comments on the ways in which family life is intertwined with 
other institutional forms. 
 
The state institutions have, of course, the power to control entry to its territory, and to 
regulate legal residence there. And, as Aihwa Ong (1999) reminds us, states are also 
strategic actors in the era of global capitalism, and they change their policies to respond to 
changes in the global market place. In most Western European countries this means at the 
moment encouraging ‘work-related immigration’ and controlling other forms. Here the state’s 
power to regulate processes of emplacement is at its most obvious. 
 
As observed above, many transnational families are such exactly because of restrictive state 
policies denying the entry for some family members. In Western European countries, families 
are often defined as nuclear families in state legislation and in regulations concerning 
migrants’ right to family unification. In many cases, however,  migrant people themselves 
include in their families also other members not recognized by their current states of 
residence. As a consequence, they need to find ways to keep their ‘familyhood’ across state 
borders, in transnational practices. This is an example of the ways in which state policies 
organize family life in a very profound sense and produce ‘transnational families’.  
 
State policies, however, channel importantly the processes of migrants’ emplacement in 
other, less obvious ways as well. The ways in which states work both in the country of 
settlement, and in the country of origin shape the forms of life within transnational fields. 
 
There are many nuanced ways in which state policies enter family life and organize relations 
within families. State policies allocate rights and duties, and in so doing arrange family 
relations. This is, at least partly a class-specific question: some migrants are more exposed 
to state policing than others. E.g. in Finland, both spouses in migrant families needing 
welfare state support are expected to participate in language and ‘societal knowledge’ 
training, and both get their own allowances individually. This may be a deviation from 
previous arrangements within the families, and it may have consequences on familial 
relations. Such changes may be experienced as liberating or as threatening by people 
themselves.  
 
There are also explicit normative discourses on gender relations to which migrants are 
exposed in their new countries of settlement (Yang 2009; Tuori 2009; Huttunen 2009b). For 
migrants themselves, these discourses are in dialectical relationship to gender discourses in 
their countries of origin. Gender, within and outside of families is one of the realms in which 
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processes of emplacement are negotiated. It is also a realm controlled by state policies in 
many nuanced ways. 
 
But the state comes into being through various activities, agencies and policies that may 
have differing consequences for migrants’ lives. Some of the policies may be contradictory 
from migrants’ perspective. For example, one and the same person may be exposed 
simultaneously to state-run integration programmes and to state-sponsored refugee 
repatriation schemes. This happened to Bosnians in Finland in the early years of this 
millennium. There were repatriation programmes aimed as Bosnians willing to return 
permanently to Bosnian, while at the same time state policies promoted migrant integration 
(Huttunen 2010). These policies send contradicting messages: one is encouraging 
integration to the new country of settlement, while the other is encouraging return to the 
country of origin. What is common to both these policies is a sedentary understanding of 
living, and no recognition of transnational practices: migrants should live either here or there, 
but not sharing their time and resources between both. Within families, this means 
sometimes geographical dispersal in order to pool family resources, and in some cases to 
build possibilities for return to the country of origin (cf. Black & Gent 2006; Eastmond 2006a). 
 
The mobility of people is managed by various international agreements and powerful 
institutions. They give us the legal and institutional frameworks for mobility, and channel 
huge amounts of resources. Migrant groups are differently exposed to these policies: some 
are managed within refugee aid schemes, while others are controlled by labour mobility 
regulations.  
 
This global system of management also gives us the language to talk about, and think about 
migration. It gives us the categories that are often critisized (e.g. Malkki 1995; Hayden 2006), 
but which still organize our understanding of migration: refugees, asylum seekers, labour 
migrants and globally mobile professionals are categories with which we organize our 
understanding of mobility. Each category opens up a different space within the international 
mobility management system and vis-à-vis various state policies. People may seek to be 
identified within certain categories in order to facilitate emplacement in certain states/ places. 
 
Families’ and family members’ strategies for emplacement in various localities articulate with 
the machinery of the international migration management. Emplacement through family life 
can never be fully understood without placing the processes within such powerful 
international political frameworks. 
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Conclusions 
 
Emplacement should be understood as a complex process of interlinking everyday life 
activities and mundane practices with various local and global structures and policies. Some 
of the policies are seen as restrictive and others as enabling by migrants themselves.  
 
Families in their different forms are the most immediate institutions structuring processes of 
emplacement. Within transnational fields, relations to various places are often negotiated 
through family and kinship structures. When analyzing families as institutions, there is always 
a tension between families as structuring institutions and families as process-like and 
dynamic configurations unfolding in time and over space.  
Within the unpredictable global economy, family and kinship networks provide both economic 
and emotional safety net for many migratory people with limited access to state provided 
modes of welfare. The key to the resilience of the family institution lies in the way in which 
the emotional and intimate articulate with the social and economic in family and kinship 
practices. Moreover, cultural understandings are embodied in many family relations, and as 
such they provide links between countries of origin and countries of settlement. But, like 
everything cultural, also modes of family life are renegotiated in new circumstances, such as 
settlement in new countries. Paying close attention to the ways in which families as 
institutions both shape processes of emplacement, and are shaped by them, provides keys 
for understanding the nuanced processes of emplacement within transnational fields. 
 
At the heart of current debates on multiculturalism, there is a question of how to understand 
‘culture’. Should (immigrant) cultures be seen as self-perpetuating closed systems, or as 
process-like changing configurations with porous boundaries, enabling various forms of 
cultural hybrity to take place (cf Hannerz 2003; Prato 2009; Wise & Selvaraj 2009). I have 
argued here that families as deeply cultural institutions are flexible and changing, 
incorporating elements from various cultural contexts. Family life in new countries of 
settlement is never simple reproduction of previous patterns, but rather an unfolding process 
of ‘relativizing’, both locally and across national borders.  
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Chapter 12 
Transmission in the Family and Intergenerational Dynamics 
in Relation to Transnational Migration 
Noureddine Harrami 
With the participation of Khalid Mouna 
 
 
This paper deals with the changes that affect the familial institution under the influence of 
transnational migration. The levels of family organization taken into account refer to the 
processes of transmitting symbolic assets within the transnational family unit and the 
intergenerational dynamics. The concept of transmission can be defined as “all the 
processes through which a human group insures its continuity in time through successive 
generations” (Hervieu-Léger, 1997:131). In the context of this chapter, this concept refers to 
a fundamental function of the familial institution: socialization, that is to say, the diffusion of 
values, rules, norms and practices, in a word – a culture, with the aim of insuring continuity. 
Socialization is considered here, according to P.Berger and T.Luckmann’s views, as a 
process of self-construction in relation to the others, involving complex dynamics of selection, 
negotiation, and re-appropriation. 
 
We will use two terms to analyze the dynamics of intergenerational transmission of Moroccan 
migrants in France with two frames of reference: first, the transnational space, second, 
transnational mobility. These two notions are intrinsically linked. Indeed it is through this 
space and migrants mobility between the country of origin and the host country that the 
stakes of family transmission are revealed. 
 
Transnational migration is not analyzed here as a particular case or a synonym of 
international migration. Our process consists in interrogating migrants social practices. We 
question the migrants relations between their country of origin and the country where they 
live and work, possibly in a diaspora context, but we also address the organization and 
creation of new cultural and economic patterns as well as the actors strategies. 
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In the space of transnational migration60, the transmission of familial cultural elements 
appears in a peculiar perspective. Transnational migration does not only mean crossing 
national boundaries. It also implies circulation within historically determined cultural spaces. 
We can approach it as a process of shuttling between two different cultural worlds. Groups 
and individuals involved in such a process happen to face diverse codes, rules, values and 
cultural representations, and so they have to make adjustments and reorganizations as 
regards these different cultural contexts. 
 
In migrant families, such various cultural codes impact on the way parents can manage what 
they consider to be ‘their culture’. It also affects the socialization of children and the way they 
deal with the rules, norms, values and practices of parental culture. This familial transmission 
can prove to be very uncertain when socialization outside the family presents a breach with 
socialization inside the family. But of course, these impacts are more or less important 
according to historical contexts and the concrete living conditions of migrant families. 
 
In what ways can cultural transmission within the family unit be influenced by transnational 
mobility through particular social dynamics (positions and interactions in the different units of 
the transnational space) and contact with various cultural contexts? How does the 
transnational space modify the objects and modalities of transmission? Since transmission 
takes place within the family organization through the interaction of the different actors, how 
do the constraints of transmission in the transnational space impact on the relations of family 
members toward family rules, values and practices? How far do such constraints affect the 
participation in familial cultural objects? 
 
To address these questions which are the framework of this chapter, we mostly refer to what 
is going on in the French-Moroccan transnational space. As different kinds of transnational 
mobility unfold in historically defined places, the transnational perspective must consider the 
concrete framework of its objects. The transnational mobility of a French trader in Dubai or 
an American artist in Marrakech undeniably differ from those of an Algerian construction 
worker in Marseille or a Senegalese street vendor in Rome. It is not only socio-economic 
                                               
60 Trasnational migration presented here is not analyzed as a particular case or a synonym of international 
migration. Our process questions migrants social practices. It questions the relations that migrants establish 
between their country of origin and the country where they live and work, possibly in a diaspora context, but also 
the organization and creation of new cultural and economic patterns as well as their strategies as actors. 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 258 
differences which cause the diversity of that mobility, but also other basic facts: for example, 
if we consider just macro-sociological determinants, the modes of social representation here 
and over there of the migrant and his own group, the ways the governments manage his 
presence (here) or his absence (there), the types of interactions with social groups in his 
transnational space. All that implies the necessity to consider transnational facts in a historic 
perspective. 
 
We argue that the requirements to manage this situation of being in multiple universes of 
rules, values and belongings give rise to a reorganization of parental codes, as well as they 
settle and develop new ways to interact with these codes. Unlike the representations coming 
from integration sociology which dominate research on families and North Africans in France 
(infra), the action of the family does not take place only in regard to the immigration society. 
In fact this action is determined by interactions with all the social units of its transnational 
space located both in the country of origin and the host country. Familial elaborations 
concerning transmission and cultural participation constitute some of the responses to the 
constraints of the transnational space. So, from this point of view, the family is a place where 
the participation of the individual in different social units of the transnational space is 
negotiated and constructed. 
 
To account for this process, we have mobilized ethnographic data about Moroccan families 
in the South-West of France. The cultural elaborations presented here have to be regarded 
as one modality, among others experienced by Maghreb migrants in France, of the 
management of various constraints imposed by the transnational space. We will examine 
cultural reconstructions within the family by starting from two aspects: first, the relation to 
religious issues and second, the relation to gender issues concerning young girls condition. 
But before dealing with the core of our object, we will present a framework treating some 
relevant characteristics of transnational mobility, particularly in the French-Maghreb context, 
from different points of view:  social history, state policy, and their treatment by social 
sciences. 
 
 
Transnational mobility in the French-Maghreb space 
 
The French-Maghreb space presents a special situation to approach our object. As concerns 
North African migration to France, scientific representations often reflect social 
representations (notably media and political ones). Populations coming from the Maghreb 
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come into question, and even are sometimes objects of fears and suspicions about their 
future and the consequences of their presence in France (infra). 
 
It is important to recall the relationship between colonial history and transnational mobility in 
this space (R.Montagne no date, A.Baroudi 1978, Y.Alouane 1979, L.Taha et al.1983). The 
presence in France of several millions of people from the Maghreb is due to a process that 
started during the colonial period (1830 for Algeria and the early twentieth century for 
Morocco and Tunisia). Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and ‘colonial workers’, as they 
were called in that time, coming from North Africa, were introduced into France during the 
two World Wars and the following years of reconstruction. The social representations here 
and over there of the actors mobility in this space attest the weight of colonial memories 
(Nouschi 1984, SAyad 1984, Belbahri 1987, Galissot 1997, Cesari 19984, B.Stora 1999). 
Immigration and colonization allowed a long-lasting asymmetrical interaction between the 
different cultures and societies of this transnational space. 
 
Today these Maghreb migrants maintain strong ties with their societies of origin. The best 
known aspect of these ties consists of remittances sent in the frame of familial solidarity, 
which constitute an important resource for the countries of the Maghreb. Morocco, for 
example, ranks fourth in the world (after India, Mexico and the Philippines) in terms of 
financial transfers, according to a World Bank report  in 2002 (Khachani 2004:181). There, in 
2003 these transfers constituted the main resource in foreign currency, greatly surpassing 
the revenue from the strategic tourism sector (Khachani 2004:180). The contribution of 
Moroccan migrants in France represent 40% of total transfers sent by Moroccans abroad 
(Khachani 2004:192). Maghreb migrants are also responsible for a lot of initiatives for the 
development of the society of origin. So in recent years the French-Moroccan space has 
been the witness of the growth of developmental organizations and associations which, in 
many cases, include the participation of second generation migrants. Developmental 
initiatives taken by migrants and their children mobilize business partners and investors, both 
from the immigrant and emigrant countries (Lacroix 2003, Dumont 2005). Other ties are 
forged with the society of origin, mostly through marriages and periodic visits. The 
geographical proximity of France and the Maghreb has created a transnational space that 
can be easily bridged. The cheaper price of various means of transportation between the two 
shores of the Mediterranean, especially low-cost airfare, facilitates this mobility. Several 
French and Maghreb telephone operators have integrated these intense transnational 
dynamics into their commercial strategy by offering products adapted to the market. Such a 
mobilization indicates that transnationalization in the French-Maghreb space has become a 
major stake both for individuals and institutions. 
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The attitudes of the states involved in the French-Maghreb transnational space towards 
mobility oscillate between identity management at a distance (for the states of origin) and the 
option of assimilation for the receiving country. The emigrating countries develop devices 
aiming to maintain their citizens allegiance. In Morocco, three governmental bodies are 
dedicated to migrants: a ministry, an advisory board, and a foundation. Through a plethora of 
religious, linguistic, socio-cultural and economic actions, the State hopes to maintain and 
reinforce migrants ties to their country of origin. Algeria boasts a ministry in charge of 
Algerians abroad and these Algerians are entitled to vote for presidential elections. The 
codes of nationality in the three Maghreb countries have been changed in order to break 
away from the old tradition of patriarchal alignment that ruled access to citizenship for mixed 
couples children, and also to allow women married to foreigners to transmit their nationality. 
On the other hand, in the countries of immigration the kind of integration proposed to 
migrants is based on a normative conception advocating individual integration. According to 
this conception, integration is the outcome of a process through which the candidate to 
integration renounces his/her ‘traits of origin’, or at least hides them and accepts or adopts 
those of the receiving society (Kilani 1994, Roy 1993, Etienne 1987). “A good immigrant is 
one that disappears either by going back to his homeland or by becoming French, 
Republican and secular”. This is the way B.Etienne (1987:294) described the model of 
integration for foreign people in France. This conception shaped recruitment policies 
regarding foreign workers during the massive waves of migration. These policies followed an 
“ethno-cultural logic” favoring the immigration, then settlement of people of European origin, 
considered to be more easily integrated than African or Asian nationalities, due to their larger 
“cultural proximity” to the French (Weil 1991). Migrants from North Africa have always been 
regarded as non-desirable and temporary because of the “major civil incompatibility” 
between Islam and the French society (Weil 1991). The option labeled “immigration choisie” 
(selective immigration) advocated by the French government instead of “immigration subie” 
(non selective immigration) follows the same selective logic. 
 
Social sciences in France have not remained completely unaware of these representations of 
North African migration and their future evolution. There was a long period of concealment of 
the migratory fact, which can be explained by the fact that the intellectual debate between 
contractualists and supporters of a racial definition of the nation (which gave birth to 
sociology in France) firmly persisted for half a century (Noirel 1988:34). The founding fathers 
of sociology in France developed a view about the nation which avoids any questioning of 
what constitutes the basis of national belonging and stipulates the rupture of the primordial 
identity and dilutes the origins of the individual into an abstract form of belonging (Harrami 
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2001:82). Immigration was not openly constituted as a sociological object until the 1960’s 
after the end of war in Algeria. Since then migration research has known a considerable 
boom.  In spite of diverse ways to construct themes and scientific objects, research is still 
dominated by integration paradigm (Simon 1999), the works about it being the most 
important quantitatively. For political reasons, Maghreb migrants hold an important place in 
integration research. The assessment of their integration in the French society is founded on 
an analytic pattern which places them between two cultures: the culture of origin qualified as 
Maghreb, and the host culture. These two cultures are postulated as antagonistic, the 
contents of either are defined with opposing characteristics: modernity/tradition, women’s 
emancipation/submission, secularism/Islamic primacy, individualism/sense of community, a 
scientific technological cultural model/ a religious cultural model, etc_Integration 
experiences a weakening of the influence of the original culture when it is confronted with the 
host culture. This integration is measured by indicators (behavior, opinions, etc_) which 
reflect either of the two postulated cultures confronting each other. The more the immigrant 
displays features of the host culture and similarities with the native population, the better 
he/she integrates. This way of thinking about migrant integration has been the subject of 
different critical analyses. Such a construction cannot account for the manipulations-
transformations to which the different codes are subjected in actual concrete situations. 
(Mauriel 1979, Oriol 1984, Sayad and Veille 1985). Besides, these studies proceed as if 
society, this permanent creation (Balandier 1986:70), was a finished product and the 
migrants had to get adapted to. On the whole, research on Maghreb integration adheres to 
the same logic that supported the sociological concealment of the migratory object during the 
first half of the last century. If the attitude of the founders of French sociology and 
anthropology towards transnational migration was driven by a concern for preserving a 
certain idea of the French nation while moving away immigration from the field of scientific 
research, today their successors contribution consists in orienting research in a way that 
excludes any reconsideration of the triumphant idea of the nation (Harrami 2001:87)61. 
 
Here, our focus is on the social experience of cross-mobility, and not on static populations. 
So we want to emphasize the difference between the classical approach of immigration in its 
twofold relation to migrant sending and receiving countries, and the themes of the diaspora 
                                               
61 In spite of the emergence of the post-structuralist thought that attempts to decenter the thought and the subject 
and institute a theory of disconstruction, this theory has had no influence on the debate about immigration and 
integration. 
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as a social frame of globalization or contemporary multiculturalism. The specific experience 
of mobility in the transnational space brings about specific social effects, for example on 
gender relations and relations between different social classes. Migration refers to a set of 
problems due to mobility. In a bi-directional movement, migrants go to the receiving country 
and regularly return to their country of origin. As a consequence of this continual mobility, 
they invite relatives and friends for some time. In the frame of these “circulations”, the stakes 
of religious transmission (like values, rules organizing gender issues: infra) are challenged, 
questioned and negotiated. Beyond this actual or/and virtual mobility through letters, parcels, 
audio and video cassettes, photos, e-mails, we also interrogate “the moral economy” 
referring to the background of migrations. 
 
 
Religious Issues 
 
In the French conception of integration, Islam has always been regarded as an obstacle to 
integration. Islam is believed to pose a problem for at least two reasons. The first problem 
concerns a few trends deemed as a danger to the foundation and values of the Republic and 
to social cohesion. In La France de l’intégration. Sociologie de la nation en 1990, 
D.Schnapper mentions these components while  inviting  the Maghreb population of France 
to reconsider them : « It is necessary for the Maghreb population in France to reinterpret two 
dimensions of their traditions : first the private right of Islam and, in particular, the provisions 
about women; second the lack of separation between public and private domains, and 
between religious and political domains, contrary to the secular tradition of French 
politics”(1991:142). What is curious is that this reference does not refer to representations 
and religious practices in individual daily lives, but to some streams of Islamic political and 
juridical thinking. This sociologist’s process consists in projecting categories of Islamic 
thought on his subject, but they are not the same categories of religious thought as for 
migrants, or Islam as it is lived and experienced by the people concerned (Hammès 1989). In 
fact, Islam, just like other religions, only exists in action, that is to say as “thought in use”, and 
not as “a system of thought” (Ferrié 1991:232). It is essential to make a distinction between 
religion as it can be found in religious texts and religion as it is actually lived, and to focus on 
the latter, that is to say the way the actors appropriate and use the religious principles and 
prescriptions. What is really part of religion from migrants point of view is a set of religious 
practices: prayer, fasting during Ramadan, circumcision for male children, ritual slaughter 
and sacrifice for Eid Al Adha (Harrami 1998:99) Of course these practices give rise to some 
organized demands here and there, mostly for worship places. And even on the level of 
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these collective actions, the components mentioned by D.Schnapper are far from constituting 
an object of mobilization, adhesion or even knowledge for migrants. 
 
The second reason that explains the harmful effects of religion on Maghreb migrants 
integration, as well as on the host society, relates to the social structures of origin. The 
migrant sending societies are regarded as “a separate universe” fundamentally based on 
religious sacredness (Ferrié 1991:229, Berque 1988:30-31). These societies have not moved 
towards secularization and modernity. There, religion is expected to settle the least details of 
social life. Individuals socialized in these societies are supposed to give a crucial importance 
to Islamic prescriptions and rules. These dispositions acquired by the migrant in his society 
of origin can be transmitted to the children within the family unit, and   impede their 
integration into a “secular” society where religion should be confined to the private sphere. 
 
However, some indicators seem to show the start of an irreversible cultural process in new 
generations coming from immigrant families: young people do not practice prayer or respect 
religious food restrictions as much as their parents (Tribalat 1995). A researcher made an 
inquiry  into youth of Maghreb immigrant families and wrote that “to enter into Islam seems to 
be a difficult decision to make, even though it implies a choice that is felt as inevitable (_) 
Indeed the new generations of young people (_) do not seem at all to be prepared for such 
a decisive situation that they postpone as long as possible (_) As France comes to be their 
true reference, they are already “lost for Islam” (Gonzales-Quijano 1988). For most young 
girls – says an anthropologist specialist of the Maghreb – religion does not seem to pose any 
particular problem; in fact not a single islamist was interviewed. But it appears that, even 
when religious practices are observed, they are viewed as private, without any political 
repercussions, and consequently they are not considered a hindrance to integration” 
(Lacoste-Dujardin 1992:84). Unless “a re-islamization of ‘les banlieues’ i.e. some Paris 
suburbs”(Gonzales-Quijano 1988)  happens to stop this disaffiliation from “the hard core” of 
the migrant culture(i.e. Islam), the children of migrant families will be on the way to 
“Frenchization”. This propensity for scientific discourse on migration to turn into a reassuring 
discourse gave rise to strange forms of conceptualization of the relationship to Islam for 
those concerned. Such is the case with classifications like “identifying islam” (Lacoste-
Dujardin 1984), that is to say an Islam that does not appear but on the level of the individual 
‘s sense of belonging and does not affect his participation in the French society; or “cultural 
Islam” (Weibel 2000:11) also called “peaceful Islam” (Withol de Wenden 1995:76), meaning 
a moderate Islam in opposition to a “fundamentalist political Islam”; or an “active Islam” that 
would be a “softer variation of Islam” (Weibel 1998:222) or a “positive Islam” (Babes 1997) in 
comparison, no doubt, with a “negative Islam”. 
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So there would be a rift between socialization and transmission within the family and 
socialization in extra-familial environments (at school, in the street, at work, etc_). Actions 
taken by the family are negated by the actions of society, which leads to the loss of several 
key elements of parental culture and, as a consequence, steers the family towards 
integration into French society. Starting from indicators often selected from religious texts or 
by approximation, and not from the social practices of the family, the loss of family cultural 
heritage is pointed out. 
 
What is not taken into account in this reasoning is the importance of dynamics engaged 
within the family in response to the constraints of the transnational space. What seems to be 
missing too in integration research is that the emergence of the rule starts a transaction 
process between the various protagonists. The rule, far from being a steadfast fixed data to 
take or leave, is the basis for complex negotiations and adjustments. The consequence is 
that the forms of its observance and its transgression are constantly being defined and 
redefined. G.Balandier rightly notes that “the universe of rules” leaves room for cheating” 
(_). Structural systems where all the modalities of social action would be set and 
institutionalized would turn into impossible systems; to remain viable, they must include a 
domain of choice, and so of freedom, in such a way that the individual might find the 
possibility to intervene according to his calculations and strategies” (Balandier 1971; 62 and 
63). So the rules and values exhibited by actors reveal information only on obvious official 
levels, on the prescribed order and not on the actual order. They are definitely relevant clues 
to the characteristic modalities of self-presentation and self-representation of a group, but 
they cannot inform us about the real social practices of this group. 
 
Religious transmission, as all the relations to religion, does not depend only on family/society 
interaction. In fact, groups of religious socialization are continually on the increase and 
include original immigrant communities, as well as other transnational organizations using 
new communication technologies (Internet and satellite stations) and associative networks. 
The action of these groups can mitigate the failings of the familial transmission system due to 
the lack of joint efforts of socialization from the family and the social environment, while 
conveying new religious islamic products different from the familial culture. As there are no 
systematic inquiries, it is difficult to assess the impact of these transnational groups of 
religious socialization on the people concerned. Nevertheless, certain practices and rigorous 
attitudes, possibly coming from these groups, such as wearing the burqa (which is currently 
arousing an intense debate in some European countries), or even the representation of 
Islamism as an ultimate identity (infra), remain confined to a very small minority. 
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The data collected in Moroccan families in France indicate that, even though canonical rules 
stipulate to start respecting religious obligations at the age of puberty, it is up to social 
conventions to define which obligations a child must observe. Such is the case of prayer, for 
example, as this practice is linked to social maturity, and not to physiological puberty as 
prescribed by the canonical law. Social maturity for families means access to a stage of life 
when the individual is regarded as an adult (rajl) opposed to adolescent (or rather teenager, 
‘darri’). In theory, a person is no longer considered adolescent when he/she founds a family 
and has children. As long as he/she has not reached this stage, he/she is still  young unless 
his/her age is revealed. Thus, the observance of prayer by a young person informs about 
his/her relation to religion that must be brought to light by the analyst. And if the linear 
integration pattern is applied, the non-observance of prayer does not mean a loss of parental 
religion and assimilation to the host culture. In fact, it might simply express an adhesion to 
the parental representation, considering that the practice of prayer concerns those who are 
socially mature. However R.Linton – one of the great representatives of so-called culturalist 
anthropology – specifies that each culture defines modalities and forms of its members 
participation in the elements proposed. The anthropologist thinks it is very important to study 
individual behavior “according to the particular cultural requirements imposed by his/her 
society in regard to his social position” (Linton 1967: 53). 
 
The necessary accommodations to the host society and to all the social units of their 
transnational space lead families to continually review the conditions and forms of children’s 
participation in the religious elements of their culture. Families manage the expectations of all 
these units. Children must be able to appear as Muslims and claim to be Muslims anywhere 
in the transnational migratory space. The management of different social units constraints 
and expectations leads to the reorganization of the religious sector of parental culture on two 
levels: the notion of religious belonging and basic practices of worship. 
 
First, primo-migrant parents promote a very flexible concept of affiliation to Islam. This sense 
of belonging is based on family genealogical history, and not on religious knowledge or 
practices (Harrami 2003). Non conformity to religious rules does not affect his/her individual 
status as a Muslim. (talfu)”That is why migrant children are always viewed by primo-migrants 
as Muslims, despite the reprobation they may provoke in the parental group. “The Islamic law 
does not apply to them, but they are Muslims. They have just forgotten. They are lost” as a 
migrant said. (Harrami1998:247). This representation of the Muslim is dominant among 
migrant children who distinguish between religious practice and religious affiliation. 
Consequently the Muslim identity is either easily claimed and seen as a supreme identity 
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capable of replacing and containing the other types of adhesion (affiliation to Moroccan 
national territory, affiliation to French national territory, etc_) or this identity is subject to 
reservations and a weaker form of adhesion (Harrami 1998:249). 
 
Second, the reorganization of the religious sector of parental culture concerns worship 
observances. In the transmission process, all religious practices are not given the same 
importance. Family control on these practices follows a system of classification placing at the 
top of the scale: fasting during Ramadan, circumcision, the prohibition of pork (and alcohol 
for non-religious reasons in the case of girls: infra), while pushing the following ones down to 
a lower level: prohibition of alcoholic consumption (for male children), religious celebrations, 
charity, prayer, and the prohibition of carrion meat. Only fasting and abstinence from pork 
require children’s effective participation from an early age. The other religious practices are 
essentially governed by the laws of  hachma (modesty, social decency) like the prohibition of 
alcohol, some are not even subject to any significant social control (like breaking the rule 
prohibiting carrion meat consumption), others have to be observed when the child reaches 
the stage of social maturity (all the other practices mentioned). This hierarchical organization 
of religious practices also takes account of the constraints of the transnational migratory 
space. The observance of some practices that might prove to be restrictive for a young 
person or inconsistent with “youth culture” of the whole society, or difficult to respect outside 
the family, is regarded as corollary to the person’s social maturity, and consequently do not 
concern a young person (like the five daily prayers). On the other hand, the practices that 
provoke a strict control within the cultural community in France as well as in the Maghreb are 
given extreme importance (like fasting during Ramadan, circumcision, and pork prohibition). 
This social control is all the more effective when grandparents come to France and stay for 
some time; they insure the continuation of traditions of the original country. The transnational 
social control of the community needs to be taken into account as it is proved in the different 
treatments of children’s relation to the religious rule prohibiting alcohol. Generally a 
“moderate” transgression of the rule by boys is not considered to be a worry. In the case of 
girls, it is a sign of grave moral depravity (not a transgression of a religious rule) that can 
seriously affect the family’s honor (infra). 
 
 
The Young Girl’s Condition 
 
Women’s status in the migrant culture seems to pose a serious problem for the host society 
as for integration (Lacoste-Dujardin 1992:6 and following). From the point of view expressed 
in the dominant discourse (in the media, in thescientific and political discourse), this aspect, 
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as well as Islam, represents the expressions of an ethnic feature of the Maghreb in France. 
Maghreb families, like their societies of origin, are seen as a hell for women. “Most of the 
discriminations against migrant women come from the tradition, which is often on the same 
line as religious texts, rather than from the host society” (Minces 2004:17). Women’s 
condition is due to a Maghreb patriarchal tradition, ideologically and legally supported by 
Islam. The scientific assessment of women’s condition in the countries of origin often 
proceeds by mingling different levels of legal, social, political realities under consideration, 
systems of representation and social practices,  official order and actual order, and finally 
leads to a stereotyped image of the Maghreb woman “submissive”, minor”, “passive”, 
”dispossessed of her body” (Harrami 2006:89). 
 
 On this point too, the scientific discourse about the evolution of Maghreb migrants in France 
tends to be reassuring. Time can but favor a process of convergence with the French society 
(Todd 1994). If families try to transmit their cultural inheritance, the children already keep at a 
distance from this inheritance (Tribalat 1995). For young generations, “socio-cultural 
integration is progressing, in contrast with economic integration” (Withol de Wenden 
1999:236).  Girls can but refuse patriarchal despotism and adopt the open options offered by 
the French society. Their only possible choice is “modernity”, given the underprivileged 
status they are likely to have in their family culture (Minces 2006, 1986, Taboada-Leonetti 
1982). The traditional familial model persistent in newcomers will erode in young generations 
(Zaleska 1982 :177). Some other researchers  combine the effects of children’s socialization 
in the French society and some changes affecting the family organization (nuclear family, 
men’s social discredit  due to unskilled jobs and unemployment) and they anticipate an 
unavoidable degradation of men’s traditional role and women’s condition improvement 
(Bouamana,S  et Saad Saoud, H.1996). 
 
Reorganizations in the religious domain are also perceptible in the field of gender social 
relations. We need only compare two levels of these relations: on the one hand, the values 
flaunted by parents, and on the other hand, their own actual behavior and their children’s 
conduct in relation to these values. 
 
So from the common point of view in Maghreb families representations, women’s behavior 
reveals the values and status of their group. That is why the common opinion is that girls in 
migrant families must be supervised. They must conform to specific behavioral norms typical 
of bnat-s annas (“girls from good families”). In addition to the absolute prohibition of sex out 
of marriage, they must avoid any behavior that might possibly lead to a violation of this rule – 
or simply be interpreted as such by people around them – such as smoking, drinking, going 
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to nightclubs, hanging out with boys, etc_Any occurrence of behaviors considered to be  
symptoms of moral depravity tarnishes the girl and her family ‘s social image. Migrants 
express this prejudice with words like tusikh lujah (a stain on the face), hachma (shame), and 
ar (dishonor). All the terms used in such cases refer to the idea of dishonor. It follows that the 
principles ruling women’s sexuality and social status are intrinsically tied to the honor of the 
familial group. A woman’s dishonorable act carries with it dishonor for the whole family. Men 
are considered in charge of this honor while women are regarded as the “syndrome” of honor 
and shame. Honor represents a group or an individual’s virtue, force and values. So honor is 
not only a guide for actions, it is also a social expression of the actor’s value (groups or 
individuals): “A woman’s status determines the status of all the men that are linked to her in 
any way. These men share the burden of the consequences of what happens to her, and 
therefore they also share the responsibility for the protection of her virtue” (Schneider 
1986:217) . Young males behavior in matters of sex and marriage is not subject to any real 
control or supervision and has no effect whatsoever on the social image of the family. If the 
son is involved in marital practices that do not conform to the rules of honor (marrying a bant 
azzanqa “street girl”, or in some cases marrying a non-Muslim or non-‘Arab’), it may provoke 
some sort of reprimand, but it is not likely to endanger the family’s reputation. The common 
opinion is, as a father says, that after all, “a man is a man (arrajl ‘arajl). The offspring always 
follow the father (J). A man always comes back (when he gets married out of his ethno-
cultural group) while a woman, if she leaves, she never comes back. She belongs to her 
husband’social group” (Harrami 1998:395). It is of paramount importance that a young girl 
remains within the limits prescribed by the group in matters of marriage. 
 
The fate of the offspring is, for all their community in the host society where they live as well 
as in the original society, a criterion to assess the success of migrants plans and the degree 
of parents respectability. The close watch of different groups of allegiance located here and 
over there is an essential data in family life. This watch, which in fact is a transnational social 
supervision by the community, has been made possible by the housing policies for migrant 
populations which concentrate people from the same geographic origins (the Maghreb) in 
confined spaces (‘H.L.M’ or council flats, for example), so that it created a community based 
on common linguistic religious elements, gathering the three nationalities of the Maghreb 
(Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) (Harrami 1998:67). The very rapid development of new 
communication technologies, by reducing distance and providing means of contact, has 
greatly increased the implication of groups living in the society of origin on migrant families in 
France. Transnational family ties remain very important. In addition to sending remittances 
as a display of solidarity, migrant families often play the role of intermediary and mediator 
when conflicts arise between members of the large family in the native country. The family 
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network settled over there is still a major reference. Social recognition is mostly expected 
from this group. In this context of transnational social supervision, families must take into 
account various groups of relatives located in both societies, emigration and immigration 
societies. All that shows that the success of migrants projects does not depend only on 
criteria of economic success, but also on the preservation of the moral capital. The family’s 
ability to maintain its cohesion and safeguard its children against “negative influences” 
(delinquency for boys, disregard for sexual modesty and honor for girls) is a vital reference 
for the protection of the economic and moral capital. So the family space is “the object of a 
very powerful dual relation between ‘here’ and ‘over there’, and the flow of goods, people and 
information from one side of the Mediterranean sea to the other is an essential data in family 
life” (Streiff-Fenart, 1999:55). 
 
As concerns the rules and values governing the girls’ status, the parents have to face a triple 
challenge. First, there are the groups of primordial loyalty (community networks of neighbors, 
familial networks in the society of origin, etc_) who consider young girls chastity important. 
Second there is the host society that does not share the same representations about chastity 
and grant girls an institutional right to escape from family control (appealing for justice, 
placement in foster homes, etc_). Third, young girls pressing demands for spaces of 
freedom to realize their aspirations officially prohibited in the family value system. How can 
parents cope with these three types of contradictory social pressures? 
 
According to our ethnographic data, the management of these pressures is achieved, first by 
revising the rules about honor and setting up new rules likely to temper the climate of 
suspicion and supervision which implies the fear of ‘ar (shame). Then a new value with moral 
connotation is brought forward, involving the young girl’s personal responsibility. So she is 
her own guardian, and no longer watched over by the family. Mothers repeat to their 
daughters again and again: “Your father trusts you, do not bring him dishonor!” In other 
words “You are privileged compared to other girls, your father trusts you, you must not 
disappoint us, you must prove that we were right to trust you and this confidence is well 
deserved”. Later when the young girl is to get married, she must do her best to avoid scandal 
for her family, whether by proving she is still a virgin (if not, she must marry the man who had 
sex with her or find a man willing to marry a non-virgin) or by avoiding marriage to a man 
from a group prohibited for social or religious reasons (non-Muslims, and according to her 
family, non-Arabs, non-Moroccans, etc_). But to trust a girl also means that the family has to 
be clever in the girl’s supervision. Migrants think a good father is the one who knows how to 
use his authority (as a man, a husband and a father)and is clever enough to make his family 
accept his rules without endangering the cohesion of his household. Parents realize that a 
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blind excessive authority, as well as laxness, may be dangerous. So in order to maintain the 
girl’s loyalty to parental order, the father keeps off any confrontation with his daughters and 
lets the mother manage day-to-day problems, preserving his efficacy in case of more serious 
problems. Parental control can turn out to be not so strict as soon as the young woman 
leaves home for legitimate social reasons (work, studies). If she is autonomous and lives 
apart, parents carefully avoid visiting her, or give advance notice before going so as to give 
her time enough to hide all that is socially considered to be a sign of “moral depravation”. 
The principle adopted by fathers to maintain their authority is to avoid any situation that might 
affect the respectful father-daughter relationship, for example, in case he should find a 
boyfriend in her home, catch her smoking, find alcoholic drinks, etc_Provided the girl is 
protected from gossips of her ethno-cultural group in France, and consequently of her group 
over there as the news flow rapidly between the two sides of the Mediterranean, she is left in 
peace. What matters is that she does not create any scandal in the family (getting pregnant 
before marriage and wanting to keep the baby, marrying a man outside the family code, not 
being virgin, which might lead to a crisis on the wedding night). For the rest (any minor 
deviance), the best is to remain unaware. In this way, the parents prevent major clashes by 
turning a blind eye on minor transgressions (Oriol 1986:46). In short the negotiations 
opposing daughters and parents , the regulating pressure of the dominant society and the 
ethno-cultural network lead to the consequence that the respect of the rules about chastity 
are governed by a logic of undeclared cooperation between daughters and parents. The girl 
is “allowed” to discreetly contravene some behavior rules. In return, the parents avoid 
situations that might cause a serious rift and ensure their daughter’s loyalty in situations 
where their authority is publicly tested (marriage, for example). The limits to know how far 
rules can be infringed vary according to the individuals who decide for themselves. Young 
girls behave not only in relation to the limits set by the parents (i.e. spare the family a 
scandal), but also to their own capacity of handling the situation of infringement they happen 
to experience (Harrami 2008:242-243). So they just have to“ do what is prohibited and hide it 
(_) to act in such a way that the persons they are the most grateful to are those who are the 
least aware of their actual behavior” (Ferrié and Radi 1990:233). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The different parts of this article point out the central role of the transnational space in the 
reorganization of the family institution. We have attempted to show how interactions of the 
families with various social units of their transnational space lead them to continually review 
the objects of transmission and the conditions of children participation in these objects. As 
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concerns the families presented here, intergenerational dynamics about these objects lead to 
a clever management of cultural transmission and children participation in the rules and 
values considered by parents as expressions of their collective identity. Besides we have 
centered our analysis on the aspects which require most regulations and interventions from 
different groups and units of this space: the Maghreb group in France, the majority group, 
groups and communities located in the emigrating society, etc.., that is to say Islam and 
woman’s condition.  
For parents, religious values and rules are indicators of identity, signs of differentiation from 
the majority group. For the migrant receiving society, these values and rules express the 
strangeness of Maghreb populations and are the indicators of Maghreb ethnic features in 
France. For the communities located in the society of origin, these values are fundamental. 
Transnational social control concerning these rules is more and more efficient due to 
increasing possibilities of real and/or virtual circulation between here and over there. The 
responses emerging from an interaction of parents and children actions result in forms of soft 
adhesion to the original tradition. So in the religious domain we can see a separation 
between knowledge and practice on the one hand, and belonging on the other hand. It is the 
principle of genealogical filiation that determines belonging to the religion of parents, and not 
the child situation as concerns religious knowledge and practice. Such a readjustment 
accompanies the stratification of religious elements into more or less important elements. 
The part of this paper about the young girl’s condition is a second example of adjustments to 
the social units of the transnational space. For the Maghreb group in France as well as for 
affiliated groups in the society of origin, the values instituting the young girl’s chastity are 
absolutely essential. But from the point of view of the girls concerned and that of the majority 
society, these values are restricting and make a break with the trends of French society. The 
answer to the various social receptions of these values is that young girls can stealthily 
transgress the rules concerning their relation to the extra-family space. They must only 
participate in the control of shame, and consequently be able to manage any infringement 
situation in which they might happen to be involved. 
To conclude, what poses a problem in French society today is not the integration of Maghreb 
migrants in French society, but the solutions given to this problem. Between universalism 
and imperialism, French society has always chosen the solution of complete assimilation. 
Now, in the contemporary world where distance is no longer important, the assimilation 
pattern cannot still remain the reference for integration. 
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